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ABSTRACT
This study presents an analysis of the determinants of 
social expenditure in Australia and Canada within a 
comparative perspective. Its objectives are two-fold: first, 
to review and examine the key economic, social and 
political factors influencing outlays of public expenditure; 
second, to carry out an empirical evaluation of competing 
explanations of the link between party and policy.
The core research problem of the study is a test of two 
models portraying the role and function of political parties 
and policy. One model termed the ’structural’, highlights 
the importance of socio-economic constituencies of parties in 
moulding party objectives; and the other, the ’strategic 
actor' model stresses the importance of strategic 
incentives in shaping policy objectives. The analysis of the 
association between political party structures and policy 
outputs is undertaken with reference to social expenditure, 
and permits an evaluation of these competing models in 
accounting for policy outcomes. Differences in party 
structure and organisation in Australia and Canada provide 
the basis for an empirical test of these two models within a 
’similar systems' design.
Methodologically a distinctive feature of the study is 
the use of a subset of quasi-experimental designs, the 
multiple-interrupted time-series design, to examine the 
differential impact of key political variables such as type 
of ’administration’ on policy outcomes.
Initially, the economic determinants of expenditure are 
identified, paying heed to the effects of the international 
economic environment on policy. The latter are especially 
relevant in the economies of both countries as they are 
heavily dependent on the export of primary commodities. The 
political influences on expenditure outlays studied pertain 
to political administration and political competition. Both 
sets of influences are also subject to empirical examination.
The major empirical findings of the study are three­
fold. First, it shows that international economic movements 
as reflected in expenditure changes are more apparent for 
Canada than Australia. This is largely because of key 
economic institutions such as the Arbitration system in 
Australia which served to insulate domestic income from the 
adverse effects of external forces. Expenditure was not 
needed to the same degree as in Canada to stabilise 
fluctuations in income. Secondly, the influence of 
’administration’ on policy outcomes is evident in both 
countries. An explanation of this is offered in terms of a 
’turnover model' of party functioning where the strategic 
incentives for parties in government are seen as the
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principal determinants of policy priorities. Finally, there 
is strong evidence that the factor of political competition, 
or more specifically inter-party competition, present in both 
countries is a significant factor in explaining expenditure 
and policy outcomes.
In terms of the core research problem identified 
earlier, the findings lend strong support for the strategic 
actor conception of party rather than the structural 
perspective. This finding has important implications for the 
study of party and policy-making. It suggests that 
consideration of party strategies should be of crucial 
analytical interest. From a broader systematic perspective, 
the issues examined in this study, shows that despite obvious 
differences in political systems of Canada and Australia, 
there are marked similarities especially in the way political 
factors such as political competition and government 
administrations influence policy.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: ITS BACKGROUND 
AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The single most important feature of social and 
political development in the advanced industrialised 
societies of the West in the second half of the 20th century 
has been the rapid expansion of the budgetary allocations for 
social expenditure such as income-maintenance payment, health 
and education expenditure.1 This expenditure which forms the 
basic infrastructure of the welfare state, has been 
accompanied by extensive changes in the social and political 
structures of modern societies. It has, for example, led to 
the growth of the administrative and fiscal competence of the 
state and the development of a set of 'welfare rights’ to 
complement the existing political and civil rights developed 
over the last one hundred and fifty years.
In addition to an increase in the range of 'rights’
accessible to individuals in the political arena, a
corresponding shift in social structures has also been
apparent. As theorists such as Offe (1972) have perceptively
noted, traditional cleavages based on economic class have
been supplemented by those are based on the consumption of
2public goods and services. This new structuration of social 
forces is as important to understanding contemporary social 
and political developments in advanced societies as was the 
process of industrialisation in grasping the nature of
capitalist social order. It would therefore not be an 
understatement to say that a major consequence of increased 
welfare expenditure has been the occurrence of substantive 
changes in social attitudes as well as in the structures and 
functioning of civil society. More recently, in what has 
been termed the 'crisis of the welfare state' debate, 
commentators have pointed out that traditional welfare states 
have been riven by a profound tension (Mishra 1981; Heclo 
1981). This crisis, they argue, is due to the imbalance or 
rather the tension between expectations of increased welfare 
and methods of financing it (Schmidt 1983). Although this 
debate lies outside the frame of reference of the present 
study, it underlies the practical importance of a study of 
this sort in exploring the wider ramifications of changes in 
the patterns of public expenditure. The examination of the 
nature, extent and causes of this increase in social 
expenditure is not only a matter of practical value, but is 
also of great scholarly interest as well.
The present research endeavour is located within this 
broad-ranging area of study, and aims to make a contribution 
to it through a comparative study of welfare expenditure. 
More specifically, one of its main objectives is to analyse, 
in the light of prevailing theoretical explanations, the 
growth of public and social expenditure in Australia and 
Canada during the post-war period.
The period covered in each country, 1950 to 1980 for 
Australia and 1945 to 1975 for Canada, represents one in 
which there was a marked growth in real welfare expenditure,
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which grew annually by an average of 8.6% in Australia and
39.5% in Canada. The justification of the use of these 
particular periods is discussed more fully in section 3.3.2.
Indeed, as the data presented in Appendix 2 indicate, 
the post-war period under review remains a watershed in terms 
of the development of the welfare state. The OECD average of 
welfare as a proportion of GDP grew from 13.3% in the early 
1960s to 18.8% in the mid 1970s (OECD 1978). In fact, the 
Australian performance of 12.8% in the mid 1970s was well 
below this OECD average, and illustrates an interesting 
paradox of welfare state development in Australia. This is a 
theme developed in Chapter 2, where it is argued that an 
early expansion of public expenditure was followed by a 
period of muted decline in the growth of social programmes, 
though not of expenditure, in the post-war period. The 
contradiction between the Australian and Canadian patterns of 
development, it is argued, is explained by the nature of the
historical developments in the two countries.
In Canada, the country being compared with Australia in
this study, the performance in the ’welfare stakes’ 
approximated the OECD average. In terms of expenditure 
Canada was in the middle of the field, below the North 
European states, but ahead of countries like Australia, New 
Zealand and the USA. Nevertheless, despite the variability in 
the nature of the expenditure performances, the important 
point to be drawn from these figures is the underlying growth 
of expenditure in welfare programmes in both countries, and
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the attitudinal and structural changes that flow from them.
The study of the growth as well as the determinants of 
public expenditure is not a well-established tradition in the 
discipline of political science. Within the study of 
economics, the analytical and quantitative study of public 
expenditure has a long tradition dating back to public 
finance economists such as Wagner (1890). Broadly, this 
economic tradition has been concerned with delineating the 
nature and process of the economic determinants of 
expenditure. In contrast, the small but growing political 
science literature has been concerned with bringing the role 
of political factors to the centre stage of policy analysis. 
In so doing it reminds us that the allocation of public 
expenditure is intimately linked to the process of democratic 
decision-making. To uncouple this process of democratic 
politics from the allocation of public expenditure, as is 
common in the economic literature, is to lose sight of an 
important feature of ’fiscal life' - the role of democratic 
participation in shaping policy outcomes.
This thesis has as its main objective a comparative 
analytical study of public, and particularly social, 
expenditure in Australia and Canada. A principal contention 
is that Australia and Canada are well placed for comparative 
analysis because they exhibit a range of similarities and so 
allow the analyst to evaluate the influence of variables that 
can be treated differently between the two nations. In the 
methodology of social research this comparative approach is 
identified as a ’similar systems design', whose
4
characteristic
is that, where the problem is one of identifying and 
accounting for specific differences, selection of 
units for analysis which possess many similarities 
in terms of relevant variables makes easier the 
identification of variables which do differ, and 
which may thus be considered as the first candidates 
for investigation as causal or explanatory variables 
(Roberts 1978: 293).
The explanatory variable which is the subject of 
scrutiny of this thesis is the nature of political 
party structure and organisation. The different party 
structures and organisations in Canada and Australia permit 
the researcher to make inferences about the nature of the 
forces shaping the link between party and policy by 
evaluating the influence of socio-economic as against 
strategic incentives operating in the political system in 
shaping party policy. As outlined in section 1.2, this is the 
'core' research problem of the study. The rationale and 
approach of the strategy used to illuminate this problem will 
be discussed in Chapter 3.
A vital methodological feature of the present study, 
apart from its ’similar systems’ strategy, is its use of a 
time-series design to examine the patterns of expenditure in 
Canada and Australia. The importance of this time-series 
analysis is two-fold. Firstly, time-series designs are 
infrequently used in the social sciences in this broad area 
of comparative policy studies, the dominant strategy being 
cross-sectional analysis. Yet,clearly, development of policy 
over time is of great importance. The ’economic' or Wagnerian 
literature makes extensive use of time-series analysis, the
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best example being Fabricant (1952), while more recent 
studies include the path breaking work of Peacock and 
Wiseman (1967). The political science literature, however, 
lacks a sense of the importance of time in shaping policy. 
It is therefore instructive to evaluate comparative 
propositions about the nature of public expenditure not only 
across different political systems but also over a given 
period of time. Secondly, the introduction of 'time' into the 
analysis allows us to capture important elements of the 
process of bureaucratic influence on policy. The use of a 
time-series mode of analysis therefore has both a 
methodological and a conceptual dimension in this analysis, 
and is central to understanding the logic of the research 
design. These issues are discussed in section 1.2.3.
From a cross-national point of view, economic and policy 
developments in Australia and Canada have been at variance 
with the typical Western European pattern, perhaps because 
both countries share an economic structure shaped by the 
export of agricultural staples (Goodman 1964).5 For this 
reason alone it is necessary to consider to what extent 
cross-national studies of welfare state development can be 
generalised to include Australia and Canada. Guided by this 
fact, the analysis undertaken in this study revolves around 
an examination of the relationship between welfare 
expenditure and certain common social and economic features 
of the two countries. In this regard, it is particularly 
important to consider the role of the openness of the economy
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and its influence on welfare expenditure. This issue is 
important because it emphasises the vulnerability of the two 
economies to movements of international economic forces. 
’Vulnerability', in this study refers to the dependence of 
the domestic economy on the sale of goods, particularly 
staples, overseas. At a more practical level, recent years 
have seen both nations trying to grapple with the effects of 
restrictions on their economies caused by international 
changes. It is pertinent, then, to inquire into the manner in
which domestic social policy has been influenced by 
international economic forces.
1.1.1 Approaches to Comparative Policy
Before embarking on this comparative study it is first
useful to examine the rationale and justification of
comparison. The most important justification for undertaking
comparative studies of these developments is that they
provide a means for generalising about the nature of policy
development across all nations. Comparative studies therefore
enable the formulation of a series of propositions and
generalisations about the structure, nature, form and
development of public expenditure; such propositions aim to
be valid and applicable across different time periods and
nations. Comparison is thus central to the social scientific
endeavour. As Heclo, a leading exponent of comparative social
policy studies, admirably sums up:
To speak of comparative analysis suggests not only 
that one will be looking at variables which actually 
vary, but also that one will be so doing in contexts 
which themselves vary. Even for the contemporary
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Nominalist, it is only through such comparative 
analysis that one can appreciate what are the truly 
unique and what are the more generic phenomena. 
Particular merit resides in any mode of analysis, 
such as case studies, with the 'requisite variety' 
to specify realistically these likenesses and 
differences (1972: 95).
Radcliffe-Brown, an early eminent proponent of the
comparative method in social science research, has also
argued that
It is only by the use of the comparative method that 
we can arrive at general explanations. The 
alternative is to confine ourselves to 
particularistic explanations, similar to those of 
the historian. The two kinds of explanation are 
both legitimate and do not conflict, but both are 
needed for the understanding of societies and their 
institutions (1952: 113-14).
In this context it should be noted that not only does 
comparison provide a means of developing 'general'
explanations about the structure of policy; it also enables
distinctions to be drawn between 'general' and 'particular'
effects on policy. In other words, it enables the analyst to
recognise the general aspects of policy development from
among the more particular cultural and institutional
determinants of policy development. This is well expressed by
Higgins, who points out that
without some degree of comparison we are unable to 
say whether problems of policy are peculiar to 
certain types of political and economic system or 
whether the problems are inherent in the policies 
themselves (1981: 12).
Within the political science literature there are three 
distinct approaches to comparative social policy. These may 
be identified as the case-study, historical and expenditure 
perspectives. While all are comparative in focus, they differ
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in terms not only of the final objectives of comparison, but 
also in the manner in which they identify research problems.
The first, or case-study perspective, is premised on the 
comparison of policy areas between countries. A notable 
example of this approach is Heidenheimer's (1973) study of 
the differences in educational policy in Europe and America. 
The collections of case studies in Heidenheimer et al.(1975) 
contain valuable examples of the comparative case-study 
approach to public policy. The social policy literature in 
Australia and Canada abounds with examples of the 
comparative case-study approach (see Graycar 1979: Banting 
1974). A distinctive feature of the case-study approach is 
that its main research problem is always a specific policy or 
problem area. As a result, the conclusions generated by this 
type of comparative approach are limited in their generality 
and scope. Indeed despite the early expectations of case-
study theorists, 'theory still shows little sign of breaking 
through. At the most, these studies have generally been able
to conclude with certain moralising themes' (Heclo 1972: 89). 
In other words, rather than assisting in the development of 
explanatory propositions, case studies have become little 
more than a catalogue of policy episodes in the library of 
comparative studies.
On the other hand, the historical approach is potentially 
richer in its ability to generate more encompassing 
propositions. The work of Rimlinger (1971) on the history of 
the welfare state in Europe is a classic example of this 
approach. But, regrettably, the historical perspective is
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hampered by its own tradition, in that its emphasis on the 
formulation of a research problem in guiding comparative 
research is limited. Essentially, this tradition provides a 
descriptive account of phenomena rather than an analytical 
account or explanation of events. An exception is Flora and 
Alber (1981), whose historical studies display a high level 
of both descriptive and analytical modes of explanation. In 
general however, historical studies of welfare, although 
useful in an overall delineation of the growth of social 
policy, are constrained to the extent that they do not have a 
clear interpretive or analytical focus.
The third approach to comparative social policy, and 
that adopted in this study, is the analysis represented by 
the expenditure approach. The feature of these studies is the 
use of quantitative methods in cross-sectional research 
design to isolate differences and similarities in the 
determinants of expenditure between countries. In the 
expenditure approach, as the very name implies, the central 
focus of these studies is expenditure. A notable exponent of 
this type of approach is Wilensky (1975), whose work has been 
the impetus for a large number of other studies reported in 
the literature (see Shalev 1983 and Castles 1982b for a 
review). This thesis, situated in the broad context of public 
expenditure studies, is underpinned by the use of expenditure 
as a key dependent variable. More importantly, it is 
analytical rather than descriptive in the sense that a 
primary concern is to decipher and examine the underlying
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structure of expenditure in Canada and Australia in the post­
war period. It is a task guided by the nature of the research 
problem, namely, the relationship between party and policy 
as identified and described later in this chapter.
Assumptions of Expenditure Studies
Prior to discussing aspects of the research problem of 
this thesis, some preliminary background comment on the main 
assumptions of public expenditure studies is necessary in 
order to situate this study in relation to previous work in 
this general area. A careful distinction should be made 
between those studies that examine outputs and those that 
deal with outcomes. Outcome studies deal with the 
distribution rather than the determinants of expenditure. An 
example of such a study is the work by Goodin and Le Grand, 
(1987) on the middle class capture of the welfare state.
Research with a central focus on public expenditure 
analysis is often described as ’output studies' (Dye 1978), 
because the focus of attention is primarily on examination 
and analysis of the ’output’ of policies. A main objective of 
’outcome' studies is to identify and elucidate the social and 
economic impact of policies. Thus, in relation to social 
welfare, an output study would focus on the nature and extent 
of the distribution of welfare benefits amongst the 
population, using impact indicators such as income inequality 
or rates of participation in social security programmes. In 
this type of ’output' research, a prime consideration is to 
examine and analyse the economic and political determinants
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of policy output; the unit of analysis is not so much the 
impact of the distribution of power (as in studies of policy 
formulation) or the impact of institutions, but the end 
product of policies.'7 Consequently, output studies do not 
deal with policies per se but with the often quantifiable 
goods which these produce. These goods are invariably 
expressed in terms of expenditure. However, the examination 
of the determinants of these 'goods’ often forms the basis 
for drawing inferences about policy. For example, the 
analysis of social expenditure allows us to draw inferences 
about social policy. As with the previous approaches, the 
dominant concern still lies with understanding the nature of 
the development and process of policy.
In output studies, the chief point of interest is public
expenditure, the principal end-product of most policies.
Likewise, in the present study, social welfare expenditure is
taken as the end-product of social policy. This is not to
deny that social policy has other non-tangible products such
0as the development of a sense of social solidarity. But 
what it does recognise is that one of the main quantifiable 
products of social policies is outlays expressed in terms of 
expenditures. It is assumed that, from an analysis of these 
outlays, a clearer perspective, even if a limited one, can be 
developed on the dynamics of policy.
While the output of policies can be both tangible and 
intangible, most empirical studies in the policy output field 
utilise expenditure as the main measure of the output of 
policies. Expenditure as a dependent variable is widely used,
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not only because policy is often delivered in terras of 
expenditure, but also because of its utility as a means of 
comparison across different countries. Furthermore, since it 
is a measurable variable, it is also attractive because 
relevant research data are amenable to quantitative analysis. 
As Dye, a scholar who pioneered the advance of policy output 
studies into the sometimes hostile territory of public 
policy, has observed:
government expenditures are the best available 
measure of the overall dimensions of government 
activity. There are few public policies that do 
not require an expenditure of funds. Budgets 
represent government policies with price tags 
attached (1978: 197).
Another feature of output studies is that they portray
policy decisions as the product of demands generated outside
the political system, which can be processed through it.
Echoing David Easton, Dye explains that
The environment is any condition or circumstance 
defined as external to the boundaries of the 
political system. The political system is that group 
of interrelated structures and processes which
functions authoritatively to allocate values for a 
society. Outputs of the political system are 
authoritative value allocations of the system, and 
these allocations constitute public policy 
(1978: 37).
In recent years this feature has been disputed by the 
’politics matter school’ (see Shalev 1983; Chapter 5).
Hence the distinctive feature of output studies is the
attention paid to the determinants of public expenditure,
and it is this feature that distinguishes it from other
9approaches to comparative policy analysis.
This brief introduction is meant to situate this study
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in both a conceptual and a methodologcial context. Having 
filled in the frame of the conceptual picture, we can proceed 
to portray the nature of the research problem that is central 
to the understanding of the empirical work presented in 
Chapters 4 -6. This provides the background to understanding 
the empirical drawing of the later chapters.
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM
In describing the nature of the research problem 
underlying this study, there are three features in particular 
that need to be identified. The first concerns the importance 
of democratic politics for the study of expenditure, and in 
recognition of this the study pays particular attention to 
the role of political participation in the decisions of 
governments. The second relates to an assessment of the role 
of democratic politics in policy development and, in 
particular, the part played by political parties. In this 
regard, the present study identifies a key flaw, namely, the 
neglect of the link between party and policy in accounting 
for a given pattern of policy outputs. Consequently, one of 
the ’core' research problems of this study is the 
identification and evaluation of two competing models of 
party and policy. The third feature of particular relevance 
in characterising the research problem has to do with some of 
the conceptual and methodological flaws in the policy output 
literature. These relate especially to the lack of emphasis 
on bureaucratic and incremental influences on policy.
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1.2.1 Democratic Politics and Social Policy
Central to the analysis of the growth of welfare is the 
nature of democratic politics or, more specifically, the 
policy consequences of democratic participation. In this 
analysis particular attention is directed to the tension 
between the two logics of distribution centering around the 
notion of ’rights’. On the one hand we have a distributive 
system, the underlying basis of the capitalist economy, which 
attributes ’rights’ to individuals as owners of property; 
opposed to this conception of distribution is one which 
attaches 'rights' to people as citizens in a democratic 
society. The welfare state is a ’marriage between a 
protective state and a capitalist economy ... a union of 
opposites for it required an accommodation between two 
opposing logics of distribution' (Myles 1984: 30).
As Offe (1972) has argued, the tension between these two 
different logics of distribution lies within the liberal 
democratic state itself. Liberalism is a set of arrangements 
in which participation and rights are based on private 
property, whereas democracy is a product of a struggle for 
enfranchisement and is founded on political representation on 
the basis of membership of a community. The conflicting 
values of liberalism, with its emphasis on the protection of 
private property, and of democracy, based on the core value 
of political participation, lie at the heart of discord 
within the liberal-democratic state. Bowles and Gintis 
clarify this further by noting that 'the classical liberal 
state, which vested rights of political participation in
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owners of property, gave way to the liberal democratic state, 
which vests those rights in persons by virtue of citizenship' 
(1980: 11). It was T.H. Marshall (1963), in his classic study 
of ’citizenship', who was one of the first scholars to 
highlight this tension and its relevance for the development 
of the modern welfare state. Marshall argued convincingly 
that democracy or political participation was embodied in the 
concept of citizenship, which was extended from civil to 
political and then to social rights.
The welfare state can therefore be seen as a product of 
the widening sphere of political representation and 
participation. This idea assumes that enfranchisement is a 
process originating in the granting of civil rights, leading 
to the extension of political rights as embodied in the right 
to vote, and eventually incorporating a set of social rights 
underlying the modern welfare state. While this typology is 
’heuristic' rather than explanatory, it illustrates the 
tension between the notion of democracy as the extension of 
citizenship rights, and that of liberalism seen as a defence 
of a market economy, a tension exemplified in the 
development of the welfare state. Mishra aptly notes that the 
development of the welfare state poses a paradox where 
’growth of citizenship - which has to do with equality - has 
coincided with the development of capitalism, as a system of 
inequality’ (Mishra 1981: 28).
The empirical examination of the development of the 
welfare state requires an analysis of the impact of democra-
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tic politics on redistributive policy. The present study 
examines two main forms by which democratic politics 
influence welfare expenditure. These refer to partisanship 
and political competition as forms of explanation and both 
concede causal primacy to the role of parties. According to 
Castles, in most 'political' theories of policy output,
the question of party influence and party control plays 
a central role. This is manifestly true of those 
theories that suggest that labour union and socialist
preferences will be translated into higher levels of 
state interventionism. It is scarcely less so in other 
theories in what may be broadly described as
the 'pluralistic politics paradigm’...(1982a: 5).
The partisanship explanation of policy is based on the
premise that the ideology of the party in power has
substantial influence on policy. In this connection it should 
be noted that there exists a substantial body of recent 
empirical literature (see Castles 1982b) which specifically 
draws attention to the importance of social democratic 
parties and their impact, not only on social policy, but in
other policy areas as well. To quote Castles again,
partisanship as a crucial dimension shaping patterns of 
public expenditure rests on the prior assumption that 
the political organizations among which the electorate 
chooses have diverse ideological leanings, which are 
translated into diverse patterns of policy 
implementation (1982b: 26).
The emphasis in this literature has been the balance of 
political class forces in explaining expenditure and policy 
variations between countries as well as policy growth within 
countries. (See Castles 1978; Hibbs 1977; Korpi 1980; 
Stephens 1979.) This literature, while being methodologically 
original, is part of a general tradition that has continually
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emphasised the importance of 'power' in shaping 
distributional outcomes. In particular, the work of Lenski 
(1966) should be noted. Lenski's basic model of the 
distributive process is derived from the classical theory of 
elites as found in the writings of Weber, Mosca and Pareto. 
But, in contrast to these theorists, Lenski argued that the
'advent of democracy transformed the distribution of power. 
As a result the long term trend towards increasing inequality
was reversed’ (1966: 79).
As Canada lacks a major national social democratic party 
at the federal level, a comparative study of Australia and 
Canada would therefore provide an ideal testing ground for 
the examination of the social democratic explanations of 
policy development (discussed in Chapter 5). Political and 
policy debates in Canada have often focussed on the public 
policy consequences of a lack of a major class-based social 
democratic party. A comparative analysis provides a means of 
testing the proposition that social democracy makes a 
difference to the policy and expenditure priorities of 
governments.
The empirical analysis of this hypothesis about 
democratic politics and policy outcomes is structured in 
terms of an evaluation of two competing models of the causal 
link between party and policy. The first model is the 'social 
democratic explanation' which emphasises the social and 
ideological basis of parties in determining policy outcome. 
The other, termed the 'turnover hypothesis', emphasises the
18
Strategie advantages for political administration of 
different ideological types in embarking on new policy 
priorities. Both models emphasise the importance of 
partisanship, but differ in their accounts of the link 
between party and policy. The turnover hypothesis is 
premised on a notion of party as an 'autonomous actor’, 
whereas the partisanship model emphasises the notion of party 
as agent. This forms an essential element of the empirical 
testing of the several propositions examined in this thesis 
(see section 1.2.2). These issues, including a review of the 
relevant literature, are examined more fully in Chapter 5.
Apart from the effect of partisanship, the other avenue 
by which democratic politics influences policy is through 
political competition. In this explanation a special feature 
which commands attention in the evaluation of the impact of 
democratic politics is the relationship between the 
processes of democracy and welfare expenditure. The salient 
feature of these 'processes' is the nature and form of
political competition; and, for this analysis, elections and 
the degree of inter-party competition are seen to play an 
important role in the determination of policy outcomes. 
Here, the pivotal element pertains to the processes of 
democracy rather than to the structural aspects underlying 
the partisanship explanation. The empirical literature on 
this issue, though predominantly confined to the American 
state expenditure literature, is extensive. Clearly, the 
seminal work of Key (1951) has been critical to the 
development of the empirical analysis of the influence of
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inter-party competition on policy, but, more generally, the 
relationship between inter-party competition and policy is 
also a central theme in the theoretical work of Schumpeter 
(1950) and Downs (1957). An examination of these and 
connected issues, including a review of the relevant 
literature, will be found in Chapter 6.
1.2.2 Party and Policy
A serious omission, however, in the burgeoning policy 
output literature concerning democratic politics and policy 
has been the absence of any discussion of the manner in which 
different types of party support (class-based or non-class- 
based cleavages), and party structures (organisationally 
strong or weak) have influenced policy outcomes pertaining to 
welfare expenditure. To cite an example, Hibbs's (1977) work 
on macro-economic policy, justly considered a classic, which 
presents a cross-national analysis of the relationship 
between social democratic parties and economic policy, 
suffers from the absence of an appreciation of the range of 
differences in party organisation and structure as factors 
which may affect macro-economic policy. As Hibbs did not 
control for these factors, he is unable to shed any light on 
the manner in which party preferences are shaped. This serves 
to highlight the need for comparative studies such as those 
between Australia and Canada, in order to be able to 
distinguish and identify those characteristics that 
differentiate party structure and organisation, and thereby 
to evaluate their influence on policy outcomes.
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In sum, two competing theories of party and policy can
be identified. The first, termed 'structural’, argues that
the principal link between party and a given set of policy
outcomes is the socio-economic structural basis of a 'party'.
A party which represents a 'class’ constituency is likely to
pursue policies that benefit its constituency, as this is
directly linked to the structural basis of the party system.
Sartori (1969) has argued that these conceptions of party are
sociological, in the sense that they emphasise the social-
structural roots of party behaviour. The behaviour of
parties is not autonomous, but depends on the interests of
the constituencies they serve, as parties are agents of
socio-economic collectivities. Lipset underlines this
perspective with his oft-quoted comment that
In every democracy conflict among different groups 
is expressed through political parties which
basically represent a democratic translation of the 
class-struggle (I960: 22).
Clearly, as Sartori observes, the sociological conception of
parties tends to emphasise to what extent
parties and party systems are a response to, and a 
reflection of, social stratification, the solidarity 
structure of the society, its socio-economic and 
socio-cultural cleavages, its degree of
heterogeneity and of integration, its level of 
economic growth and the like (1969: 70).
In terms of social welfare policies, a social-democratic 
party is likely to provide increased budgetary allocations to 
social welfare expenditure in-as-much as the interests of its 
electoral constituency are served by such policies. In addi­
tion to the partisanship impact on policy of a party system
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structured by social cleavages, a strong party system (mean­
ing not only strong social-cultural cleavages, but also party 
systems characterised by ideological cleavages and strong 
organisation) would be more likely to produce party competi­
tion, and hence greater allocations for social welfare.
An alternative conception of the relationship between 
party and policy is the notion of the party as a *strategic 
actor'. In this perspective Parties are viewed as autonomous 
actors with a strategic interest in winning elections; the 
policies constructed therefore are likely to reflect the 
primacy of these objectives. In terms of Sartori’s 
argument, this is a party-centric rather than a sociological 
conception of party behaviour, wherein the causal influences 
in party behaviour are internal rather than external to the 
party. This party-centric or strategic actor conception of 
party has been greatly influenced by the work of Schumpeter 
(1950) and Downs (1957).
In an illuminating essay, Wright (1971) differentiates
between two party models which he labels, the 'Rational-
Efficient' and 'Party Democracy’ models, on the basis of
differences in conceptions of democracy, in their definition
of party goals, and also in their representative function
within the political system. In terms of the differing
conceptions of democracy, he adopts Epstein's (1967) view
that the strategic actor model (in our terms) corresponds to
a pluralistic notion of democracy. As Wright notes,
The Rational-Efficient model is thus consistent with 
a pluralistic conception of democracy, in which 
party is "downgraded" to be only one of a variety
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interestof competing political actors including 
groups and the like (1971: 20-21).
Influential theorists such as Epstein (1967) and
Schlesinger (1965) based their arguments on the geographical
division between North American parties and others. For these
analysts, a significant feature of North American parties is 
that they compete with interest groups and other actors.
The parties are
loosely organized, unprogrammatic, and less cohesive 
... The point is that these very characteristics 
allow parties to function in accord with a
pluralistic conception of democracy. The charac­
teristics are deplorable only from the standpoint of 
a majoritarian theory, which is at the heart of the 
preference, so often expressed by political 
scientists, for a large and strong party organiza­
tion able to mobilize electoral support for progra­
mmatic policies to be enacted by a party serving as 
a governing agency (Epstein 1967: 351).
As against the pluralistic conception of democracy that 
underpins the strategic actor notion of party, the
structuralist view emphasises that parties are the unique 
actors in the political arena. In addition, parties have
clear and well-defined programmes as well as the means for
pursuing these programmes once in office. Thus, in contrast 
to the strategic actor model, parties are more policy
oriented, ideological and cohesive. Epstein (1967) aptly 
terms this understanding of parties as ’majoritarian’ in 
contrast to the alternative pluralist ’strategic actor’ 
model.
In terms of the constitution of party goals, the 
structuralist conception has a purposive view of party as the 
main definer of policy objectives. Parties win elections to
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implement their objectives. According to this view, parties 
are seen as reflecting in their policies the socio-economic 
cleavages that underpin the party system. As against this 
perspective, the strategic actor conception subscribes to an 
instrumental view of parties, and sees parties as defining 
goals in order to win elections. Downs, a notable
proponent of this viewpoint, notes that ‘parties formulate 
policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections 
in order to formulate policies’ (1957: 28).
Central to this latter conception is the implicit 
economic analogy of the strategic actor conception used by 
theorists such as Schumpeter (1950), Downs (1957), Wilson 
(1962), Schlesinger (1965) and Epstein (1967). As Barry10 
notes,
There is a clear analogy with the conception of the 
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs in classical
economic theory. The voters correspond to the 
consumers (1971: 14).
In this view, the operation of democratic politics,
comparable to that of the economic market or, as Downs
argues, parties in democratic societies
are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking 
economy. So as to attain their private ends, they 
formulate whatever policies they believe will gain 
the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce
whatever products they believe will gain the most 
profits for the same reason (1957: 295).
The constitution of party goals therefore depends
critically on the competitive market-place and not on the
ideology or on the basis of socio-economic interests which
support a given party. In similar vein Schumpeter (1950) has
argued that there are two conceptions of democracy. The
24
classical conception viewed democracy as
that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions which realizes the common good 
by making the people itself decide issues through 
the election of individuals who are to assemble in 
order to carry out its will (Schumpeter 1950 in 
Quinton 1967: 153).
This conception is flawed because there are no means of 
ascertaining what constitutes the common will. Against this 
classical notion Schumpeter counterposed the idea of 
democracy as a method of competitive struggle for leadership 
rather than a debate over party alternatives offered by 
competing parties.
Wright (1971) has commented that these differing 
conceptions of party policy lead to divergent views on the 
nature of party organisations for the two conceptions of 
party described earlier. Thus, structuralists would argue 
that, if the function of parties is to represent different 
programmes to the electorate, they need a strong 
organisation; and the strategic conception would place its
emphasis on leadership rather than on organisation.
The other characteristic differentiating the two models 
of party lies in the manner in which they formulate the 
nature of the representative function of parties within the 
polity. As noted earlier, for the structuralist view parties 
both represent and aggregate interests, whereas, for the 
strategic conception, parties act as brokers between interest 
groups and the political system. Thus, according to Epstein, 
the main characteristic of the brokerage party is its non- 
programmatic character: a leadership capable of responding
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to diverse electoral considerations, and a transactional or 
brokerage view of political activity. A party may still be 
associated with particular policies and interests, presumably 
in accord with the habitual voting patterns of large portions 
of the electorate, but it preserves, in theory as in 
practice, a loose and accommodating character (Epstein 
1967: 357).
Thus, parties are loosely organised and electorally 
oriented, whereas for the structural model a party is policy- 
oriented, ideological and highly organised, and seems to be 
responding to the interests of its socio-economic 
constituency. The underlying assumption of most policy 
studies is that a party system with parties like that is more 
likely to have an impact on policy than a system that is not 
structurally strong.
To sum up, the two models of party sketched above differ 
in terms of the importance of electoral considerations, 
organisational strength and the nature of their 
representative functions. For the strategic conception of 
party, the primary goal is that of winning elections. This 
objective in turn establishes the basis for the definition of 
party preferences.
Australia and Canada, because of their differences in 
the bases of party support and organisation (this point is 
examined in section 3.3), are from a comparative perspective 
well placed to provide us with an understanding of the impact 
of party system on policy, and thereby enable us to examine
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the two competing theories of the link between party and 
policy detailed above. As we note in Chapter 3, the basis for 
the formulation of the hypotheses is that both countries are
similar across a range of relevant variables. For this
purpose the research methodology of the present study is
designed so as to permit an examination of the impact of
party support and party organisation on welfare expenditure.
An overriding concern of the study is to determine 
whether the presence of class-based cleavages and strong 
organisation (as in Australia), through the mediating impact 
of political variables of administration and competition, has 
a greater impact on welfare expenditure than a system where 
(as in Canada) there is an absence of class-based cleavages 
and strong organisation. Using the conceptual terminology 
described earlier, Australia can be identified as having a 
'strong party system', and Canada, a 'weak party system’.
Elaborating upon these differences in the Australian and 
Canadian party systems and their relation to the two
competing explanations of party and policy, three 
hypothetical models can be identified. These models, as 
presented below, broadly detail the possible impact of 
political administration or partisanship and competition on 
expenditure. In the diagrammatic representation of the models 
presented below (bearing in mind that party system denotes 
party support and organisation) a strong party system is 
identified with Australia and a weak party system with 
Canada. Additionally, in these diagrams, the notation '+’ 
signifies a presence of impact, and '-’ signifies an absence
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of impact.
The first model is the structural conception of policy. 
In this model a strong party system would have a significant 
influence on competition and partisanship. It could be 
depicted as follows:
MODEL 1: The Structural Model
Competition Partisanship
Strong Party System + +
Weak Party System
The second is the strategic actor conception of party, 
where the type of party system would be irrelevant to the 
impact of competition and administration. This is 
represented as:
MODEL 2: The Strategic Actor Model
Competition Partisanship
Strong Party System + +
Weak Party System + +
The final hypothetical model is a null model where party 
system is irrelevant and has no impact.
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MODEL 3: The Null Model
Competition Partisanship
Strong Party System
Weak Party System
Stated differently, and in a less abstract manner, a 
prime objective of this study is to consider the conventional 
wisdom in the Canadian literature that politics is not a 
significant element in the determination of public policies. 
While this lack of efficacy can be attributed to an array of 
causes such as the lack of class-based parties (Brodie and 
Jenson 1980), the electoral system (Qualter 1970; Cairns 
1968), and the lack of political participation (Mishler 
1979), a persistent theme of these studies has been a 
reference to the inherent weakness of the Canadian party 
system. The implicit assumption is that the Canadian 
political environment is not conducive to a strong party 
system, and this in turn leads to low levels of policy 
impact by parties.
This apparent lack of influence of parties on policies 
in the Canadian political system may be due to three 
important causes. The first and perhaps the most important of 
these is that Canadian parties act as brokers between 
different regional, ethnic and economic interests and the 
wider political system. (The literature on brokerage politics 
is extensive, but see Dawson 1970 for a definitive
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statement.) The following description of the Mackenzie King
administration by Hutchinson gives a flavour of the brokerage
view of Canadian parties, in which they were pictured as
a congeries of separate groups in coalition. Men like 
Gardiner as the spokesman of agriculture, Howe as the 
representative of industry, Mitchell as the delegate 
of labour, St Laurent as the leader of Quebec, 
possessed almost autonomous and sovereign power within 
the party and could apply, when necessary, a veto on 
government policy by Calhoun’s ancient Law of 
Concurrent Majority. (Quoted in Mallory 1967: 27).
The policy effect of ’brokerage politics', itself a
consequence of the lack of class cleavages, is the diminution
of the ideological distance between the two main Canadian
parties: the Liberal and Conservative. As Mallory aptly
notes,
A reader of party platforms and of leaders’ speeches 
will find there is a remarkable similarity in what 
the parties profess to want. They claim to seek the 
same objectives, the very wording of some of their declared aims is almost identical. Each is in favour 
of everything which will attract votes: each, at
least in public, is against sin (Mallory 1967: 25).
Therefore in terms of the crucial variable of party
support, if the parties are close to each other in their
objectives, their rhetoric and their basis of social support,
they cannot distinctively affect governmental
administrations. As previously argued, according to the
structural conception of the link between party and policy, a
party system composed of such parties will not be seen as
’efficient’ in delivering outcomes as one which is
characterised by sharp differences between parties. Central
to this proposition is the absence in Canada of the kind of
class cleavages familiar in Australia, and thereby both party
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systems in terms of the structural argument have different 
impacts on the nature of policy outcomes (see Chapter 3 for a 
detailed discussion).
A second reason for the lack of influence of Canadian 
parties on policies is to be found in the role of Canadian 
political culture. Canadian parties are often viewed as a 
vehicle for ’elite accommodation', emphasising the values of 
pragmatism and compromise. Robert Presthus sums up the main 
component of the Canadian political culture as a national 
political process that may be called one of 'elite 
accommodation'. It is
a system in which major decisions regarding national 
socio-economic policy are worked out through 
interaction between governmental (i.e. legislative 
and bureaucratic) elites and interest group elites 
(Presthus 1973: 20-21).
This pervasive view of Canadian political culture has much 
in common with Lijphart's (1968) notion of ’consociational' 
democracy.
The emphasis on the process of elite accommodation is 
further underlined in the work of Horowitz (1966) on the 
ideological roots of Canadian political culture. In 
particular he has argued that the Canadian culture contains 
both liberal and conservative traditions. The Tory traditions 
of order and hierarchy are, as Van Loon and Whittington 
(1981) note, particularly important values in the process of 
elite accommodation.
The effect of this elite accommodation on parties is 
twofold. One is that parties are seen as agents for
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accommodation where the 'role of national parties as a 
unifying agent in bringing together in unity some of the most 
parental dissident forces in the country ...could hardly be 
overestimated’ (Dawson 1970: 415). This accommodation tends 
to minimise the differences between the parties and hence 
their impact.
The other effect of elite accommodation is that parties
tend to be bypassed in the process of accommodation. This
feature is accentuated by the operation of the federal
system. As Mallory comments,
To the extent that many of our major governmental 
decisions have resulted from intensive consultations 
between different levels of government, parties have 
to some measure been locked out of the most 
important decision-making processes. Dominion- 
provincial conferences, meetings of premiers, 
committees of experts representing the civil 
services of several provinces, and possibly two or 
three levels of government, working parties of 
various provincial Ministers and experts, have all downgraded the role of parties who still bear 
considerable responsibility for the consequences of 
decisions but cannot always participate in their 
making. Canadian federalism has, therefore, been a 
major contribution to the decline in the importance 
and effectiveness of political parties (1967: 37).
The final factor that is thought to have contributed to
the decline in the importance of Canadian parties is
regionalism. This leads Mallory to conclude that 'Canadian
parties are becoming increasingly regionally based, almost to
the point of becoming regional parties ... None of this is
particularly new but it is becoming apparent that the trend
towards greater regionalism is growing more pronounced’
(1967: 41). It is a statement that still has validity in the
analysis of Canadian parties. This regional nature of the
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parties is made further salient by national central 
organisations, at least in comparison with Australia. In 
terms of the structural model, regionalism further diminishes 
the impact of parties on public policy.
To sum up, the conventional wisdom in the Canadian 
political and policy literature is that the party system does 
not have any substantial effect on public policy. In terms of 
the model discussed above, the sources of this weakness are 
structural, especially in terms of party support and the 
efficacy of party organisation. One objective of the present 
study is to assess within a comparative context this 
underlying and often implicit, if not explicit, assumption of 
Canadian politics. In other words, it is to examine the 
’structural’ account of the link between party and policy.
The Australian system, in comparison with these elements 
of the Canadian party system, differs in three main ways: 
the articulation of interests, the role of ideology in the 
party system, and the strength of party organisation. The 
main difference between the two systems (and indeed this 
issue is the critical factor that demarcates the two models 
of party distinguished above), is that Australian parties 
articulate or aggregate distinct social interests, which in 
turn lead to ideologically distinctive parties. As Aitkin 
points out,
Free trade, protection and Labor extended the notion 
of politics as the regulation of economic interest 
to groups that spanned communities. Modern parties 
have added a thick ideological coating to the bases 
of economic self interest on which the party system 
rests (1977: 14).
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This perspective markedly differentiates it from the 
notion of parties as brokers that is a predominant feature of 
Canadian parties. The conception of the relationships between 
parties and interests outlined above illustrates the role of 
parties as aggregators of economic interests. The Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) represents a social democratic ideology 
(Jupp 1963), while the Liberal and Country Parties, 
identified as the 'Coalition parties’ because of the 
alliances made between these parties for purposes of 
government, represent different versions of liberalism and 
conservatism (see Tiver 1978; for a more general account see 
Starr, Richmond and Maddox 1978). In a similar manner, the 
federal organisational basis of Australian parties is 
stronger than that of the Canadian parties, despite the fact 
that the level of organisation varies between the parties.
The features distinguishing the Australian party system 
from the Canadian are twofold: firstly, the mode of the 
representation of interests, and secondly, the ideology and 
organisational strength of the mainstream parties. 
Therefore, in accordance with the structural perspective 
identified earlier, it should follow that the strong parties 
in the Australian system would wield a greater influence on 
policy than the weaker Canadian parties. A central issue in 
this study is the relevance and validity of these 
contrasting perspectives in the two party systems in 
explaining the determination of policy.
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1.2.3 Conceptual and Methodological Problems
In addition to the neglect of the relationship between
party and policy, a further weakness in the policy output
literature is the neglect of a bureaucratic or internal
budgetary process in the determination of policy. As we argue
below, whether policy output models are predominantly
environmental,11 in that they stress the effects of the
environment on policy, or whether they are political, in that
the focus is on political influences, the literature
encounters a serious problem in that in both approaches to
expenditure the models are underpinned by a conception that
12is society-centred. The concept of society-centred theories 
of policy, first used by Nordlinger (1981), denotes a 
perspective on state-society relations dominated by the 
interplay of societal actors. These models are unable to 
account for the influence of ’state' or bureaucratic factors 
on policy. Central to the argument in this thesis is that 
this conceptual limitation has a counterpart in a 
methodological defect - the neglect of time-series design in 
policy output studies.
Conceptual Problems
By a ’society-centred' view of policy Nordlinger means
to describe a wide range of theories such as group theory,
Marxism and corporatism, all of which, while having differing
conceptions of the interaction of societal actors and the
state, tend to deny the importance of state autonomy in
13influencing and shaping policy.
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A major criticism that Nordlinger makes of ’society- 
centred’ conceptions of state-society relations is that all 
these tend to have a sociological, reductionist concept of 
the state which allows no independent role for the 
preferences of public officials, both elected and non- 
elected. The policy-making process is seen as being 
exclusively dependent on societal actors and forces. In 
these studies, the state is a black box impenetrable to 
analysis. In contrast to these ’society-centred' conceptions 
of policy, a 'state-centred' model emphasises the analysis 
of state interests in shaping public policy.
As Nordlinger argues, the limitation of the society- 
centred view is that each conception of state-society 
relationships provides a basis for the effectiveness of 
different societal resources, by which he means that, while 
capital might be important as a resource for one set of 
theories, others might emphasise resources such as the 
ability to mobilise. His argument is that each set of 
resources is just about equal in weight, or alternatively 
that their effectiveness might vary according to specific 
circumstances. In either case, however, public officials have 
flexibility in choosing the resources and groups needed to 
gain support for their parties. In other words, they have a 
degree of autonomy.
Therefore, even within the framework of the society- 
centred perspective, the state is able to support certain 
groups and resources over others in order to gain the needed 
support of societal forces. Moreover,
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public officials ...can purposefully restore exist­
ing patterns of societal convergence, deference and 
indifference so as to forestall the emergence of 
potentially constraining divergent preferences, and 
they can do so with little risk of societal 
sanctions since their behaviour does not run 
contrary to current societal preferences.
(Nordlinger 1981: 69).
Nordlinger's criticism, although applicable to theories 
such as pluralism and corporatism, has the same force when 
applied to policy output models of the type being considered 
in this chapter. In the context of policy output 
perspectives examined in this chapter, a flaw in these models 
is that they neglect the influence of interests which, in 
Nordlinger's terms, are the preferences of public officials 
in shaping public policy.
In the case of environmental studies, the basis of
policy development is the response of the state to a range of
social or economic needs. In this approach, policy is seen as 
a series of reactions to need, as in the need for
infrastructure (Wagner 1890) or for capitalist reproduction
(O'Connor 1973) or as a way of satisfying social needs such
as those arising out of demographic changes (Wilensky, 1975).
A major limitation of this perspective is that the causal
linkages between needs and the consequent policy response are
never spelt out. In order to sketch a more comprehensive
theory we would need to examine the role of the state in
policy development.
In a similar manner, a significant weakness in the 
political model of policy output is that, while the impact of 
politics forms the core of the model, it is analytically
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focussed on the role of parties and interest groups,
described by Beer (1978: 20) as the 'private sector of 
politics’, rather than on influences emanating from within 
the government itself. This is similar to the view of the
state as a canvas on which parties and other 'interest' 
groups attempt to design their conceptions of public policy.
In this context, a shortcoming of the policy output
model, and particularly of studies of the determinants of
expenditure, is that they neglect the impact of budgetary
strategies on expenditure. One way of determining the
importance of budgetary strategies is to examine the
influence of incrementalism, the notion that expenditure is a
function of previous expenditure (Wildavsky et al. 1966).
The basis of incremental budgeting is that
Budgets are almost never actively reviewed as a 
whole in the sense of considering at once the value 
of all existing programmes as compared to all 
possible alternatives. Instead this year’s budget 
is based on last year's budget, with special 
attention given to a narrow range of increases or 
decreases (Wildvasky et al. 1966: 529-30).
Since incrementalism is pre-eminently a bureaucratic
budgetary strategy in which bureaucrats tend to base current
expenditure on past expenditure, the isolation of incremental
factors provides a mode by which the extent of bureaucratic
process can be examined.
Incrementalism is, to use Lindblom's (1959) classic 
phrase, a form of 'muddling through’.1^ Lindblom uses this 
term to describe a decision-making process which is the very 
antithesis of rationalistic decision-making theory. It
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emphasises the step-by-step evolution of policy in contrast 
to the consideration of fundamental alternatives, which is 
the main feature of rational decision-making theory. Lindblom 
(1959) outlines this incremental mode of reasoning as 
follows:
1) The selection of value goals and the empirical 
analysis of the needed action are not distinct from 
one another, but are closely intertwined.
2) Since means and ends are not distinct, means/ends 
analysis is often inappropriate or limited.
3) The test of good policy is typically that various 
analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a 
policy (without their agreeing that it is the most 
appropriate means to an agreed objective).
4) Analysis is drastically limited because
i) important possible outcomes are neglected;
ii) important alternative potential policies are 
neglected;
iii) important affected values are neglected.
This form of decision-making emphasises the limited 
comparison made by policymakers between alternatives and the 
need to reconcile different and often contradictory values 
with unclear means and ends. Incremental budgetary strategy 
is therefore insulated from both environmental and
political influences.
Methodological Limitations
These conceptual flaws are mirrored, as previously 
noted, by the limitations of cross sectional research design 
widely used in these types of output studies. In contrast, a 
distinctive feature of the methodology of this study lies in 
the use of a time-series design to examine the influence
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of environment and political variables on policy. The 
measurement of the influence of 'time' becomes not a mere 
statistical procedure but also a means of measuring the 
impact of incrementalism on policy. The detection of auto­
correlation in the time-series indicates the presence of 
incrementalism because it captures the influence of previous 
levels of expenditure on current expenditure. The fundamental 
assumption behind this aspect of the methodological design is 
that examining the influence of previous expenditure is a 
measure of the influence of bureaucratic process. This is the 
method used by some analysts to detect the influence of 
incrementalism (Wildavsky et al. 1966; Peroff 1977). The use 
of this method is preferable to using lagged dependent 
variables because of the technical problems associated with 
the latter type of statistical analysis. Apart from this 
technical reason, the interrupted time-series analysis used 
in Chapter 5 requires that the time-series be made stationary 
before the impact of the explanatory variable on the time- 
series can be fully evaluated. In this context, the use of a 
time-series filter to examine incrementalism has distinct 
advantages in the present study. Nevertheless, this 
assumption has obvious limitations in that it does not reveal 
the precise operation of bureaucratic forces, but is an 
aspect of research design used in studies of the impact of 
incrementalism (as for example in the work of Wildavsky, 
1964).
In addition to this detection of statistical noise, a
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more complex means by which to model the influence of
bureaucratic elements in the policy process is made by
designating certain economic variables as stimuli to which
policy-makers respond. The main problem with the economic
variables used in the environmental models of policy output
is that those examined are far too general, and do not
suggest causal linkages between these variables and the
policymaking arena. As Jacob and Lipsey point out,
The first problem with this operationalized model is 
that income, urbanization, industrialization and 
education are not in themselves inputs. The 
measures have little substantive relationship to the 
phenomena they are supposed to represent 
(1968: 514).
The current study will endeavour to examine more 
specifically economic variables, notably revenue, inflation 
and unemployment. It will be argued that these variables 
have more direct causal influence on policy output. These 
measures will be emphasised in Chapters 5 and 6, which are 
devoted to examining the influence of party and competition 
on expenditure. (Chapter 5 examines a more conventional range 
of economic determinants.) Rather than representing several 
environmental stimuli, these variables will be regarded as 
proxies for measuring the impact of bureaucratic forces on 
the policy process. The use of these research strategies is 
an attempt to overcome the drawbacks of a society-centred 
conception of policy, and it therefore aims to extend the 
literature by attempting to isolate specific bureaucratic 
influences on policy. Consequently, it forms an essential 
part of the research methodology of this study.
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1.3 CONCLUSION
To conclude this introductory overview, the thesis has 
as at the core of its research design two main objectives. 
First, it seeks to examine the nature and role of democratic 
participation in policy. Second, it identifies a key weakness 
in the model of democratic participation - the neglect of the 
relationship between party and policy.
It sets out to examine these two issues in the light of 
two models of party and policy, termed ’structural' and 
'strategic conception’. The former model emphasies the 
importance of parties responding to their constituents and 
the socio-economic cleavages on which they are based. The 
latter model focuses on the notion of parties reacting to 
strategic incentives in the political system regardless of 
their constituencies and the socio-economic cleavages 
associated with them. Differences in the nature of party 
support and structure are ideal for evaluating these two 
models of party and policy.
In Chapter 3 we turn to consider aspects of the research 
design employed in the study of the different conceptions of 
the link between party and policy, and then to examine in 
greater detail some aspects of the differences between the 
Australian and Canadian parties. The nature of the history of 
welfare development so critical to understanding the growth 
of policy is set out in Chapter 2 as a background to the 
research problem and empirical analysis undertaken in 
Chapters 4,5 and 6.
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NOTES
1. In addition to the OECD (1985) statistics on the 
development of the welfare state, the best source of 
information on the growth of welfare state in Europe is 
Flora and Alber (1981). For an early study see Rimlinger 
(1971).
2. Offe (1972) provides an excellent account of the social 
structural effects of welfare state development. For 
somewhat different accounts, see Heclo (1981) and O'Connor 
(1973).
3. See OECD (1978) for an analysis of public expenditure 
growth rates. These growth rates refer to the total public 
sector welfare growth, i.e., they refer to both federal and 
non-federal social welfare expenditure.
4. In the context of Australia and Canada, see particularly 
the work of Bird (1970) and Butlin et al. (1982) on the 
growth of public expenditure.
5. For an overview of these economic developments in Australia 
and Canada see Goodman (1964), Hancock (1929) and Boehm 
(1971).
6. Here, the distinction between openness and vulnerability 
should be emphasised. The present research is concerned 
with the vulnerability of Australian and Canadian
economies.
7. See Dye (1978) for an overview of this development from 
institutions to outputs in policy analysis. For an 
introduction to such an institutionalist analysis in the 
Australian context see Spann (1979). For a classic 
decision-making approach see Lindblom (1959).
8. Welfare indicators such as health and education levels can 
be used to measure social policy. However these indicators 
are undeveloped and hence cannot be used in a time-series 
framework such as the one used in this study.
9. However, in methodological terms, impact studies could 
properly be seen as a part of the 'output' approach to 
policy.
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10. For an incisive analysis of these theories see Barry (1971).
11. The terra 'environmental' denotes a vector of economic 
factors thought to be influential in policy output.
12. Appendix 4 provides an outline of three conceptual models 
of policy output. These models are all underpinned by a set 
of relationships between the 'inputs' of the environment 
and the political systems and 'outputs’ of public 
expenditure. These conceptual models have provided the 
basis for much of the empirical analysis of expenditure
13. For an excellent analysis from a state-centred perspective 
see Skocpol’s (1979) comparative analysis of social 
revolutions. She argues that the analysis of state 
strategies in China, Russia and France provides for a 
better understanding of these revolutions.
14. The incremental literature goes beyond the simple model of 
bureaucrats and politicians. For example, Auten et al. 
(1984) attempt to examine bargaining between Congress, 
politicians and the executive. However, because the nature 
of the budgetary process in Australia and Canada is not 
'public', such an analysis of bargaining is not really 
possible in either country.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL WELFARE IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to set the research problem outlined 
in Chapter 1 relating to the development of social welfare in 
Australia and Canada. With this objective in view, it sets 
out to examine briefly the main patterns of policy and 
expenditure growth in Australia and Canada since the early 
part of the 20th century. In addition, it provides a 
necessary conceptual basis, presented later in the chapter, 
for understanding the development of welfare. As this chapter 
seeks to provide only the backdrop for the main picture 
presented in the later chapters, it is not an entirely 
comprehensive survey of welfare state development in 
Australia and Canada.
More specifically, the purpose of this chapter is to 
indicate that, from a historical perspective, the 
development of the welfare state in Australia and Canada is 
exceptional in comparison with similar developments in 
Western Europe. The evidence gathered in this chapter 
suggests that a useful means of analysing the evolution of 
the welfare state is to see it as a set of puzzles. More 
specifically it could be argued that the analysis of policy 
patterns and dynamics reveals two basic puzzles. One of these 
is the deviant nature of welfare state development in the two 
countries when considered against the modal European pattern.
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It is this derailment of Australian and Canadian social
policy from the conventional historical tracks of welfare 
state development that makes the welfare experience of both 
countries similar, and therefore deserving of careful study 
and analysis.
The second puzzle or paradox arises from the existence, 
despite a general similarity, of marked differences in 
welfare outcomes in Canada and Australia. The post-war period 
in particular has shown, that whereas Canada has exhibited 
features of policy innovation and continuous growth, the 
pattern of Australian policy development has been more 
reminiscent of stagnation rather than growth or innovation. 
The general pattern in the post-war period has been one of 
significant expansion of social programmes and services. This 
pattern of outcome is therefore contrary to one which could 
be predicted from a knowledge of the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature on the evolution of the welfare state 
during the post-war period. In the light of this pattern 
the Australian and Canadian developments deserve explanation. 
(For a useful review of the literature relating to the 
welfare state in the post-war period see Shalev 1983.)
In summary, this chapter delineates, within the 
framework of Heclo's (1981) stages of the evolution of the 
welfare state, the main contours of policy adoption in both 
Australia and Canada. Additionally, it proceeds to examine 
the main features of social expenditure in the post-war 
period in Australia and Canada. A more analytical final
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section discusses some of the reasons that may have led to 
the adoption of the policy patterns described in this 
chapter.
2.2 POLICY TIMING AND ADOPTION
2.2.1 A Framework for Analysing Policy Developments
Heclo (1981) has argued that the evolution of social 
welfare can be analysed in terms of three stages classified 
as experimentation, consolidation, and expansion. Broadly, 
the framework of historical evolution of the welfare state 
that Heclo offers is based primarily on the European 
experience. By using this framework heuristically we are 
able to categorise the development of welfare in Australia 
and Canada, and consider the apparent 'aberrant' welfare 
development of both countries.
Heclo saw the first stage, the period of experimentation, 
from the 1870s to the 1920s, as being characterised by 
significant policy innovation, notably the introduction of 
social insurance as well as innovations in public education 
and public health. 'Experimentation' was reflected in the 
fundamental discussion of the objectives and values of social 
insurance as well as in arguments over the design of policy 
instruments. In Europe there was also rapid development in 
the sphere of manufacturing and in the labour movement. While 
the relative emphasis placed on these forces is a matter of 
theoretical and empirical contention, these developments had 
a profound impact on the growth of welfare state policy 
structures.
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Before turning to the key elements of development in the 
public welfare institutions in Australia and Canada, it may 
be instructive to gain some understanding of the background 
and the context within which social policy ’experimentation' 
occurred in Europe. Basing the analysis broadly on Rokkan 
(1970), (1974a), (1974b); Lipset (1983); and Marshall 
(1963), one can argue that the introduction of social 
insurance in Western Europe was a direct outcome of the 
granting of economic and political citizenship in countries 
such as Germany, France and Italy. ’Economic citizenship' 
denotes the timing and level of industrialisation that has 
been translated into social and economic benefits for the 
citizens, whereas ’political citizenship' indicates the 
extension of political benefits including franchise. Hence, 
contrary to many theories of welfare state outcomes based on 
a mono-causal explanation in terms of either political or 
economic variables, the above explanation emphasises the 
interaction of industrialisation and political mobilisation 
in the emergence of social policy. (See Flora and Alber 1981; 
for an earlier, more descriptive, historical study see 
Rimlinger 1971).
As against this, it appears that Australia and Canada 
were quick to exhibit ’political citizenship', as evidenced 
by the early granting of franchise. However, according to 
Albinski (1973), Castles (1985) and, Aitkin and Castles 
(1987), they show no evidence of ’economic citizenship' in 
the sense of industrial development and consequent social 
modernisation. In other words, the extension of political
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mobilisation in the absence of the compulsive pressures of
2industrialisation, even though in the case of Australia 
there was a manufacturing push in Victoria in the 1880s. 
created a pattern of demands for welfare in Canada and 
Australia; and this pattern differed from the course of 
European policy development. Castles observes that this 
argument could equally be applied to New Zealand (see Castles 
1985). It should be emphasised at this point that unlike 
the Australian Constitution, which gave the Federal 
Government power to legislate in the areas of pensions and 
industrial relations, the British North America Act (BNA) 
in Canada was highly restrictive in the legislative scope it 
gave to the federal authorities. However, in Canada the 
constitutional mechanisms for expanding federal power in 
areas of social welfare are very much simpler than those 
prevailing in Australia.
Heclo’s second stage of 'welfarism' is termed 
consolidation, and occurs when policy experimentation is 
replaced by generally agreed welfare structures. The main 
contours of the welfare state having being laid down, 
emphasis now shifts to the consolidation of existing 
programmes. Consequently,
there was generally a great deal less argument about 
fundamental and private/public boundary problems; 
less revisability in programmes once established; 
less varied proposals and greater acceptance of 
existing constitution of ssocial policies (Heclo 
1981: 390).
In other words, during this stage there is little ideological 
disagreement over the fundamentals of social policy. For the
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purposes of analysis, this stage of consolidation lasted from
the 1920s to the late 1940s - a period which not only took in
the Depression and the Second World War but also saw the
growth of interventionist ideas about economic management. 
The welfare state not only had a social function but to it
was also added the role of an agent of economic
stabilisation.
The most recent and final stage of ’welfarism', 
classified as 'expansionism' , resulted, according to Heclo, 
not only in the introduction of new programmes but also in 
great increases in both the coverage and extent of 
expenditure. In part the expansion resulted not so much in 
the growth of new programmes but in increasing levels of 
expenditure on existing programmes.
While Heclo's emphasis on stages in his model of the 
evolution of welfarism is useful only as a guide to the 
historical development of the welfare state, it does capture 
the essential elements (though not the dynamics) of the 
growth of the welfare state in Europe. However, as indicated 
in Table 3.2, both Canada and Australia (along with New 
Zealand, USA and Japan) differ markedly from the pattern 
outlined by Heclo. Perhaps it is more correct to say that, 
while the development of social policy in the two countries 
can be accommodated within Heclo's framework, it does not 
conform to his time scale of social policy adoption and 
evolution. For this reason, social policy development in the 
two countries may be said to differ from the modal European
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pattem of development.
2.2.2 Comparative History of Policy Adoption 
TABLE 2.1
Selected Social Insurance Programmes by Year of Introduction
Country
SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMMES
Industrial 
Accident Sickness Pension
Unemploy­
ment Family Health
*
Canada * 1930 1971 1927 1940 1944 1972
Australia 1947 1947 1908 1945 1941 1974
New Zealand 1900 * 1938 1898 1930 1926 1941
USA 1930 - 1935 1935 - -
UK 1906 1911 1908 1911 1945 1948
Sweden 1901 1910 1913 1934 1947 1962
Germany 1884 1883 1889 1927 1954 1880
pertains only to federal programmes in these countries.
Sources: This table has been constructed from a combination
of sources outlined in Footnote 3.
Table 2.1 above outlines the dates of introduction of 
key social welfare programmes in Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, USA, Sweden and the UK. While this table indicates 
the date of initial policy adoption, it does not identify the 
extent of policy developments after the date of first
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programmes allows an analysis of the patterns of policy 
initiation, but not of the nature of policy growth after the 
initial introduction of a programme. In other words, it 
serves as a guide to the period of experimentation outlined 
above. This table therefore not only enables an evaluation 
of the salient features of policy adoption in Australia and 
Canada, but also gives a picture of policy initiation in a 
wider comparative context. This comparative examination 
permits the analysis of welfare state development in terms of 
Heclo's stages model; it allows, in particular, the 
identification of the 'deviant’ growth of social expenditure 
programmes in Canada and Australia.
The comparative story of policy adoption has four main 
features. First, the period of social welfare policy innova­
tion in Australia in the early decades of the century 
contrasted with the absence of significant social welfare 
legislation during a similar period in Canada. Indeed in 
these terms Australian pension legislation was among the 
earliest in the world, and the introduction of maternity 
allowances was one of the early innovations in this field, 
preceded in this regard by New Zealand (Kewley 1965; 
Mendelsohn 1954). In this context the Australian experience 
is comparable with the European model, whereas the early 
Canadian experience, although similar to the United States 
pattern, deviates from the European model. On Heclo's stage 
model the introduction of social welfare legislation in 
Australia, particularly old age pensions and maternity
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allowances, coincides with the stage of ’experimentation'.
The innovativeness of Australian welfare policy and a 
persistent leaning towards institutional innovation have been 
enduring themes of Australian historiography (Hancock 
1929). Evidence for this is found in the evaluation of 
Australian programmes by overseas visitors. The most famous 
of these was M^tin, who set out in his book Socialism 
Without Doctrine 'to contrast the practical empirical 
colonial labour movements with much more theoretical and 
intellectual movements in the continent and to stress that in 
fact the colonial movement had achieved much more’ (in Ward 
1977, Foreword). Reeves (1902), in his State Experiment 
In Australia and New Zealand. extensively detailed the 
legislative innovations of the period as well as innovations 
in welfare and more particularly, pension legislation.
Among the important legislative achievements in social
policy in Australia during the era were the introduction of
old age and invalid pensions (1908) and maternity benefits
(1912). In terms of later social policy development, as will
be argued, the crucial innovation in this era was the
establishment of federal compulsory arbitration and the
introduction of minimum wage legislation. Castles makes
pointed reference to this by noting
that the conciliation and arbitration legislation 
enacted in Australia and New Zealand must be
considered to be the most novel of the early 
reforms; it was also that most commented on by
foreign and colonial observers and the most
significant in its overall impact (1985: 13-14).
53
The Harvester judgment, handed down by Justice Higgins in
1907, was a landmark in the determination of the minimum wage
legally payable, because this judgment had far-reaching
implications for social policy in that it embodied in the
wage-fixing system the principles of 'equity and need' that
were the basis of European social insurance schemes. The
following comment, though made with reference to New Zealand,
has equal applicability to the Australian context:
the theory of fair wage that appears to prevail is 
the doctrine of the living wage, stated both in its 
negative and positive form. Stated negatively, the theory holds that extremely low wages, such as are 
found under the sweating system, are not fair wages, 
because insufficient to afford a decent living 
according to the colonial standard. Stated
positively, a fair wage is a wage which is
sufficient to give the worker a decent living 
according to the colonial standard, which is higher 
than the British standard, considerably higher the 
that of continental Europe, and immeasurably higher 
than that of the Chinese or Indian coolie.
(Le Rossignol and Stevens, 1910: 239, quoted in
Castles 1985).
The crucial point being urged by Castles (1985) is that a 
full understanding of Australian social policy development is 
not possible without noting the introduction of arbitration, 
which was central to the further evolution of welfare.
By comparison, a similar stage of 'experimentation' in 
social welfare policy in Canada did not begin until the 
1930s, and then it lasted only until the Second World War - a 
period of time that coincides with the stage of consolidation 
in the European context. Apart from pensions and income 
support programmes for veterans, there were no purely 
national programmes in the social security field until the 
enactment of a federal scheme for unemployed insurance in the
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1940s. Indeed, as one writer put it, the history of social 
welfare in the early part of the century in Canada can be 
summed up by the words such as 'family', 'charity' and 'local 
responsibility' (Guest 1980). Bryden has also observed that, 
although municipalities had the prime responsibility for 
social welfare, they
for their part moved at a snail's pace in exercising 
the authority conferred on them. The void was 
partly filled by organized private charity, which 
emphasized institutional care, but also provided 
some outdoor relief (1974: 22).
Despite the focus of public attention on the lack of 
public welfare provision, political pressure for reform was 
almost non-existent in Canada, in stark contrast to the 
Australian situation. This neglect occurred at both 
provincial and federal levels. Most of the welfare 
provisions of this time were through municipal government and 
often took the form of outdoor relief (Guest 1980; Bryden 
1974.)
During the period under review, in contrast to the
legislative innovation in Australia, there was hardly any
attempt in Canada by federal or provincial authorities to
enact legislation in the broad area of social welfare.
Despite this lack of legislative innovation, welfare was
emerging on the policy agenda. This is well portrayed by
Guest in his comment that:
By the 1890's social reform had become a multi­
faceted public issue. Prospects for reform in the 
field of housing, sanitation, town planning, public 
health, factory legislation, child welfare, 
corrections, civil politics and a host of other 
related subjects were brought to the public's
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attention by the work of concerned individuals, by 
the press, by voluntary organizations and by social 
movements (1980: 27).
The Royal Commission of 1887 on the Relations of Labour
and Capital, set up to inquire into and report on all
questions arising out of the conflict of labour and capital,
condemned aspects of the factory system and acknowledged that
labour organisations had a legitimate role to play in
society. (See Bryden 1974, for an analysis of the Report of
the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital.)
One innovation during this period was the introduction of
the Public Annuities Act of 1908. The Royal Commission on
the Relations of Labour and Capital had recommended in its
Report the creation of a government annuity system. Due to
perceived inefficiencies in the private life-insurance
market, the annuity scheme that emerged was, as Guest
observes, a compromise between public and private provisions:
arr scheme of government-operated.. annuities was offered to tne public as a means of overcoming tne
deficiencies in the private market. Individual
contracts could be started with a initial premium of
ten dollars (1980: 35.)
As one analyst cogently notes, the Act had many
advantages over private schemes such as
security of funds, confidence, freedom from 
forfeiture, and elasticity in making payments. But 
for the average factory worker it was expecting too 
much in terms of discipline and sacrifice. His 
surplus, if any, was small, and there were too many 
current risks demanding accessible saving to make it 
possible for him to tie up regular sums for a 
distant prospect. The whole Act insofar as it was 
intended to serve the needs of workingmen was based 
on misconception of their way of life (Laycock, 
quoted in Guest 1980: 35).
Whereas the above comment indicates the annuities plan
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failed to attract many people, and more importantly it did 
not provide retirement security for many in low-income 
groups. In comparison with the Australian situation, Canada 
in the early part of this century clearly did not have any 
comparable social security programmes (residual or universal) 
similar to the relatively comprehensive system of old age 
security found in Australia. An important aspect of this 
issue is that it emphasised the different ideological bases 
of social intervention which underpinned government action. 
The Australian programme had a residual approach based on a 
conception of responsibility for those it deemed ’needy', 
whereas the Canadian programme was 'market' oriented.
Hence what is significant in terms of the comparison 
between Canadian and Australian policy developments is not 
only the degree of policy innovativenes but also the extent 
of federal intervention in social welfare programmes. As 
Butlin et al. have noted, the 1908 Pensions Act was the 
'first national experience of social welfare policy involving 
non-contributory benefits paid from public funds' (Butlin et 
al. 1982: 161). By contrast, as previously observed, 
Canadian public welfare in the early part of the century was 
largely in the hands of local authorities. All provinces 
placed on their municipalities, by direct or indirect method, 
the duty of relieving the local poor. This was done sometimes 
by out-relief and sometimes by means of special almshouses 
(Mendelsohn 1954: 74).
The second characteristic feature of policy adoption in
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Australia and Canada is the marked decline in Australian
policy innovativeness during the inter-war period, while
during this same period Canadian welfare history witnessed
the beginning of the stage of policy experimentation and
encompassed two main legislative enactments. The first was a
programme of means-tested pensions that authorised the
Dominion to provide payments to provincial old-age pensions
schemes. The Old Age Pensions Act of 1928 was not so much an
introduction of federal income security, as a contribution
of federal grants to provinces for their operation of a
pension scheme (Banting 1982). The basic logic of the scheme
was to authorise the Federal Government to enter into
agreement with any province to provide half the cost of
pensions, provided the provincial legislation met the
requirements laid down by the federal legislation. Bryden,
discussing this, has observed that
Administration was entirely a provincial 
responsibility, but an administrative scheme and any 
changes in it had to have federal approval in 
advance. The provinces were protected against being 
left high and dry after having once committed 
themselves to the plan by a provision requiring the 
federal government to give ten years' notice of 
termination of an agreement. A province for its part 
could terminate at any time simply by repealing its 
legislation (Bryden 1974: 61).
Consequently, the operation of the Act varied from 
province to province. In the context of the the issues to be 
discussed later in this study, the role played by electoral 
and party considerations in the pressure for the adoption of 
pension legislation is important. The impact of the Firsts 
World War, the general climate of opinion favouring the
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introduction of pensions and demographic factors were all 
important issues that exerted pressure for the adoption of 
old age pensions. In fact, the pensions issue played a 
crucial role in securing King's victory in the 1926 election
(Bryden 1974). A comparable controversy surrounded 
Diefenbaker’s proposals regarding social insurance in the
1956 election, and is discussed in later chapters.
The system of unemployment insurance (The Unemployment 
Insurance Act of 1940) introduced by the Conservative Bennett 
administration was the first large-scale federal welfare 
programme in Canada and, more importantly, the first to be 
nationally managed. According to Guest, this programme aimed 
at
covering 75 per cent of wage earners... it was the 
largest social programme in Canadian history, up to 
that time, covering 4-6 million people including 
dependents, in its first year of operation 
(1980: 107).
Despite this the Act was not adequate in providing a 
reasonable rate of benefit for those unemployed.
Overall, this period marks out the Australian and 
Canadian policy experience sharply from European welfare 
development. It could be said that, although both countries 
extended social programmes, the extent of expansion was not 
as great as in West European countries. Therefore it could be 
argued that, in terms of Heclo’s model of the stages of 
welfarism, both countries failed to pass through a period of 
welfare consolidation. Indeed, Australia joined Canada in 
the ranks of 'welfare state laggards' while Canada was 
passing through a period of 'experimentation'.
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Interestingly, both countries have a significant history 
of aborted social legislation. This suggests that this 
historical development was not inevitable, but may well have 
been different under altered circumstances. In Australia, the 
Commonwealth Government established a Royal Commission on 
National Insurance in 1923. By 1928, the Commission had 
produced four Reports, the main recommendation of all of them 
being the establishment of a comprehensive insurance scheme. 
Some of these recommendations were later incorporated in the 
National Insurance Bill of 1928. This Bill was eventually 
dropped. Once again, in 1938, after a period of extensive 
debate about social insurance, the Commonwealth passed 
legislation, but this was not enacted because of the 
impending war (Kewley 1965).
Likewise in Canada too, this period saw the introduction 
of social legislation that was proposed but not formally 
enacted. Thus, in 1935, the Conservative Prime Minister 
Bennett attempted to put together a package of social 
policies, similar in nature to a smaller version of the 
American New Deal, to replace the yearly relief etc. And on 
the eve of the parliamentary election which was lost to 
King’s Liberals, Bennett’s Government passed through 
Parliament a series of social welfare measures including a 
programme of unemployment, old age and health insurance, 
cost-shared social assistance and public works, measures to 
help people with mortgages and an agricultural programme to 
help farmers obtain higher prices. But, in 1937, all of
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Bennett's social measures were invalidated by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council after New Brunswick, Ontario 
and Quebec had initiated a legal suit challenging the Federal 
Government's role in compelling contributions from 
individuals as unconstitutional. (On the ’Bennett New Deal’ 
see Finkel, in Panitch 1977; Bryden 1974; and Guest 1980). If 
these social measures were passed, Canadian social history 
may well have been more comparable with the European
experience. In other words, the policy choices made in one 
period had important consequences for later policy
development.
The third feature of policy timing and adoption in the 
two countries is the extent to which new welfare programmes 
were introduced after the Depression, and during and 
immediately after the Second World War. It was a period of 
critical importance for policy innovation in Australia. 
Indeed, nearly all key social programmes except old age and 
invalid pensions and maternity allowances were established by 
the post-war Labor Government during this period (Mendelsohn 
1954; Kewley 1965; Jones 1983). Similarly, Canada saw the 
extension of the Unemployment and Universal Family Allowance 
as well as extensive proposals for federal intervention in 
other areas of social welfare contained in the Marsh Report, 
which was an important post-war social policy document (Guest 
1984; Morgan 1969).
In this aspect of policy adoption, the two countries 
followed the European pattern, but still remained 'welfare 
state laggards'. Although political factors (e.g., the
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strength of the industrial and political labour movements) 
were undoubtedly important in explaining policy outcomes in 
this period, the importance of two key international events - 
the Depression and the Second World War - cannot be over­
estimated in accounting for the introduction of new social 
policy programmes. Variations in the degree of policy 
innovativeness of individual countries can be accounted for 
by local contextual factors, but the convergence of these 
programmes was more likely a consequence of the Depression 
and Second World War. Additionally, the acceptance of 
Keynesian ideas of economic management, more particularly the 
adoption of full employment as an economic objective, changed 
the context of social policy formulation. Social policy came 
to be seen as an adjunct to economic policy. In this 
context, both countries produced White Papers on full 
employment which acknowledged the role of social welfare in 
economic policy.
Fourthly, health insurance is a field in which Canada 
and Australia (along with United States) lagged behind 
European developments. Whereas comprehensive health insurance 
was established by West European states in the decade after 
the Second World War (as in Britain in 1948), it was not 
until much later that Canada (1966) and Australia (1974)^ 
established fully comprehensive national health insurance. In 
fact the Australian scheme lasted for only a year and half 
before it was subject to major revision. (For a review of 
Canadian health insurance policy, see Taylor 1978.) It should
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be noted that Australia had a system of subsidised health
insurance, which provided substantial health cover introduced
by the Menzies Government in the mid 1950s.
Canada's Medical Care Act of 1966 established a system
of National Health Insurance following the recommendations of
the Hall Report, which favoured the introduction of health 
insurance plans based on the type existing in Saskatchewan.
Saskatchewan's medical insurance plan was based on (a) pre­
payment; (b) universal coverage; and (c) administration by 
the public body responsible for the legislature. The Act 
established a comprehensive health insurance scheme in which 
the Federal Government agreed to subsidise provincial health 
schemes:
The funding offer for each provincial government 
equalled 50% of the per capita costs over all 
provincial plans, multiplied by the number of 
persons. Eventually all provinces accepted the
offer - Saskatchewan and British Columbia on July 1 
1969; New Foundland, Nova Scotia and Manitoba on 
April 1 1969; Quebec on November 1 1970; and Prince 
Edward Island on December 1 of the same year (Brown 1983: 45-48).
Patterns of Policy Initiation
The analysis of policy initiation, focussing as it does 
on the date of first introduction of social programmes, gives 
only a partial and limited account of the nature of policy 
innovation in Australia and Canada. To obtain a more complete 
picture of policy dynamics, it is necessary to examine policy 
accretions, that is, significant additions to established 
programmes. Therefore we now focus not so much on the date of 
first introduction of programmes but on the nature of growth
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patterns of social policies.
Borrowing an analogy from contemporary debates in 
evolutionary theory (Eldredge 1985), it could be argued that 
whereas in Canada policy innovation is gradualist, the 
Australian pattern appears more as a process of punctuated 
equilibrium, in which periodic episodes of policy changes are 
followed by long periods of stagnation.
Elaborating this argument, one could identify five major
periods of policy innovation and stagnation in
They are:
1900-1914 policy innovation
1914-1943 stagnation
1943-1949 policy innovation
1949-1972 stagnation
1972-1975 policy innovation
1975-1980 stagnation
The characteristic feature of these periods has been that 
the introduction and extension of welfare programmes has 
occurred mainly in periods of Labor rule, though it should be 
emphasised that the above schemata relates to the 
establishment of new programmes. In relation to expenditure, 
the importance of Labor governments, particularly the Whitlam 
Government, can be exaggerated, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. It is the wave-like nature of welfare policy 
innovation that is a notable feature of patterns of policy 
development in Australia, although this is in part a 
function of the infrequency of Labor governments.
6 4
From a comparative perspective, a most revealing period 
for policy innovation in Australia is 1945-1949 (the most 
immediate post-war period) and the subsequent stagnation of 
the 1950s and 1960s. This is vividly portrayed by Jones:
The period from 1940-1946 saw many specific 
legislative measures in the field of Australian 
social security in contrast to the previous twenty 
years which had been rich in debate, but weak in 
specific actions. By 1946, a number of new 
programmes had been enacted: child endowment,
unemployment and sickness benefits, tuberculosis, 
hospital, pharmaceutical and funeral benefits, and 
widows’ pensions (1983: 48).
In contrast he notes that the ’period from 1950-1960, 
the dullest in Australian social policy history, produced few 
innovations’ (1983: 55).
It is the period of policy stagnation from 1949 to 1972
that significantly marks out the Australian from the Canadian
experience as well as from that of nearly all other OECD
countries. It was in this period that Canadian programmes
exhibited a pattern of continuous expansion, which justifies
the description of the Canadian policy pattern as one of
gradual or continuous changes to existing programmes. Table
2.2, below, outlines the gradual expansion of income
maintenance policies in the post-war period.
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TABLE 2.2
Important Milestones in Canadian Income Maintenance Policies
1927-1975
Year Act Coverage
1927 Old Age Pensions Act
1940 Insurance Act
1944 Family Allowance Act
1951 Old Age Security Act
Old Age Assistance Act 
Blind Persons Act
1954 Disabled Persons Act
1956 Unemployment Assistance Act
1957 Hospital Insurance and 
Diagnostic Services Act
1964 Youth Allowance Act
1965 Canada Pension Plan
1966 Guaranteed Income Supplements 
Canada Assistance Plan
Medical Care Act
1971 Unemployment Insurance expanded
1973 Family Allowances modified and
made taxable
1975 Spouse Allowance added to
Guaranteed Income Supplement
1978 Child Tax Credit
means test
social insurance
demorgant
demorgant 
means test 
means test
means test
means test
universal
demorgant
social insurance
(income test) 
needs test with 
asset limitations
universal
social insurance
income test 
income test
Source: Leman (1978: 34.)
Note: ’Demorgant' indicates that programmes are confined to a 
given demographic category.
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Canadian old-age pensions provide a classic illustration 
of the hypothesis outlined above. There have been two main 
steps in the evolution of Canadian old-age policy. One is
federal intervention in the social welfare field, and the
other is the establishment of comprehensive social insurance.
Federal intervention in the social welfare field first
occurred with the introduction of the 1927 Old Age Pension
Act which empowered the Federal Government to share costs
with the provinces for means-tested pensions for those over
seventy. Canadian old-age policy underwent significant
changes in the 1950s with the passing of the Old Age Security
Act (OAS) of 1951. This Act provided for a federally
financed demorgant scheme at age 70 with provision for shared
cost with old-age assistance via lessened means-test for
those aged 65 through to 69. As Banting notes,
Demorgants are universal, flat rate payments made to 
individuals or families solely on the basis of 
demographic characteristics, such as age, rather 
than on the basis of proven need as in the case of social insurance (1982: 7).
Though finance of the old-age pensions was not contributory,
Prime Minister St Laurent insisted that OAS pensions be
financed not from consolidated revenue but from a special
old-age security tax levied on sales, corporate income and
pensions. Leman notes that
This tax would have to be increased whenever 
benefits were hiked - although subsequent policy 
makers did not actually maintain this correspondence 
(1977: 177).
The next significant metamorphosis in Canadian old-age 
pensions policy was the establishment of a system of
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comprehensive contributory social insurance. This
effectively established a three-tiered system of old-age
security in Canada. The first tier consists of OAS benefits.
OAS provides benefits to all Canadians regardless of income
(in other words, a demorgant programme), and the scheme is
financed through consolidated funds (Leman 1977). Until 1972,
however, it was financed through special social security
taxes (cf. 1952 Act). The second tier consists of a means-
tested Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS). The GIS is paid
to Canadians who receive OAS but whose income is below a
given limit; it is financed through consolidated revenue.
The third tier is the Canadian and Quebec Pension Plan
(C&QPP), which is effectively a system of contributory
national insurance. As Rice describes the scheme:
The Canada Pension Plan pays 25% of average adjusted contributory career earning for a number 
of months of low or zero earnings (1979: 126).
The above description of the growth of Canadian old-age 
policy is intended to illustrate clearly the gradualist 
evolution of Canadian social policy in contrast to the 
Australian pattern of periodic bursts of innovative policy 
developments followed by periods of stagnation. The latter 
point also serves to underline an important difference in the 
structure of income maintenance in the two nations, that is, 
the predominantly means-tested and non-contributory 
programmes that are characteristic of Australian welfare 
programmes (Castles 1985).
In terms of finance, Australia remains deviant from the
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modal patterns of welfare policy development, in the absence 
of contributory insurance programmes. The financing of 
Australian welfare programmes has been almost totally from 
consolidated revenue. However, the feasibility of introducing 
contributory insurance schemes has been widely debated, 
especially during the inter-war years. Twice the Commonwealth 
Government drafted legislation for national insurance and 
once, in 1938 it passed an Act of Parliament, which however, 
was not proclaimed. In fact the only social insurance 
programme was in Queensland, where a system of unemployment 
insurance was introduced in 1923. Brennan (1982) has provided 
a useful comparison of different modes of financing in OECD 
states by constructing a ranking of countries based on the 
degree to which they depend on financing welfare (largely 
income-maintenance programmes) from general revenue or 
progressive taxation. According to this ranking, New Zealand
and Australia come first and second respectively, indicating 
the degree to which they depend on finance from general
revenue.
Canada, on the other hand, has a mixed mode of 
financing, in that it relies on both contributory schemes and 
consolidated revenue. In terms of Brennan’s (1982) ranking, 
Canada lies somewhere in the middle of the field. Kudrle and 
Marmor (1981) illustrate the extent to which Canadian 
programmes have become universalised in the post-war period. 
Financing, however, presents an interesting comparison with 
Australia in the sense that contributory insurance schemes 
were fairly late to develop in Canada, as it was only during
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the 1960s that Canada established contributory social
insurance. Prior to this, it had a system of welfare
programmes predominantly financed from general revenue,
though these programmes were universal rather than means
tested. Indeed Canada in the 1950s was
unique among Western industrial countries in 
financing social security without assessing 
contributions directly on the prospective 
beneficiaries or their employers. This uniqueness 
was purchased, however, by their illiberality. (Leman 1977: 278).
2.3 CONCLUSION
Before drawing some general conclusions about the nature 
of historical developments in Australia and Canada, it is 
pertinent to examine some of the main trends in welfare 
expenditure between the two countries. It is evident from 
Table 1 in Appendix 2 that total welfare accounted for 18.9% 
of GDP in Canada, while in Australia it amounted to only 
12.8%. This is a relatively high difference, and underlines 
the point that Australia is clearly a welfare state laggard 
(see Appendix 2). Canadian expenditure is around the OECD 
average, and, in the context of the expansion of OECD social 
expenditure, the figures reflect the reality of Australian 
stagnation rather than the growth of Canadian social 
expenditure.
The importance of these expenditure figures lies however, 
not in the absolute levels but in the rates of change of 
expenditure. Canadian welfare expenditure increased by 7.5% 
of GDP from 1965 to 1975 as against an increase in Australia
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of 3.2%. Similarly, comparison of elasiticity of welfare 
expenditure with respect to GDP indicates an Australian 
figure below the OECD average (see Appendix 2). This 
indicates that, in terms of the relationship between growth 
of GDP and welfare, which is what elasticity captures, 
Australian social expenditure had a slower rate of growth in 
relation to overall economic expansion of other
industrialised countries. This evidence bears out the 
contention of this chapter regarding the contrasting periods
of stagnation and innovation in Australian and history as 
compared with the gradualist Canadian pattern.
The analysis of patterns of policy adoption examined 
above raises two important problems which require 
explanation in terms of Heclo's model. The first puzzling 
fact is the early trend of Australian innovation in welfare 
legislation as against the almost total lack of any 
significant welfare legislation in Canada. The second is the 
unexpected stagnation in policy innovation in Australia after 
the initial spurt of legislative activity.
As has been explained in this chapter, a critically 
important factor in understanding the different patterns of 
innovation in the two countries is the extent of 
centralisation of the income-security system. In relative 
terms, Australia moved towards a more centralised income- 
security system much earlier than Canada. This occurred 
because in Australia pensions were unambiguously a federal 
power but, more importantly, because welfare issues rarely 
entered the arena of federal-state relations. The BNA Act, on
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the other hand, did not give the Canadian Federal Government 
power over income maintenance. Moreover, welfare issues were 
part of federal-provincial relations. In sum, the relative 
degree of centralisation of income-security systems in the 
two countries was a factor in the degree of innovativeness of 
social policy at the turn of the century.5
Another factor which explains the differing degree of 
innovativeness in Australian and Canadian welfare legislation 
in the early part of the century is the strength of the 
labour movement. Both the industrial and political labour 
movements, as reflected in the extent of unionisation and 
electoral share of the ALP, were among the strongest in the 
world (Kewley 1965; Stephens 1979; Aitkin 1982a; and Castles 
1985). It was the Fisher administration that introduced 
maternity allowances in 1912, while old-age and invalid 
pensions were introduced partly because of labour pressure. 
But in Canada, labour was marginal in its impact on policy. 
Politically organised labour was not in the mainstream of the 
Canadian party system; although the unions had some 
influence, the work force was not as highly unionised as in 
Australia.
Aside from these factors, a critical element in 
understanding policy initiation is the attitudes and values 
held in both countries concerning welfare. As Collins 
(1984: 32) has recently argued, Australian political culture 
can be viewed as Benthamite in the sense that it emphasises 
pragmatism and utilitarianism. These values were supported
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and reinforced by experience. Colonial governments have a
long history of state intervention to provide infrastructure,
capital and services (see for example, Butlin et al. 1982).
This view of political culture and conception of the State
has roots in Australian historiography. While this mode of
analysis, especially as employed by Collins (1984) can be
faulted on methodological grounds, particularly its implicit
historicism, it does provide a plausible analysis of the
values and attitudes which were embedded in the early
legislation and especially in the pension programme. This
helps to explain the predominantly residual means-tested
character of the old-age pension scheme, a form which has
lasted without significant change.
Conversely, in Canada, the dominant set of values at the
turn of the century was, as Hartz (1964) and other writers
have noted, liberal in character. It stressed the values of
self-reliance and individualism. Society was seen as
composed of atomised individuals engaged in competition for
material pursuits. Bryden aptly terms this the dominance of
the market ethos, and argues that
The destitute were considered to be more in need of 
moral exhortation and uplift than material 
assistance ... The fundamental belief was that the 
family was responsible for those of its members both 
children and adults who were unable to provide 
adequately for themselves (1974: 20).
It would be a mistake, however, if we (like Hartz) 
neglected other sources of Canadian ideological inheritance. 
Horwitz (1966) cogently argued that what distinguishes the 
Canadian and American ideological inheritance is the presence
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of the Tory values built around collectivism, and which seek 
to redefine liberal values. While at the turn of the century 
liberalism was certainly dominant, other ideological
traditions have influenced the major Canadian parties, 
especially the dominant Liberal Party, and contributed to 
changed attitudes towards social policy.
The other issue raised by the analysis of policy 
adoption is the puzzle of Australian stagnation following the 
initial burst of innovation. One factor which may explain 
the Australian policy of a low degree of policy innovation 
and social expenditure as well as the residualist pattern of 
welfare is the system of industrial relations. Comparative 
research in the field of cross-national industrial relations 
has been increasingly directed towards the examination of 
the impact of different modes of industrial relations on 
other outputs. A pioneering work in this field was the work 
of Snyder (1975), who examined the impact of different models 
of industrial relations (in a time-series analysis) on the 
levels of strikes. More recently, Korpi (1980) has attempted 
to build on this early work, and examined different welfare 
outcomes under collective bargaining and corporatism. The 
implication of his work (it is not explicit) is the 
importance of trade-offs in accounting for welfare policy 
outcomes. In the corporatist system this trade-off is between 
the level of real wages and increased social expenditure; and 
in the collective bargaining system it is between increases 
in the level of real wages and reduced social expenditure.
The basis for our argument is that arbitration involves
74
a trade-off in policy arenas. The largely supplementary or 
residualist nature of Australian welfare policy is partly due
to the fact that some aspects of major redistributive issues 
are not resolved within the mainstream of the policy process, 
but rather are matters that fall within the ambit of 
arbitration. The critical point here is that issues normally 
regarded as re-distributive are processed within the arena of 
arbitration. The system of industrial relations in this case 
involves not an exchange between wages and social expenditure 
but a trade-off between policy arenas. The consequence of 
this trade-off between policy arenas is reflected not only in 
the levels of social expenditure but also in patterns of 
social policy. Arbitration offered the labour movement an 
institutional means by in which to pursue the issues of 
economic security.
A related but distinct argument about the role of 
industrial relations and social welfare concerns the linkage 
between social insurance and arbitration. A plausible but 
speculative hypothesis proposed is that arbitration is the 
functional equivalent of social insurance. Many analysts, 
the most recent being Castles (1985), have noted the strong 
correlation between the timing of social insurance 
legislation and the strength of the labour movement. One of 
the paradoxes of early Australian welfare history, which led 
Castles (1985) to write in terms of 'Australian 
exceptionalism,’, is the presence of a strong labour movement 
but the lack of development of universal social insurance.
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However, Castles suggests that this paradox of timing is 
resolved when one substitutes arbitration, or more 
specifically the basic-wage judgment, for universal social 
insurance. The argument not only provides a basis for the 
residualist pattern of welfare policy but, more importantly, 
provides an explanation for the lack of pressure from the 
labour movement for social insurance. Central to this 
argument is that institutional choice at one period of time 
determines the range of policy options open to the state. In 
the area of social welfare, the choice of arbitration reduced 
the capacity to introduce universalistic social policies.
A particularly interesting problem to emerge from this 
analysis, as we noted in the introduction, is the 
relationship between 'economic citizenship’ and levels of 
policy development. Clearly, Australia and Canada have 
economic structures that are different from those of other 
industrialised countries (see Chaper 4). Given the fact that 
Australia and Canada are dependent on exporting staples, to 
what extent are the policy choices and strategies in 
Australia and Canada related to the fluctuations in the terms 
of trade? More specifically, how does social welfare 
expenditure respond to variations in the levels of export 
income? This issue forms the basis for the argument which 
will be examined in Chapter 4.
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NOTES
As Heclo (1981) notes, it is possible now to delineate a 
further stage in which the traditional frontiers of the 
welfare state remain under attack.
The best account of the development of the welfare state in 
Europe in these terms is in Flora and Alber (1981), and 
the other articles in the collection edited by P. Flora and 
A. Heidenheimer (1981). See also A. Rimlinger, (1971).
The dates presented in Table 2.1 have been based on surveys 
of the welfare state development in Australia and Canada. 
The most useful of such surveys of the welfare state are 
Guest (1980; 1984), Kewley (1965) and Mendelsohn (1954), 
which provide an interesting introduction to the early 
development of the welfare state. In addition, the 
distinctly policy-oriented studies of Graycar (1979), 
Jones (1983) and Bryden (1974) provide a more analytical 
perspective.
Australian health insurance prior to the introduction of 
Medicare was characterised by a system of subsidisation of 
private medical insurance which had 85% cover in 1970. The 
benefits of subsidised voluntary insurance were felt mainly 
by supplier groups, particularly the insurance groups, who 
not only retained the private insurance market but whose 
profits were largely increased by subsidies. The other 
group of supplier beneficiaries consisted of the doctors, 
who were able to make large profits in the regulated 
environment (Brown 1977; Deeble 1970; Scotton 1968). The 
benefits of the regulation of health insurance were felt 
mainly by private suppliers. Indeed, it is analogous to 
the 'capture theory’ of regulation proposed by Peltzman 
(1976), and Tollison and McCormick (1981). It should also 
be noted that the introduction of a system of national 
health insurance by the ALP during the post-war period was 
continually frustrated by both the Constitution and the 
BMA, which later became the Australian Medical Association 
- AMA.
It should also be argued that the provisions in the Federal 
Constitution for central control over pension programmes 
led to the centralisation of the income security system. 
The causality is the other way around.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND ASPECTS OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1, the basis of the research problem that is
to be the guiding framework of the research was outlined.
This chapter provides an account of the research strategy,
the methodology and some of the design aspects of the study.
It sets out to explain not only the methods constructed to
test the hypotheses, but also seeks to place these methods
in a more general and methodological framework by examining
the structure of the comparative design used to falsify the
general conjectures outlined in Chapter 1. This research
being essentially a comparative study, the selection of an
appropriate comparative research strategy is not independent
of the research problem, but rather is crucially dependent
upon it. As Roberts points out,
the relationships between theory and strategy are 
multiple and rich. Theory selection may determine the 
way in which cases for comparison are selected, 
whether intra-system or cross-system comparison shall 
be undertaken (1978: 299).
Many earlier comparative policy studies suffered from the 
fact that they were based on descriptive policy studies that 
formed a
series of isolated, episodic descriptions 
particularly of legislative enactments - which are 
apparently thought to be of intrinsic interest. To 
only a very limited extent does this legacy consti­
tute a body of scientific observation helping to discern larger patterns (Heclo 1972: 90).
The major flaw in this type of case-study approach is the
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lack not only of an appropriately formulated research
problem, but also of a well thought out research design. In 
contrast, central to the logic of this study is that the 
’core problem’ identified for research in this study, and 
described as the problematic relationship between party and 
policy, is best handled by a 'similar systems' research 
design. The nature of the design is critically dependent on 
the research problem. On the other hand, if the problem 
related more to the relationship between institutions and 
expenditure, a 'different systems’ design would have been 
more appropriate because it is only through the choice of 
widely different institutional settings that propositions can 
be tested. Clearly, the choice of strategy in comparative 
studies is dependent on the nature and purposes of the 
research problem. The similar systems design pursued in this 
study is therefore based on the fact that it appears best 
suited to explicating the several features of the research 
problem identified in Chapter 1.
In brief, a similar systems design is one in which the 
selection of the units for comparative study is guided by 
relevant similar characteristics of the units chosen for 
comparison. (See Lijphart 1975, for an outline of these 
designs.) By contrast, in studies based on a different 
systems design, the selection of units for comparison is 
determined by relevant different characteristics of the 
units. The strategy is based not 'upon systems or cases 
which are similarly patterned in their main relationships, 
but on those where the actual patterns of relationships among
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variables differ' (Roberts 1978: 294). To cite an example 
within the policy output literature, the important study of 
Wilensky (1975) on the determinants of welfare expenditure 
is one which employs a different systems design.1 The
justification for a different systems design is that any set 
of explanatory statements can be generalised to a wide
variety of circumstances.
The choice of a different systems strategy, despite
being preferable in an ideal scientific setting, has distinct
drawbacks in the uncertain social-science environment in
which we operate. First and most seriously, the strategy is
premised on the development of ’grand' theories in the sense
of theories that attempt to be all encompassing and which
therefore cry out for testing in different systems.
Unfortunately, the difficulty with policy output studies is
the paucity of systematic theoretical explanation. The
empirical testing of middle range theoretical propositions,
such as those outlined in this study, is needed so as to
develop a sound body of research findings which could then be
tested in a ’different system' framework. A second
shortcoming of a different system strategy is that, in a
study of this sort, where the problem is one of identifying
the effects of specific differences,
the selection of units of analysis which possess many 
similarities in terms of relevant variables makes 
easier the identification of variables which do 
differ, and which may thus be considered as the first 
candidates for investigation as causal or explanatory 
variables (Roberts 1978: 293).
On the other hand, the logic of the similar systems
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design is basically analogous to that of a controlled 
experiment and may be regarded as being similar to that 
described by Campbell and Cook (1979) as * quasi-experiments' . 
According to these authors, quasi-experiments are 
'experiments that have treatments, outcome measures, and 
experimental units, but do not use random assignment to 
create the comparisons from which treatment-caused change is 
inferred' (1979: 6). In order to make valid inferences about 
the effect of the treatment on the outcome, one needs to 
control the quasi-experimental setting. The important aspect 
of this design is that it enables the researcher to make 
inferences about the effect of treatment on the outcome with 
the knowledge that other relevant variables have been 
controlled.
The greatest threat to the validity of the research 
design comes from the researcher’s failing to account 
adequately for the influence of factors other than those 
affected by the treatment (also called 'independent 
variables’) which influence outcomes. Consequently, in 
determining the nature of the 'experiment' in a comparative 
setting, the analyst must endeavour to hold constant a set of 
relevant characteristics or elements, which are believed to 
be important in making inferences about the effect of 
independent variables on the dependent variable. The notion 
of experimental control is central to all experimental 
designs; its logic and its rationale are derived from John 
Stuart Mills’s analysis of the logic of scientific inquiry,
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in particular, Mills’s method of difference. (See Cohen and 
Nagel 1934, for an outline of Mills's account of this logic 
of scientific inquiry.) As Campbell and Cook point out, 
Mills's contribution was
to realize that the comparison of situations where a 
particular threat to valid inference was or was not 
operating provided the key for assessing whether the 
threat might account for any observed relationship 
between the cause under study and its possible effect 
(1979: 19).
The chief elements in any quasi-experimental research 
design such as the comparative method based on a similar 
systems design are (a) the selection of control elements or 
factors for the study (section 3.2), (b) an identification of 
the treatment effects or the operation of independent 
variables (section 3.3), and (c) determining the measures of 
outcome (section 3.4). Each of these elements of the research 
design is examined below.
Apart from this feature of comparative design employed 
in this study, another element of its structure is its time- 
series focus. As many have pointed out, a primary flaw of 
comparative studies, as evidenced in the cross-national 
literature is that, most of them have employed a cross- 
sectional rather than a time-series research design (Castles 
1982b; Shalev 1983). The present research attempts to rectify 
this by a detailed time-series study of two countries, 
Australia and Canada. The problems of using time-series data 
are examined in the section on statistical procedure (section 
3.5) .
82
3.2 CONTROLS FOR COMPARISON
As indicated earlier, the countries represented in this 
study are Australia and Canada. Although this choice has 
been somewhat arbitrary, considerations such as the 
availability of data had an important bearing, in addition to 
other systematic considerations. In terms of the design 
adopted, the systematic grounds for the comparison rests in 
particular, on the presence of four relevant similar
characteristics in the two countries represented in the study 
design.
These four key characteristics are (a) common historical 
experience, (b) similar parliamentary institutions, (c)
similar systems of expenditure appropriation, and, (d) 
federal character. These particular characteristics are by 
no means the only similarities existing between these two 
countries, but from a design point of view, their inclusion 
has been justified in view of their special relevance for the 
proposed analysis of welfare expenditure. It is pertinent 
therefore to comment briefly on each of these
characteristics, as they are vital to establishing the logic 
of the comparative methodology of this study.
First, the common historical experience of the two
countries flows from their being settler societies, a legacy
of the days of British colonial rule in the 18th and 19th
centuries. Hartz (1964) sees Australia and Canada as ’Anglo
fragments' because of their links with Great Britain, the
overriding colonial power guiding the destinies of both 
2countries. Furthermore, these countries have had a broadly
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similar economic history, based on the exports of agricul­
tural staples such as wool, wheat and beef which formed the 
central 'core' of the economy. These 'staples' in turn 
provided a basis for the evolving of the economic and (to a 
certain extent) social structure of these countries.
Perhaps it was this fact which prompted some 
distinguished historians like Keith Hancock (1929) in 
Australia and Harold Innis (1956) in Canada, to develop a 
comparative history of former 'Dominion States’ such as 
Australia and Canada. Innis in particular developed his 
influential 'staples theory’ of economic growth, stressing 
the backward and forward linkages that the export of staples 
created for the emerging process of industrialisation in 
these countries. Incidentally, this process of industrialisa­
tion was markedly different to that of the classic European 
pattern (see footnote 4 in Chapter 1) and is well 
characterised by Ehrensaft and Armstrong in the following 
terms:
In effect, there is a preponderant element of rent on 
natural resources, which supports the 
industrialization and prosperity of dominion 
capitalism. The economy as a whole is thus subject to 
the same long-term risks as any rented resource.- 
...Dominion capitalist societies are thus both 
structurally shallow and subject to high risks over 
the long run; in this sense we may speak of a 
truncated economic base (Ehrensaft and Armstrong 
1981: 102).
Secondly, both countries have parliamentary systems of 
government based on the Westminster tradition of responsible 
government typified by (a) cabinet government, (b) majority 
party government formed on the basis of the majority
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political party in the Lower House, and (c) the existence of
3cohesive political parties in the Legislature. As Albinski 
has correctly observed ’cabinet government and prime 
ministerial leadership' are 'the hallmarks of Canadian and 
Australian political life’ (1973: 289).
Nevertheless, in terms of governmental structure and
process, there are also some important differences,
especially the divergent roles of the Prime Minister, the
.4Upper House and Parliamentary Committees. The relatively 
more powerful position of the Prime Minister and his office 
in Canada has prompted some observers to compare the Canadian 
Prime Ministership with the United States Presidential style 
of government. The position of the Canadian Prime Minister is 
further reinforced by the process of election of party 
leaders by Party Convention.^ (See Van Loon and Whittington 
1981.) This difference may be increasingly less significant 
because there are signs that the office of the Australian 
Prime Minister has been growing in importance in recent 
years. Moreover, in recent times, the issue of leadership may 
have increased in importance as a determinant of Australian 
electoral behaviour.
A further difference between parliamentary institutions 
in Australia and Canada lies in the role and function of 
the Upper House. Although in constitutional terms, the 
Canadian Senate has a great deal of influence (see Jackson 
et al. 1987), recent decades have seen the Australian Senate
rise to the centre stage of political life to assume an
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importance that is greater than its Canadian counterpart. An 
index of this increasing influence is evidenced in the growth
of the Australian Senate Committee system. A reason for this 
phenomenon is the fact that recent Australian governing 
parties have often been in a minority in the Senate.
In the Lower House too, the importance of Parliamentary 
Committees differs between the two countries. The role of 
Committees and Committee work has been of greater importance, 
and politically more influential in the Canadian than in the 
Australian context. (See Jackson and Atkinson 1974, for an 
analysis of the Canadian system; also Kornberg and Mishler 
1976.) But once again, the recent growth of Lower House 
Committees in Australia has tended to minimise this 
difference.
The third similar characteristic relevant for design 
purposes, is the common system of expenditure appropriation 
existing in both countries. Expenditure level and priorities 
are determined by the annual Budget process which begins in 
the Lower House, and passes through similar parliamentary 
procedures in both countries. Outside the annual budgetary 
context there is only minor variation of expenditure 
priorities.
Lastly, and importantly for our purposes of comparison, 
both countries have a federal system of government with the 
federal and sub-national units (states/provinces) of 
governments having specifically designated legislative and 
executive functions.6 While the type of federalism (a topic 
that has generated the most amount of work by scholars
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interested in Australian and Canadian federalism) differs 
between the two countries, the relevant and crucial 
consideration for our purposes is that welfare functions 
remain divided between the federal and sub-national levels of 
government in Australia and Canada. (See Banting 1982, for 
an excellent discussion of federalism and welfare in Canada.) 
It could be argued that the type of federalism in Australia 
and Canada differs from one another. However, in an aggregate 
study of the kind undertaken here, it is difficult to 
construct measures which are sensitive to variations in the 
type of federalism. Moreover, such an analysis is not 
relevant to the issues dealt with here. The description of 
the principal variables having been outlined, the next task 
is to highlight the nature of the explanatory variables - the 
party structure and organisation - that differ between the 
two countries.
3.3 PARTY SUPPORT AND ORGANISATION AS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The independent variables examined in this study are 
briefly categorised here (they will be examined in detail 
in subsequent chapters) into two main groups. The first group 
deals with economic variables, and the second with political 
variables. This latter group is further classified and 
differentiated for purposes of analysis by considering the 
influences emanating from political administration and 
political competition. In short, the logic of the research 
design is to examine the impact of these variables (later
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referred to as 'treatment effects’) on expenditure ('outcome 
measures’).
Broadly speaking, what is being suggested here (and this 
will be detailed below) is that the party systems in 
Australia and Canada differ from each other in two main 
respects: (a) in the basis of class support, and, (b) in 
organisational strength of parties. The absence of class- 
based cleavages in Canada as well as the lack of a national 
electorate inclines us to describe Canada as being character­
ised by a weak party system, whereas, by contrast, Australia 
has a stronger party system in that there is a degree of 
class support with an electorate that is not fragmented as in 
Canada.
To recapitulate, the proposition that has been advanced 
is that a strong party system, measured in terms of class 
support and organisation, has greater influence on welfare 
expenditure than would a weaker system. In this context, the 
Australian and Canadian data provide a useful testing ground 
for this proposition. The examination of these data enables 
the analyst to draw inferences about the nature of the 
linkage between party and policy. Therefore, a central 
interest of the study is to consider whether the marked 
differences in the nature of the political party system 
lead to differential policy outcomes through the influence 
of the empirically tested political variables.
From a methodological standpoint, we may be said to be 
invoking Mills’s method of difference in that we will be 
drawing inferences about the mediating effect of the party
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system on the independent variables. This is based on the 
fact that after we control for other relevant political
variables, the party system (in the terms defined in the 
study) is the element that varies between the two countries. 
Inferences can be drawn about the effect of these aspects on 
the independent variables, and hence on policy outcomes. Of 
course, it is possible that there are other elements that 
vary between the two countries, but all possible variables 
which impinge on public expenditure have been controlled.
One final note of caution needs to be expressed about 
the design aspects of this study, particularly in relation to 
the independent variables: there may be factors
external to those controlled for, which may influence the 
independent variables. This is clearly a limitation of this 
study. This limitation is characteristic of all 'quasi- 
experiment' type designs which are by definition not 
adequately protected from all 'threats' to the validity of 
the research design (Judd and Kenny 1981). Nevertheless, the 
chief merit of such a design is that as a reasonably 
controlled study, it creates a better climate for under­
standing the systematic issues described previously.
The diagram below represents the logic of the research 
design, and serves to clarify the terminology. It 
demonstrates the relationship between the treatment effects 
or independent variables (IVs), and the outcome measures or 
dependent variables (DVs) in the study.
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DIAGRAM 3.1
RESEARCH DESIGN
Treatment Effects Outcomes
(I Vs ) (DVs )
Expenditures relating to:
(a) Economic
(b) Political
(i) Social welfare
(ii) Health
(i) Administration 
(ii) Political (iii) Education
Competition
(iv) Total Welfare
(v) Total Expenditure
Party Support and Organisation in Australia and Canada
As noted above, we have argued that the political parties 
in Australia and Canada may be characterised as differing 
in respect of two important factors, namely, the class 
support and the nature and extent of the organisational 
strength of the parties. More specifically, as regards class 
support, the absence of major class-based cohesive parties in 
Canada and their presence in Australia enables us to 
determine whether this factor of class-based political 
cleavages in the party system has an influence on welfare 
expenditure. It is in this sense that Australia and Canada 
- countries otherwise matched in terms of other relevant 
characteristics - provide a reasonably controlled comparative 
focus for explaining differences in policy outcomes between 
the two countries. Similarly, differences in the strength of 
party organisation between the two countries also permit us
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to examine the effect, if any, of this element.
3.3.1 Class Support
Evidence in support of the proposition that the class 
cleavage in Canadian parties is not significant comes from a 
survey analysis carried out by Clarke et al. (1980). The 
latter study in fact tends to cast doubt on the proposition 
of an earlier work by Alford (1963) who posed the view that 
the party system in Canadian politics, despite its low level 
of class voting at the time of his analysis, would move 
inexorably towards class polarisation. However, Clarke et al. 
(1980) point out that the percentage difference in Liberal 
support across all occupational categories, which provide a 
crude measure of class interests, is not significant. In a 
similar manner, the New Democratic Party (NDP) in Canada 
has failed to capture a majority amongst any single 
occupational group. Again, this too is suggestive of the 
absence of class support for parties.
The diagram below taken from Clarke et al. (1980) shows 
the measure of relationship between social class and voting 
for the ’left' parties - the Liberal Party and the NDP - in 
Canada as a whole, as well as in the provinces separately. It 
is similar to Alford’s class voting index between regions. 
Clarke also computed a second index of class voting using the 
NDP vote as the only ’left’ option, but both indices were 
similar.
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DIAGRAM 3.2
Index of Class Voting
(Liberals and NDP versus PCs and Social Credit)
+20 - I
+16.3 British Columbia
....
+3.2 Ontario
+0.9 Canada
-3 .0  Atlantic
-11 2
Note.-- The indices of class voting range from -100 to +100. The 
positive values indicate the extent to which the working 
and lower classes cast proportionately more votes for 
the 'left' parties (the Liberal Party and the NDP) than 
do the middle and upper classes. Conversely, values less 
than 0 show the extent of middle and upper classs 
support for the 'left' parties in proportion to that of 
the working and lower classes.
Source: Clarke et al. (1980: 84).
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While there are some interesting variations in class
voting patterns by regions as well as by voting trends, for
our purpose, the main conclusion to be drawn from this
analysis is that the relationship between class and voting is
weak. In this regard, a general conclusion to emerge from the
survey data analysis as expressed by Clarke et al. is that
the investigation of social class and vote indicates 
the weakness of socio-economic divisions as 
politically relevant cleavages in Canadian society. 
Confidence in this conclusion is buttressed by the 
fact that several measures of social class, including 
occupation, education, Blishen scores, and subjective 
assessments of social class position, all failed to 
yield strong correlations with voting behaviour in any 
of the three national surveys (1980: 86).
The comparison between the Canadian data on class and 
the Australian evidence, reported by Aitkin (1982a), 
indicates that there is a greater degree of class voting in 
Australia. This however, is a relative statement in relation 
to Canada. As recent evidence indicates, there might have 
occurred over the last two decades a process of de-alignment 
of class and party in Australia. (See Aitkin 1982a; and 
Kemp 1978.)
One of the earliest comparative studies of class voting 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries and, indeed, one of the few 
comparative studies of class voting in general, is Alford's 
(1963) analysis of the relationship between class and party. 
Alford's index of class voting was computed by subtracting 
the percentage of non-manual workers voting for 1 left'parties 
from that of manual workers voting for ’non-left' parties. 
He ranked class voting in the Anglo-American democracies in 
the following manner:
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Table 3.1: Class Voting 1952-1962
Based on 
number of
Country Mean Lowest Highest surveys
Great Britain 40 35 44 8
Australia 33 27 37 10
United States 16 13 23 5
Canada 8 -1 17 10
Source: Alford (1963: 105).
These results, however, should be viewed with some 
caution as they are based on a time period earlier than that 
covered by Aitkin (1977; 1982a) and Kemp (1978). Furthermore, 
Alford's analysis is only confined to an examination of 
Anglo-American democracies. A larger sample of countries 
should be considered before arriving at a more definitive 
view of the causal linkages between class and party.
Nevertheless, the point we wish to make is that, in 
relative terms, the party system is more class-polarised in 
Australia than in Canada. The mean index of class voters for 
Canada is 8, compared with the Australian mean of 33. Indeed, 
in terms of the Anglo-American countries surveyed, Canada has 
the lowest level of class voting, leading to Alford's oft- 
quoted description of Canada as a case of pure 'non-class 
politics ' .
Recent survey evidence, however, while not challenging 
the validity of this proposition concerning the relative 
degree of class voting, tends to support the thesis that, 
since Alford’s study, there has been a narrowing of the 
differences in this area between the two countries. Of
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course, it could be argued that Alford’s analysis is flawed 
because he uses the NDP rather than the Liberal Party as the 
'left' party in Canada. Instead, a plausible case could be 
argued for regarding the Liberal Party as ’left’, given its 
perception as a more radical party than the progressive 
Conservatives. However, re-analysis of his data, with the 
Liberal Party as the major left party, does not alter the 
basic proposition that
class voting is low in Canada, whether education, 
income or occupation are used singly or in combination 
as the measure of social class position. Class voting 
is also lower in all regions and with major religious 
grouping than it is in Britain or Australia (Alford 
1963: 250).
The key to understanding the Canadian party system lies 
in the fragmented nature of the Canadian nation. While Canada 
has symbols of national integration, many of the institutions 
are not national in the same sense as those of a comparable 
federal system such as in Australia. This lack of national 
integrative institutions is certainly a distinctive feature 
of the Canadian political system. Canadian politics could be 
described in terms of an 'aggregation of sectional 
communities' (Dawson 1970). (See Porter 1965, for a classic 
and influential account of this aspect.) In this, it is 
similar to States such as Switzerland and the Netherlands 
where the federal systems are more decentralised.
The Canadian party system is one set of political 
processes which reflects this national fragmentation. One of 
the main differences between the Australian and Canadian 
party systems lies in the relative importance of a
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nationalised electorate. Australia has a highly developed
national electorate whereas, in Canada, the electorate is
fragmented and regional loyalties predominate. As Jackman, in
a study on Canadian electoral fragmentation, points out,
A review of the foregoing research leads to the 
conclusion that Canadian electoral politics have not 
become more nationalized in the twentieth century. 
The evidence indicates that Canadian voters were not 
responding to their parties in terms of national 
identification in the 1960’s and that in this respect 
there has been little change in their behaviour since 
the 1920's. Moreover the same behaviour pattern holds 
regardless of whether Quebec is included or excluded 
from the analysis, suggesting that the presence of 
Quebec is not the sole reason for the results 
(Jackman 1972: 528).
The Table below indicates some of the marked regional 
contrasts in the electoral support for the main parties.
TABLE 3.2
Percentage of Vote by Province and Region, 1974
(row percentages)
Liberal P.C. N . D. P. S.C. Other
Newfoundland 47% 44 9 X X
Pr Edward Is. 46% 49 5 X X
Nova Scotia 41% 48 11 X X
New Brunswick 47% 33 9 3 8
Atlantic Region (44%) (42) (10) (1) (3)
Quebec 54% 21 7 17 1
Ontario 45% 35 19 X 1
Manitoba 27% 48 24 1 X
Sasketchewan 31% 36 32 1 X
Alberta 25% 61 9 3 2
Prairie Region (27%) (51) (19) (2) (1)
British Columbia 33% 42 23 1 1
Canada 43% 35 15 5 1
3
Range: 29 40 27 17 8
x Less than 1 %
3
Range in percentage of popular vote across provinces
Source: Clarke et al. (1980: 75).
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The results above indicate that for the 1974 election,
the range of the Liberal vote is 29%, from a maximum of 54% 
for Quebec to a minimum of 25% for Alberta. The variability
of the NDP and the PC vote is as great, if not greater than 
the Liberal vote with a variation of 40% and 27% 
respectively.
This evidence lends support to the proposition that a 
characteristic feature of the Canadian electorate is its 
regional fragmentation that at the same time is reinforced 
by religious and ethnic cleavages. Alford underscored this by 
noting that
This evidence of the non-class linked bases of party 
support underlies the fundamental cause of low class 
voting in Canada. Embedded within a nation where the 
majority is Protestant and British linked, is the 
enclave of traditionalist French speaking Catholic 
Quebec. Unlike the social cleavages in the other
Anglo-American countries which cross-cut each other, 
Quebec unifies several crucial cleavages - ethnic, 
language, cultural, religious and even (to some extent) class - and these are bulwarked by a semi- 
autonomous political unit coexistent with boundaries 
of the separate culture (1963: 528).
The importance attached to regional (as well as
religious) cleavages is one characteristic that distinguishes
the Canadian and Australian party systems. Analysis of
regional variance in electoral support in Australia has
confirmed that there had indeed been an increasing
nationalization of mass political responses in
Australia from 1940 to 1972, with a declining
proportion of variance attributable to state or local 
factors (Kemp 1978: 257).
It is the fragmentation of the electorate which lies at 
the heart of the differences in the respective party systems. 
Alford's comments quoted above underline the importance of
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Quebec in understanding the evolution of the party. 
Similarly, the Canadian West has been equally important, 
resulting in the formation of various agrarian protest 
parties such as Social Credit and the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation, later the NDP.
The differences in the relative fragmentation of party 
support relate to the emergence of the established mainstream 
parties. Whereas the Australian party system was organised 
around the articulation of economic interest, the Canadian 
system centred around the representation of regional 
interests. The difference between the Australian and Canadian 
party systems lies in the notion of interest, which in turn 
helps to shape the structure of the political arena. This 
difference in the type of interest forms the basis for the 
relative degree of integration of the electorates.
While these differences in the mode of representation 
are due to a range of factors, the chief of which are 
political culture and the strength of labour organisation and 
the time of the crystallisation of the party system, the 
important fact to note, however, is that the party not only 
reflects underlying social cleavages; it also reinforces and 
shapes these cleavages. The differences in modes of 
representation shape the conception of politics. Hence in 
Canadian politics it is seen in predominantly non-class terms 
and dominated by regional interests. Consequently, the 
parties tend to reinforce the fragmentation of the Canadian 
electorate.
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3.3.2 Party Organisation
A further characteristic of the party system 
particularly relevant to the party and policy links examined 
in this study is the difference in the strength of party 
organisations at the federal level and its relationship to 
policy outcomes. As a general proposition it may be stated 
that the Canadian party organisations are primarily 
provincial rather than national. Thus according to Epstein, 
'in the two major national parties, one finds the principal 
structural elements at the provincial level’ (1970: 339). For 
the purpose of thesis, the important point is that the 
Canadian party system operates at two different levels: 
provincial and national.
As against this, the Australian party organisations in
the context of a federal structure, do have a greater
national presence. (See Starr et al. 1978; Walker and Watson
1976, for a general outline.) Admittedly, this varies
greatly from party to party, with the ALP having a strong and
increasingly centralised national organisation. Indeed the
national executive of the ALP has the power to intervene in
State party branches - the ultimate sanction of a national
party organisation (see Crisp 1978; Jupp 1963). Although
the Liberal Party and NCP have a less centralised
organisation and are more state-based (see West 1965), in
recent years there has been a move towards a greater degree
of centralisation within the Liberal Party as well. Therefore
in terms of the federal structure in both Australia and
99
Canada, party organisation as a variable has different
degrees of centralisation of party structure.
Related to the lack of a strong national party
structure is the lack of extra-parliamentary activity in
Canada. In this regard Epstein points out that,
extra-Parliamentary organizations are loose and non- 
doctrinal at every level. Regardless of the nature of 
their parliamentary wings, the external Liberal and 
Conservative organizations resemble their Liberal and 
Republican and Democratic counterparts in the United 
States (1970: 331).
While Canadian party organisations have changed significantly 
in structure since Epstein’s research, the significant point 
of interest is the relative lack of organisational strength 
in comparison with the Australian party system. In making 
this generalisation it should be noted that individual 
parties in the two countries differ between themselves in the 
degree of organisational strength. In Australia for example, 
the ALP has a stronger extra-parliamentary wing than the 
Liberal Party (Crisp 1978), whose strength lies more in its 
stronger parliamentary organisation than the extra- 
parliamentary wing (West 1965).
To sum up, the Canadian and Australian parties differ 
significantly in the extent of class polarisation of the 
party system. In Canada, these differences are related to the 
lack of a nationalised electorate and the consequent 
importance of regional loyalties in the formation of the 
party system. Contrary to the highly nationalised electorate 
in Australia and its socio-economic cleavages, the 
distinctive feature of the Canadian electorate, and. hence the
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basis of party support, lies in its fragmentation.
Associated with this feature of the Canadian party system is 
the relative organisational weakness of national parties in 
Canada in relation to the main parties in Australia.
3.4 OUTCOME MEASURES: PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AS 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
In measuring outcomes, an important question for 
comparative expenditure studies is comparability of
expenditure. The problem is obvious, but it needs
reiteration. As we argue below, federal welfare expenditure
in Australia and Canada has a sufficient broad similarity
for interesting comparative conclusions to be made.
Nevertheless, federal expenditures in both countries are not
fully comparable. An example of this is federal education
expenditure in Canada: it is confined to the provision of
funding to the provinces for post-secondary expenditure. On
the other hand, education expenditure for Australia has a
much wider field of reference.
In addition to this problem of comparability, caution
needs to be exercised in relation to the inferences about
welfare from expenditure statistics. Expenditure is only one
approximation of the overall welfare of a nation. As Saunders
appropriately notes in the Australian context:
It would, however be inappropriate to make too much of 
such international comparisons. They should certainly 
not be used for prescriptive purposes by arguing, for 
example, that Australia's relatively low level of 
spending provides sufficient justification for
increasing future commitments. Such simplistic
analysis can be counter-productive in the longer term. 
Recent research (Saunders 1986, 1987) suggests several
reasons why social security (and other government)
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spending levels in Australia are low by international 
standards (1987: 412).
The outcomes measured in the study can be disaggregated 
into five main expenditure categories: (i) social welfare, 
(ii) health, (iii) education, (iv) total welfare expenditure 
and (v) total expenditure.
Total expenditure, the last category, deserves a brief 
note of explanation. It is included in the analysis primarily 
to provide a comparison with non-welfare expenditure, but 
this variable also has intrinsic value and warrants inclusion 
in its own right as most explanations offered for the 
growth of social expenditure may be equally applied to total 
expenditure. In the empirical analysis we have undertaken, 
social expenditures are regarded as fiscal measures used in 
the implementation of welfare policy. As will be observed in 
the next chapter, the expenditure determinant literature, for 
the most part, uses expenditure as an operationalised measure 
for policy.
In the present study, federal social expenditure is 
taken as an operational measure of social welfare policy. It 
is recognised that this line of reasoning is not without its 
critics. It has come under attack from a wide variety of 
critics (among others, Donnison and Chapman 1965; Scotton 
1978), some of whom argue that expenditure is a poor measure 
of welfare, and particularly of redistribution, which is seen 
as the ultimate objective of most social policies. However, 
the theoretical and empirical problems (such as the problem 
of building adequate policies) inherent in the use of social
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indicators, and also those associated with operationalising 
measures of redistribution, are further compounded in a time- 
series analysis. For these reasons, social expenditure still
remains a valid and defensible measure to use in an empirical 
study of this nature. But, as Scotton himself points out,
public expenditure for social purposes is
the most important single instrument of social policy, 
if only because it is the principal source of income 
for income units outside the work force, and for 
unemployed people within it. In addition, of course, 
public outlays supplement a large number of other 
incomes and strongly condition the provision of, 
and access to, socially vital consumption in the 
fields of education, health, welfare and housing 
(1978: 8-9).
Turning to the description of the social expenditure data 
used in this analysis, we note that it is based on public 
federal expenditure data provided annually in both Australia 
and Canada. For Australia, these data correspond to expendi­
ture coming under the purview of the federal government 
portfolios of social security, health, and education, and 
made available in the Annual Budget Papers. Hence, the 
statistics reported in this chapter as federal public expen­
diture correspond to the public expenditure figures reported 
in the Annual Budget Papers. This usage is consistent with 
the notion of expenditures used by other scholars such as 
Scotton (1978), who points out that this usage differs from 
the Australian National Accounts definition of public 
expenditure which is premised on the distinction between
final expenditures and transfer payments - that is, 
between expenditures undertaken by the public sector 
and payments to households and private business 
enterprises, in the form of cash benefits, subsidies 
and grants for private purposes. Public final
103
expenditure are a component of final demand, while 
transfer payments are not. The implication is that 
one has a direct impact on the allocation of resources 
while the other is merely a redistribution of income, 
with any allocation effects limited to the extent 
that the spending patterns of the recipients of 
transfers are different from those of the people from 
whom income has been transferred (Scotton 1978: 9).
With respect to the Australian data, this study differs 
from the expenditure analysis presented by Scotton as well as 
the more recent OECD (1985) comparative analysis of income- 
maintenance expenditure in that it includes only federal 
expenditure and excludes the state and local government 
expenditure. However, it needs to be pointed out that most of 
the economic analysis of expenditure in Australia, as well 
as in Canada has centred on analysis of the total extent of 
federal and state/provincial expenditure. (For an important 
Canadian study see Bird 1970.) Given the predominant 
interest of this study in the linkage between national 
political variables and expenditure, it is important for the 
logic of our argument to confine the empirical analysis to 
federal public expenditure. While the division between 
federal and state spending varies between Australia and 
Canada, there is sufficient similarity between federal 
progammes, especially in the area of social welfare, for 
comparison to be meaningful.
3.4.1 Outline of Expenditure Variables
Given below is a brief description of the chief 
components of the federal expenditure in social welfare, 
health and education in the two countries.
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Social Welfare Expenditure
Canadian federal social welfare expenditure includes the 
major income security programmes, namely, family and youth 
allowances, old age security, guaranteed income supplement 
and veterans' pensions. Canadian social welfare expenditure 
also includes federal-provincial income-insurance programmes 
and federal-provincial cost-sharing insurance and income 
security programmes, the main components of which are the 
Canada and Quebec Pension Plan, Unemployment-Insurance, Old 
Age Pensions, and the Canada Assistance Plan.
For Australia, social welfare expenditure at the federal 
level, till 1985, consisted solely of income security 
payments coming within the portfolio of the Department of 
Social Security. The main components of these payments are: 
old age pensions, unemployment insurance, single parent 
benefits, and family income supplements.
Education Expenditure
Education expenditure in both countries consists of 
federal transfers to the states/provinces. The Australian 
figures include those for education in the Annual Budget 
Papers. It should be noted, however, that we deal with 
Canadian expenditure only up to the year 1975, that is, 
before the substantial reorganisation of federal grants to 
the provinces which took place in 1977 (Banting 1982). The 
restriction to 1975 is warranted because of the significant 
changes in the principles of provincial allocations that 
occurred after 1975.
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Health Expenditure
Health expenditure is an area where the introduction of 
new programmes in both countries has resulted in marked
expenditure increases. Canadian health expenditure increased
significantly in the late 1950s with the introduction of the
Federal Hospital Insurance Diagnostic Service Act in 1958
which provided 50% of the cost of provincial health
expenditure. The introduction of Medical Care Programme in
1966 introduced funding for one half of the per capita cost
of medical insurance for each member of its insured
population. The Australian health expenditure category
includes provision of funding for public hospitals and health
insurance programmes. The expenditure included in this
category is under the appropriation for the Ministry of
Health in the Annual Budget Papers.
Total Welfare Expenditure
Total welfare expenditure for both countries consists 
simply of the aggregation of federal social welfare, health 
and education expenditure.
Total Expenditure
In both Australian and Canada, total expenditure consists 
of total federal government outlays and refers to the total 
federal budget expenditure. In addition to state 
expenditures, this includes outlays on defence and infra­
structure services.
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3.4.2 Specification of the Dependent Variable
For the purpose of the empirical analysis undertaken, 
the expenditures previously examined in the study are de­
flated by the consumer price index for the two countries in 
order to arrive at a ’real expenditure level’ for each of the 
expenditure categories. But the actual 'real levels' of 
expenditure are not used in the analysis. Instead, the depen­
dent variables are specified in terms of changes in real 
expenditure arrived at by the subtraction of the current 
annual expenditure from the previous year's expenditure.
The specification of the dependent variable in terms of 
change is justified because, as the works of Shalev (1983) 
and Hicks and Swank (1984) suggest, the analytical focus of 
expenditure determinant studies is found to be on the 
determinants of the rates of changes in expenditure rather 
than on absolute levels of expenditure. The significant 
feature of the growth of welfare lies not so much in the 
increase in the absolute level of expenditure, but in the 
changes to the rate of expenditure growth. The latter is 
characteristic of all OECD countries where there has been an 
expansion of welfare expenditure in absolute terms.
Moreover, real change in expenditure is superior to 
other specifications of the dependent variable such as per- 
capita income or share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in cases where the research problem concerns an examination 
of the behaviour of government and political parties. If 
these actors do behave strategically, policy is likely to 
involve changes in the real level of expenditure because the
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electorate perceives changes in this manner rather than in 
terms of per-capita or GDP change in expenditure.
It should be mentioned, however, that there are serious 
problems involved in the deflation of expenditure by the 
consumer price index. The most important of these, as noted 
by Bird (1970), is the difficulty encountered by government 
when adjusting in any direct manner for differences in 
output over time. Indeed, as Baumöl (1967) has so 
convincingly argued, the labour-intensive nature of 
governmental activity combined with low levels of 
productivity have created cost pressures on expenditure, 
which are significantly greater than in the private sector. 
However, despite these limitations, price deflation remains 
the best instrument for measuring real expenditure levels 
because of the difficulty of obtaining adequate deflators 
which would reflect changes in government cost over the time 
period studied.
In summary, this chapter has delineated some of the 
central analytical concerns and issues that the study set out 
to examine. The most important of such analytical issues was 
an investigation of the link between different party systems 
and policy outcomes. The results of such an investigation 
would leave us well placed to consider the relative merits of 
two competing models of party and policy - the structural and 
strategic actor models.
3.4.3 Nature of Sample
The time-series data for the expenditure variables have
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been collected for Canada and Australia. For Australia the
sample spans the period 1950-1980 (n=31), and for Canada, it 
spans the period 1945-1975 (n=31). For both countries this 
broadly covers the post-war period, and subsumes the crucial 
period in which the welfare state was constructed. Indeed, 
while many principal social programmes were established prior 
to the post-war period, the large increase in federal social 
expenditure was an outcome of post war developments.
One final point needs to be made regarding the extra 
five years, for Australia, that is, 1975-1980. At a first 
glance it might appear that this extra period will lead to a 
loss of comparative focus, thereby diminishing the force of 
the conclusions drawn in the study. The reason for the lack 
of comparable Canadian data is practical - the lack of access 
to contemporary Canadian expenditure comparable with the 
expenditure series used by the study. At a more conceptual 
level, this missing period should not detract from the 
conclusions drawn by the study for two reasons. First, the 
primary interest of this thesis is in the operation of broad 
political and economic forces which would be little affected 
by small changes in the period. Second, the thesis does not 
focus specifically on the dynamic of welfare growth in one 
particular period, though of course, this remains an 
important area for research.
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3.5 TIME-SERIES AND DATA ANALYSIS
The Problem of Serial Correlation
Regression analysis is the main method of statistical
analysis employed in this study. The normal regression model
consists of the following six assumptions where the function
is y = b + h x„+ U„ (Ostrom 1978; see also Johnston 1984; o 1 1 1
Pindick and Rubinfield 1978):
1 . U is a random variable
2. The mean value of ’U' in any particular period is 
is zero.
3. The variance of ' U' is consistent in each period
4. The variable ’U ’ has a normal distribution
5. The random sample of different observations (U U )
are independent i j
6. ’U* is independent of the explanatory variable
One of the assumptions of the classical normal linear 
regression models is non-autoregression in the residuals. As 
this study uses different regression models which are 
estimated from time-series data, a key assumption of these 
regression tests is that the disturbance occurring at any one 
point is not correlated with any other disturbance (Johnston 
1984). Put differently, the disturbances are not a function 
of previous values. As the observation field is composed of 
time-series data, the biggest potential problem with the 
statistical analysis is the problem of serial correlation.
The assumption of course, may not be valid within time- 
series data, and this is especially so in the case of
expenditure series because one expects the present
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expenditure value to be a function of past expenditure. 
Indeed, a critical feature of this study is the control for 
influence of time on expenditure (discussed in Chapter 1) 
as a means of assessing the influence of incrementalism, 
which is the dependence of present budgetary appropriations 
on previous appropriations. The detection of autocorrelation 
and the correction for it is not merely the filtering out of 
'statistical noise’, but a measure of the influence of 
bureaucratic factors. In this analysis, therefore, the 
presence of autocorrelation is both an indication of a 
statistical and conceptual nature. Statistically, it 
pinpoints the correlation between the past and present 
values. Conceptually, the statistical noise indicates the 
latent presence of a certain mode of budgeting, that is, 
incrementalism.
The main problem with time-series data such as 
expenditure series influenced by autoregression is that the 
value of the least squares estimators are affected, and 
though they remain unbiased, are no longer the best linear 
unbiased estimators. In other words, though the estimators 
are unbiased and consistent, they are not asymptotically 
efficient (Kmenta 1971; Johnston 1984). In order to carry 
out the testing of the hypotheses, the estimators need to be 
not only unbiased but must also have unbiased minimum 
variance. (See Kmenta 1971; Johnston 1984; Pindyck and 
Rubinfield 1978.) As Peroff points out, in these instances,
Conventional formulas for carrying out tests of
significance or constructing confidence intervals for
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the regression coefficients may lead to incorrect 
statements. The calculated acceptance regions or 
confidence intervals will be either narrow or wider 
than the 'true' ones, depending on whether the bias in 
estimating the variance is negative or positive 
(1977: 77).
There are several procedures that can be used to correct 
for serial correlation. One such method is the use of lagged 
variables in the equation. The problem with this procedure is 
that the current and lagged values of a variable will be 
highly correlated and this leads to a compounding of their 
separate effects on the dependent variable (Hibbs 1974).
Another procedure is the method of first-difference. It 
calls for the transformation of the original data on *y' and 
*x' into first difference:
Y -Y t (t-1) and xt-x
The equation: Y = a + bX +e
becomes V V - i )  = a‘ + B<Xt_Xt-l)+ 
where a* = 0
The equation can then be estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). The assumption behind this method is that the 
auto-correlation coefficient is close to unity. As Kmenta 
(1971) notes, the estimated variance of the regression 
coefficients is small when the autocorrelation is close to 
unity, but relatively large when it is small. As a result, 
the estimates of the variance of the coefficient in the first 
differences equation may still not be the most efficient
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estimators. Hence the problem of using these estimators for
significance testing is the same as those outlined for serial 
correlation. The method therefore is not appropriate if the
autocorrelation coefficient is not unity.
Another possible way to correct for the presence of
serial correlation and to measure the extent of any
incremental budgetary process is the inclusion of lagged
dependent variables. Indeed, many of the early budgeting
(Wildavsky 1966) used such a variable to measure the
influence of incrementalism. The inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable appears to be the easiest method of
correcting for serial correlation.
However, the combination of lagged values and
autocorrelation disturbances means that OLS estimators will
no longer be consistent. As Johnston points out,
Autocorrelated disturbances without lagged Y values do 
not produce biased estimators, even in small samples; 
lagged Y values with random disturbances will give OLS 
estimators which are consistent, though biased in 
finite samples; the combination of the two problems, 
however, throws OLS off-beam and gives inconsistent 
estimators (1972: 307).
In a similar context Ostrom adds that
if we have a model with lagged values of the dependent 
variable serving as explanatory variables and the 
positive serial correlation, we are likely to be 
overconfident about the fit of the model. That is, we 
are likely to overestimate b, underestimate p, and d 
will be biased towards 2.00 (1978: 51).
The basic technical problem here is that the current and
lagged values will be highly correlated and this leads to a
compounding of their separate effects on the dependent
variable.
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Another minor factor which weighs against the use of 
lagged dependent variables is the fact that in a small sample 
regression such as that utilised in this text, the inclusion 
of a additional explanatory variable will further diminish 
the degree of freedom available to the analysts.
A more appropriate procedure for estimating parameters 
is based on the theory of Generalized Least Squares (GLS). 
This procedure does not require the assumption that auto­
correlation coefficient is 1. The method is based on least 
squares estimation of transformed variables. The transformed 
variable can be presented as follows ('p' is the 
autocorrelation coefficient).
Y *i = Y i 1-p2
x q  = x1 l-p2 
Y* = V pYt-l
X* = Xt - pXt-l
The errors are also implicitly transformed;
2
U *1 = U1 1_P
U * t ut-pu (t-1)
The GLS estimator has minimum variance in the class of 
linear unbiased estimator. Unlike the classical Ordinary
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Least Squares (OLS) estimators, the virtue of GLS 
estimation procedure is that it yields an unbiased estimate 
of the error variance when disturbances are autocorrelated 
(Aitken 1935; Johnston 1978).
The efficacy of the GLS method depends on knowing the 
autocorrelation parameter. Since this is rarely the case, 
several procedures have been constituted for estimating ’p’ 
and using it to improve the efficiency of OLS. A common 
method that is used, and also utilised in this study, is the 
Cochrane-Orcutt method. It is similar to GLS, but not 
exactly the same, as it depends on reducing the sample size 
from N to N-l. The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure involves an 
iterative process of estimating several values of *p' until 
that value which provides the minimum sum of squares is 
obtained (Johnston 1978). Ostrom (1978) notes two questions
raised by this process: (i) convergence, and (ii) local 
minima versus global minimum, that is, the existence of
multiple solutions. With respect to these problems, it has 
been shown that this
iterative process will always converge to a 
stationary value of the sum of squares with respect to 
the possibility of several local minima (in which case 
the process would converge to one of them depending on 
the starting point), Sargen found that in a large 
number of studies there was no occurrence of multiple 
minima” (Peroff 1977: 24).
(For an excellent discussion of these issues in the context 
of time-series modelling see Hibbs 1974.)
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3.6 SUMiARY AND CONCLUSION
To sum up, the basis of the research design utilised in 
this study is a quasi-experimental form of comparative 
testing. The basis of selection of units for analysis is 
based on the similar features of the two countries being 
tested. While this does not rule out the operation of factors 
external to those controlled for in this study a similar 
systems design allows the analyst to draw confident 
conclusions as to the effect of the treatment variables on 
outcomes measures.7
In addition to this aspect of the research design, another 
key feature of the analysis is the use of time-series data. 
In examining time-series data, attention has been drawn to 
the important problems of auto-correlation, and the 
procedures for correcting these problems. Having outlined the 
research problem, the historical context, and the rationale 
and justification for the research strategy, we now move on 
to consider the main empirical problems of this thesis.
NOTES
1. Przeworski and Tenue (1970) contain an interesting plea for 
a different systems framework. But their approach is 
premised on both availability of comparative data and a 
solid conceptual framework which allows examination of 
hypotheses in ’different systems’. Both of these 
conditions are difficult to obtain in the social sciences 
which is the area of concern to Przeworski and Tenue.
2. The Hartz thesis has not had wide application in Australia, 
but for Canada see Horowitz (1966).
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3. For an excellent introduction to the Canadian legislative 
system see Jackson and Atkinson (1974). For a discussion 
of the form of responsible government in Australia see 
Archer (1980); Weller and Jaensch (1980).
4. For a comparative study of Australian and Canadian Prime 
Ministers see Weller (1985); for the role of the Canadian 
Prime Minister see Punnett (1977); for the Canadian Senate 
see Kunz (1965). The theory of the Westminster form of 
responsible government should be qualified for Australia. 
The Senate in Australia has equal power with the House of 
Representatives thereby providing conditions for conflict, 
as those which led to the dismissal of the Whitlam 
government in 1975.
5. For an account of Canadian leadership conventions see 
Smiley (1968) and Courtney (1973).
6. The type of federalism in Australia and Canada does vary 
considerably. Broadly, Canada has a more decentralised 
system of federal and provincial relations than Australia 
(Banting 1982; Aitkin 1982a). Canadian federalism is 
similar to patterns of elite accommodation observed in 
states such as Switzerland and the Netherlands (Lijphart 
1968; Porter 1965). For a survey of the influence of 
federalism on policy making in Canada, see Simeon (1972).
7. The statistical analysis presented in this thesis relies 
on'beta' coefficients rather than partial regression 
coefficients. The main reason for this is because the 
thesis is concerned not so much with prediction as with the 
testing of hypothesis. In this context, the interest of the 
thesis lies in the falsification of conjectures in the 
Popperian sense.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS 
OF PUBLIC POLICY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is twofold. The first is 
to examine the economic and social determinants of policy 
outcomes. Such an examination is important not only in terms 
of the evaluation of the larger controversy between the 
advocates of economic and political theories of policy, but 
also in terms of understanding the sub-structure on which 
policy outcomes are founded. To use a metaphor, economic and 
social structural determinants provide the scaffolding on 
which are built the political factors that influence policy.
The second objective is to understand the process by 
which the common economic structure of both countries 
(Goodman 1964) influences the nature of public expenditure 
outcome. Such an analysis is important because, while the two 
countries are similar to West European nations in terms of 
Gross National Product per capita (GNP), the dependence of 
the Australian and Canadian economies on the export of 
primary commodities sharply distinguishes these economic 
structures from the West European model.
The study of economic determinants of public expenditure 
has a long history, but it was Adolf Wagner, a German 
economist, who first inspired interest in the subject.1 
Wagner's theory of public policy and public expenditure can 
best be described as a research programme in the Lakatosian
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(Lakatos 1970) sense rather than as a fully developed body of
origorous hypotheses.-^ The notion of the research programme, 
that is, a series of common assumptions guiding theoretical 
work, best sums up the tradition of scholarly inquiry 
stimulated by Wagner's work. The evolution of the research
programme and the availability of better data and techniques 
have led to the development of a variety of competing models.
The common 'hard core' - in the Lakatosian sense - of the 
research programme is the idea of a link between levels of 
economic development and the growth of the public sector. 
Associated with this idea is the concept of public policy and 
public expenditure as a response to the needs, or the 
consequences of economic development. These two concepts 
define the limits of the research programme (Tarschys 1975), 
the boundaries of which are necessarily broad.
The 'positive heuristic’ of the research programme, to 
use Lakatos’s terminology, is the attempt to develop, both 
theoretically and empirically, causal linkages between public 
expenditure and economic development. The existence of 
competing models within the research programme should be 
understood not in terms of compatibility of the later 
formulation of the Wagnerian hypothesis to its original one, 
but as an attempt to defend the hard core of the research 
programme.
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4.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAGNERIAN MODEL3
Before proceeding to formulate and test Wagner's model, 
it is instructive to examine the original model and some
critical work which has influenced its development. Some of
this ground, already covered in Chapter 1, is further
developed in this chapter. Wagner's (1890) basic insight was
that a growing public sector is the inevitable consequence of
economic growth and industrial development. While this does
not seem a highly original notion in the late 20th century,
the concept was novel at the time. The following quotation
from Tarschys exemplifies (barring some notable exceptions
such as Adam Smith, the early Socialists and Marx) the
prevailing view of governmental activity:
In the age of Enlightenment it was a common view that 
the scope of government actions would diminish through 
the moral and economic evolution of mankind.Authority was required in so far as people were unable 
to control themselves and manage their own affairs.
As they matured, however, they would no longer need 
guidance (Tarschys 1975: 10).
This 'enlightenment' view was not shared by Wagner, who was
convinced after an analysis of public expenditure trends
that government activity would tend to increase rather than
diminish with economic development. Wagner discerned a 'law'
of increasing governmental activity,
the result of empirical observation in progressive 
countries at least in our Western civilization; its 
explanation, justification and cause is the pressure 
for social progress and the resulting changes in the 
relative spheres of private and public economy, 
especially compulsory public economy. Financial stringency may hamper the expansion of state 
activities causing their extent to be conditioned by 
revenue rather than the other way around as is more 
usual. But in the long run the desire for the 
development of a progressive people will always
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overcome these financial difficulties (Wagner 1890, 
in Musgrave and Peacock 1958: 8.)
The growth of public expenditure itself is explained 
with reference to several processes. Firstly, defence costs 
would increase as the nation invested in sophisticated 
weaponry; secondly, the greater complexity of society would 
result in a need for more public control in areas such as law 
and social defence; thirdly, the ability of the government 
to meet demands for public goods that are income-elastic 
would lead to increased government expenditure. Of these, the 
second and third are the central components of the Wagner 
explanation. As regards the third, Tarschys notes that, for 
Wagner,
Education and culture were fields where collective 
producers were by and large more efficient than 
private ones. Hence, the public sector would grow as 
basic needs were satisfied and the consumption pattern shifted in this direction (Tarschys 1975: 10).
F.S.Nitti (1920), an Italian economist, was perhaps one 
of the first to examine public expenditure trends in several
countries. He observed a tendency for expenditure to
increase, and speculated that some of the causes for this
trend were the continued increase in military expenditure,
the growth of public works and the development of forms of
social control. Nitti laid particular emphasis on the impact
of urbanisation and population density in accounting for
expenditure growth.
In another early study, Arnold Brecht (in Tarschys
1975) compared public expenditure in different German Länder 
or sub-national units during the Weimar Republic.5 His
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findings also supported Nitti's work by stressing the 
importance of population density and urbanisation as causal
factors in accounting for expenditure differences. Brecht's 
work was important in being one of the first efforts to 
empirically examine sub-national differences in expenditure, 
a tradition that was carried on by the American economist, 
Solomon Fabricant (1952).
In terms of methodology, technical sophistication and 
scope, the work of Fabricant (1952) remains the classic work 
on the determinants of government expenditure. Fabricant, 
in his account of expenditure differences among American 
States, concluded that three main variables accounted for 
most of the variance in expenditure. These three variables 
were income, urbanisation and per-capita income. Fabricant 
argued that, of this trinity of variables, income was by far 
the most important overall, even though urbanisation was a 
central factor in explaining expenditure variation in 
specific areas such as fire-protection, sanitation and social 
welfare.
Fabricant's work proved to be a direct stimulus to 
economists, who produced a number of studies of inter-state 
expenditure differences. These studies were followed by 
political scientists whose interest lay primarily in the 
examination of the role of the political as against the 
economic determinants of policy. Foremost among the latter 
was Thomas Dye (1966) who, after examining inter-state 
expenditure differences in the United States, argued that 
economic rather than political variables were a better
1 O O  1 1 1
predictor of expenditure differences. Referring to the 
economic variables themselves, Dye found that income was by 
far the best predictor of state expenditure. (For another 
important early study see Sharkansky & Hofferbert 1969.)
Besides this work of Dye, Pryor (1968) too, in a more 
cross-national context, examined some of the economic 
determinants of public expenditure, and showed that the 
’economic systems variables’ accounted only for some items 
of expenditure, such as, research, non-military external 
security, internal security and foreign aid, but not for 
defence, health or welfare. Likewise, per capita income 
failed to account for spending on military purposes, health 
and education, but related in a significant manner to such 
items of expenditure as foreign aid, research and development 
and internal security.
4.3 TESTING MODELS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS 
OF POLICY
The test of the economic research programme has been 
carried out in two phases or separate stages of analysis. 
The first of these is to test the original Wagnerian 
hypothesis concerning the relation of the elasticity of 
expenditure to economic development. This version of the 
model, termed by us in this study as the ’income elasticity 
model', is not a structural or a causal one, in that it does 
not seek to isolate the linkages between economic growth and 
public expenditure. What it does is to test the statistical 
relationship between growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
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and elasticity of expenditure, which in theoretical terms 
would be assumed to grow more than proportionately because 
expenditure is income-elastic in terms of the Wagner law of 
expanding government activity. In other words, as economic 
resources available to a nation increases, the demand for 
public goods and services grows at a linear or exponential 
rate. The income elasticity model therefore is a proposition 
about the relationship between the increase in economic 
resources of a nation and the resultant expansion in 
expenditure. Moreover, central to this notion is the argument 
that expenditure will outstrip the growth in income. The 
hypothesis, as noted below, can be examined in terms of GDP 
per capita. However, both in terms of the objectives of the 
thesis and the technical problems involved in having GDP on 
both sides of the equation, nominal expenditure is a more 
relevant test of the Wagnerian thesis.
The second phase involves the testing of a more 
structural hypothesis concerning the 'causal' linkages 
between economic development and public expenditure. An 
appropriate metaphor for this stage of analysis is that it is 
more concerned with the ’hydraulics' rather than the 
’mechanics' of the relationship between economic variables 
and expenditure. We seek to examine the variety of causal 
models that have been proposed to explain the growth of 
expenditure. Two distinct ’causal' models are identified. 
The first, termed an economic needs model, lays emphasis on 
the primary importance of economic factors in the growth of 
State expenditure. The second, termed a social needs model,
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gives emphasis to the alleviation of social needs (arising 
as a consequence of industrialisation), and is distinguished 
from the economic model in placing greater weight on social 
structural variables such as demographic changes in 
explaining expenditure changes.
4.4 A TEST OF THE INCOME EFFECT 
4.4.1 The Income Elasticity Model
There has been debate over the precise specification of
the dependent variable in models which test the notion of the
primacy of economic development in explaining public 
0expenditure. Indeed, often the differences observed in 
relation to these competing hypotheses appear to rest on the 
characterisation of the dependent variable. Three major 
specifications of the dependent variable can be identified. 
The first is found in the model of Peacock and Wiseman 
(1967), who hypothesise that public expenditure rises faster 
than output, the dependent variable in this version being 
aggregate expenditure. Another specification of the dependent 
variable is evident in Pryor's hypothesis, namely, that in 
’growing economies the share of public consumption
expenditure in the national income rises' (1968: 451). In 
this formulation, the dependent variable is the share of 
public consumption expenditure. A third version of the 
dependent variable is presented by Musgrave (1969) who
contends that Wagner's hypothesis must be interpreted in
terms of the increase in the share of the public sector
relative to GNP.
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The analysis of the elasticity of expenditure carried 
out in this chapter is based on the Peacock and Wiseman 
(1967) formulation, using aggregate nominal expenditure as 
the dependent variable. This specification has been selected 
in preference to Musgrave's interpretation which poses 
some technical problems for regression analysis because the 
denominators of the dependent and the independent variables 
are identical (see Mann 1980). The model can be specified as:
E = f(GDP)
where E = level of aggregate expenditure 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product
Expenditure elasticity as a concept denotes the response 
of expenditure to an increase in GDP. The basic proposition 
being tested is that as GDP increases, expenditure will 
increase more than proportionately to GDP. In statistical 
terms, the hypothesis to be tested proposes that the 
elasticity of expenditure is greater than one. The growth 
in GDP should result in the demand for public or collective 
goods and services to increase more than proportionately to 
the growth in economic resources (Mann 1980: 190).
The income-elasticity model has been tested in the 
general logarithmic form, so that the elasticity of 
expenditure can be derived directly. (This is examined for 
both Australia and Canada.) The general regression equation 
is as follows .-
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log y = a + b log x
where b = elasticity of expenditure
The expenditure categories (dependent variables) covered 
are social welfare, health, education total welfare and total 
expenditure. In terms of the model specified above, the 
values of all the expenditure categories are specified in 
nominal terms as are the values of Gross Domestic Product 
(independent variables).
Table 4.1 outlines the main results of the analysis. 
Included in this Table is also the mean rate of changes in 
nominal expenditure expressed in percentage terms so that 
comparison can be made not only with the elasticity 
coefficient, but also with the results of the structural 
model presented later on in the chapter.
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4.4.2 Results and Discussion
TABLE 4.1
Elasticity of Expenditure for Australia and Canada^
Elasticity^ Nominal Expenditure'
Expenditure Coefficient Growth Rate
Category ___________________________________
Aus: Can: Aus: Can:
Social Welfare 1.1 1.2 8.9 11.0
Education 1.5 1.2 25.1 36.7
Health 2.5 2.2 16.6 12.0
Total Welfare 1.3 1.2 9.5 11.1
Total Expenditure 1.1 1.4 10.4 10.1
Note.-- a) For Australia the period tested is 1950 to 1980; 
for Canada the period tested is 1945 to 1975
b) The elasticity coefficients for both countries are 
significant at p < .01
c) Nominal expenditure growth rate is a figure 
calculated on the basis of changes in current 
expenditure over previous year's expenditure as a 
proportion of expenditure (in percentage terras). 
The figures are the mean values for the periods 
defined in Note a.
d) For sources see Appendix 1.
e) Aus: Australia; Can: Canada.
This may not be an entirely fully appropriate test of the 
income elasticity hypothesis, because the examination of 
federal government expenditure does not fully and properly 
test a proposition relating to the expansion of public 
expenditure in general. The hypothesis examined is therefore
128
of the elasticity of federal expenditure. However. as 
federal government expenditure in both countries has been an
area which has risen markedly in the last few decades, the 
analysis retains much of its strength. Nevertheless, there 
is ground for belief that the elasticity of health and 
education expenditure would be greater if non-federal 
expenditure was compared. Considering that only federal 
expenditure was taken into account, caution should be 
exercised when comparing the elasticity of expenditure of 
unitary state systems with federal states.
The results presented in Table 4.1 show a positive 
relationship between GDP and elasticity of expenditure in 
all the expenditure categories examined for both countries. 
The analysis of the elasticity coefficients for all 
expenditure categories confirm Wagner's hypothesis that 
expenditure grows more than proportionately with the growth 
of GDP. In terms of the hypothesis tested therefore, 
elasticity is greater than one. Before examining these 
results it should be mentioned that the analysis was confined 
to the post-war period which was characterised by high rates 
of expenditure growth in comparison with the pre-war period.
The striking feature of the results of the analysis is 
the degree to which the coefficients are similar across 
expenditure categories for both countries. This pattern of 
results is consistent with the rate of growth of nominal 
expenditure outlined in Table 4.1.
The elasticity coefficients of social welfare for both
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expenditure categories examined. This pattern indicates that 
social security expenditure has had the lowest rates of 
growth in the welfare expenditure categories examined.
Indeed the Canadian results indicate that both health 
and education expenditure grew by 2.2 and 1.2 respectively 
whereas for Australia the comparable figures were 2.5 and 
1.5. The Canadian figures reflect the fact that once the 
major social insurance programmes were established, the rate 
of growth of social welfare expenditure was largely 
predictable. On the other hand, Canada in the 1960s and 
1970s witnessed increasing debate over health policy with the 
federal government intervening to establish guidelines for 
the provision of health insurance (Taylor 1978). In a 
similar manner education expenditure by the federal 
government has increased rapidly in the Canadian context. 
The largest expansion in the welfare budget has been in 
education expenditure (OECD 1978). The results of the 
analysis of the political variables suggest that while social 
welfare was subject to influence of party in government in 
the 1950s (after controlling for incremental forces), it 
was predominantly the health and education expenditures that 
were subject to political influence in the 1960s and 1970s. 
It should be noted however that in Canada, federal education 
expenditure was almost non-existent before the 1950s and 
hence the rapid escalation of expenditure reflects the low 
base from which it started.
In a similar manner Australian health expenditure has
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the highest elasticity coefficient for all the expenditure
categories. This again reflects the emergence of health as a 
political issue in the late 1960s and the eventual
introduction of Medibank by the Whitlam Labor Government. 
This along with changed federal-state relations with respect 
to public hospitals created the conditions for increases in 
health expenditure.
In respect of education expenditure, the Australian and 
Canadian figures differ in the degree of their responsiveness 
to expenditure changes. The reason for this difference is the 
vast increase in Canadian education expenditure, an increase 
which stands out in the analysis of Canadian expenditure 
data .
The final point of note in the analysis of the 
elasticity coefficients is the degree to which the elasticity 
of total welfare and total expenditures were similar, 
despite the fact that in Australia the total budget grew 
marginally more than the total welfare budget, whereas in 
Canada the opposite was the case with total welfare growing 
marginally more than the total budget.
4.5 THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
4.5.1 Introduction
The specification of Wagner’s hypothesis in terms of 
the expenditure elasticity model in the manner described, as 
we have previously observed, is not the direction taken by 
the type of research programme in the last quarter of the 
century. The emphasis has shifted from a crude identification
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of a statistical relationship between GNP and expenditure to 
an examination of the structural factors and causes related 
to expenditure growth. In this process, considerations 
pertaining to the causal structure have become issues of 
major concern. For this reason, the model being examined is 
defined by its epistemological structure rather than by any 
specific set of propositions, and is capable of accommodating 
diverse theoretical frameworks, such as those of Dye and 
Fabricant emphasising the importance of environmental factors 
in public expenditure, and the neo-Marxist analysis of 
James O'Connor (1973).7 The underlying epistemological 
structure in all these versions is the causal notion of 
'need'. This is the view that expenditure arises out of the 
'needs' of both economic and social structures, and therefore 
account for its description in this research as the 'policy 
responsiveness model’. Diagrammatically it may be presented 
as follows:-
DIAGRAM 4.1
Policy Responsiveness Model
increased economic need
the development
rising GNP ----------> ----------->
increased social need
of expenditure
initiating causal policy
factor structure output
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4.5.2 Economic Needs
The first explanation of the causal linkages between 
economic development and public expenditure, termed the 
economic needs model, is based on the notion of expenditure 
as a response to the needs of industrialisation. Distinct 
from the 'social needs model’, the explanatory structure of 
the economic needs model emphasises the causal primacy of 
economic infrastructure and resource determinants of 
expenditure. The four main causal factors identified in the 
economic needs explanation are: (1) concentration of capital,
(2)industrialisation, (3) resources and (4) international 
economic structure.
QConcentration of Capital
The work of O'Connor (1973) has been influential in 
shifting the focus of attention to the segmentation of 
capital and its social and political impact. Relevant for 
this analysis is the emphasis on the relationship between 
concentration of capital and the growth of social
expenditure. O'Connor maintains that the 'monopoly sector’ 
within the capitalist economy attempts to externalise the 
cost of production (for example, by socialising the cost of 
education, housing etc.). This process serves to reduce 
labour costs and performs an accumulative function for 
capital, but at the same time creates pressure for the state 
to supply these services. Apart from this accumulative 
function, the growth of monopoly capitalism creates 
legitimation problems for the state caused by the recurrence
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of economic crises, and thereby necessitates investment in 
social expenditure. Therefore, there can be both accumulative
and legitimation bases for public expenditure (Devine 1933; 
Hicks et al. 1978).
Industrialisation
This has been the central explanation in most Wagner- 
inspired accounts of expenditure development. In these 
accounts, industrialisation leads to demand for the provision 
of capital infrastructure as well as intervention by the 
state to provide social insurance to compensate for the 
deleterious impact of industrialisation on the social fabric. 
While the influence of industrialisation has been a source of 
great interest in classic public expenditure studies of 
Fabricant (1952) and Dye (1966), the work. of Rimlinger 
(1971) provides a more historical account which delineates 
the link between social insurance and industrialisation in 
Western Europe. Rimlinger's approach is similar to the 
'concentration' explanation in its emphasis on the 
infrastructural needs of economic development. But as Mann 
argues, the causal primacy is that the technological needs of 
an industrial society require larger amounts of capital than 
those forthcoming from the private sector. As a consequence 
the state is impelled to provide the necessary capital funds 
to finance large-scale capital expenditure (Mann 1980; 189).
The main difference between the concentration of capital 
approach and the industrialisation hypothesis is the emphasis 
of the latter on technological rather than 'class needs' for
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infrastructural expenditure.
Resources
The argument that resources are important in determining 
expenditure, in general, and social expenditure, in
particular, has been an influential element in economic 
theories of policy output. As mentioned earlier, this 
argument was one of the paramount concerns of those who 
investigated the economic determinants of expenditure.
Fabricant isolated a trinity of variables of which income, as 
a proxy for the extent of resources, was a key variable. The 
work of Dye (1966) and Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1969), no 
doubt influenced by early public expenditure studies, gives 
pride of place to 'income' in the range of economic variables 
identified, as being central to the development of public 
expenditure. The fundamental explanatory premise of this
argument is that the extent of economic resources within the 
community determines the ability of the government to
structure the nature and extent of both the total public
expenditure and welfare expenditure sectors.
Independent of this public-expenditure literature, 
several writers on the welfare state stress the importance of 
economic resources in determining levels of welfare 
expenditure. These include not only Outright (1967a) who 
proceeded from a quantitative analysis to argue for the 
importance of economic resources, but also a range of other 
more descriptive historical works on the welfare state which 
examine the impact of resources on the development of the
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welfare state. Rimlinger’s work noted above is one such 
outstanding example; and within the specific context of
Australia and Canada, the works of both Kewley (1965) and 
Bryden (1974) stress the importance of economic resources in 
the development of the welfare state. In this study per 
capita income is a proxy variable to operaionalise the 
influence of economic resources on expenditure.
International Economic Structure
In contrast to the emphasis placed on the domestic 
economic determinants of expenditure, some studies have 
argued that the impact of the international economic 
influences on expenditure deserves equal consideration. The 
most important of these studies is that of Cameron (1978) 
who has shown the importance of the openness of the economy
9in determining levels of expenditure. Cameron’s general 
contention is that the 'openness' of the economy leads to 
increased expenditure through two main avenues: one, through 
the influence of an open economy on the labour movement by 
its impact on economic concentration, and the other, through 
the pressure on the state brought to bear by an open economy 
to intervene in order to stabilise national income. The 
latter, it is suggested, tends to fluctuate more in an open 
economy than in a closed one because of the sensitivity of 
an open economy to the international economy. Influences 
emanating from the international economy can be 
operationalised in many ways, but in this analysis they are 
confined to and measured by the openness or rather the
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vulnerability of the economy.
Central to this analysis however is not the impact of 
the degree of openness of the economy, on which score 
Australia and Canada are not particularly high, but on the 
extent of the vulnerability of the economy to the
international economic environment. The measure of openness 
can be consistent with a variety of interpretations. What 
lies behind this proposition is the raw material-exporting 
structure and the predominance of primary products of the 
national economies of Australia and Canada (see Goodman 1964; 
Boehm 1971; and Armstrong 1970). A key causal factor in this 
analysis is the instability of the national incomes in both 
economies, caused by the vulnerability of each economy to 
fluctuations in the international economic environment, and 
the extent to which this vulnerability in turn is associated 
with the growth of the public sector. Conceptually 
therefore, the two notions of vulnerability and openness 
should be distinguished. The former describes an economy 
which by virtue of its structural characteristic is 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the international economy; 
while all open economies are vulnerable, vulnerability is not 
an attribute exclusive to a highly dependent export economy. 
Economies such as Australia and Canada, while not being in 
relative OECD terms, export dependent (Katzenstein 1984), 
are highly vulnerable because of their reliance on primary 
and raw material exports. It is this vulnerability which 
exposes such economies to the fortunes of the international 
economy. Consequently the argument about openness which
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depends on the impact of international economy on public 
policy is equally applicable to vulnerable economies.
In the Canadian case, in addition to the vulnerability 
of the economy, there are two other features that make the 
Canadian economy particularly sensitive to fluctuations in 
the international economic environment. The first of these 
pertains to the dependence of the Canadian economy on the 
United States, its ’gigantic’ neighbour in the south, for its 
exports as well as for direct investment in Canada (Kornberg 
et al.1972; Falcone 1974). Secondly, trade and exchange 
restrictions in Canada after World War 11 were dismantled 
much earlier than in other countries (English 1961). 
Moreover, the floating of the Canadian dollar in 1970 was a 
contributing factor to the increasing importance of the 
international economic environment in the domestic economic 
sphere. In this context, the measure utilised to examine 
this vulnerability is the fluctuation in the value of 
exports. Given the nature of the economic structures of 
Australia and Canada, such a measure is a good indicator of 
the effects of the international economy on public policy. 
Other possible measures of vulnerability include such 
variables as prices of primary commodities and the terms of 
trade. Both these variables capture central elements of 
economic vulnerability in Australia and Canada. Clearly, any 
future research on this aspect has to include a discussion of 
some of these measures.
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4.5.3 Social Needs
The explanatory structure of the social-needs model 
hinges critically on the causal significance attached to 
economic development in accounting for the growth of 
expenditure. It is argued that the increasing social inter­
dependence associated with economic growth creates social 
dysfunctions which necessitate the sort of public interven­
tion reflected in expenditure growth. The functional 
significance attached to integration and solidarity in the 
course of economic development has a long and important 
legacy in sociological theory stemming from the classic work 
of Dürkheim. These social functions were implicit, if not 
explicit, in the concepts of 'citizenship' and 'social 
rights' expounded by later scholars such as Marshall, 
Titmuss and others in theorising about social development. 
Central to all this work is the functionally altered nature 
of social interdependence caused by economic development. 
Put differently, economic development creates new forms of 
dependency which require public intervention to maintain both 
income and social support. An example of this type of 
intervention is the need for the provision of income 
security in old age. Two factors in particular have been 
responsible for the changing patterns of social
interdependence. These are: (a) increases in the size of
the population; and (b) changes in the age structure of the 
population. In this study, the latter are represented by
changes in the size and age composition of the population 
dependent on services. These two variables are empirically
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examined here.
Population Changes
It has been argued that population increases result in
the growth of a range of social problems which require state
intervention. These population pressures are often linked to
the development of industrialisation. In the context of
Australia and Canada, a central feature of this analysis
concerns the impact of migration-induced population changes
on social expenditure. As noted by Lowery and Berry:
a population increase would intensify and expand 
existing interdependence thus leading to an 
expansion of government (1984: 688).
Demographic Changes
The influence of demographic changes on expenditure has 
been a key variable in most accounts of expenditure 
determinants which refer to changes in the age-structure of 
the population as a result of economic development. Thus, 
these changes are seen as the determinants of pension and 
education expenditure, and are interpreted specifically as 
expenditures for programmes and services which are needed by 
certain age-specific demographic groups, for example, the 
young and the aged.
One of the best empirical studies linking demographic 
structure to social security expenditure, is that of Wilensky 
(1975). Wilensky's key proposition is that increased economic 
development leads to welfare growth through the mediation or 
the impact of demographic factors. According to Wilensky, as
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the economic level rises the proportion of the aged in the 
population increases because of a fall in birth rates and
increased life expectancy associated with high levels of GNP. 
This change in the proportion of the aged directly affects
spending as income security in old age is one primary
function of the social security system. In addition to this
direct causal link, economic development and the increased
proportion of the aged in the population help to determine
the timing and spread of social security programmes, the age
of which in turn indirectly affects the growth of social
security expenditure. Wilensky sums up the argument thus:
Over the period, economic level is the real cause 
of welfare state development, but its effects are 
felt chiefly through demographic changes of the 
past century and the momentum of the programmes 
themselves once established (1975: 47).
A critical element of Wilensky's argument, although this 
is not set out clearly, is that an increasingly aged
population creates political pressure for government pension 
expenditure. Apart from this engine for the expansion of
pensions, an increased proportion of aged in the population, 
given an existing social security system, leads inexorably to 
the growth of pension expenditure in the absence of any 
changes to entitlements. The latter outcome might be termed a 
'systems effect’. Hence while Wilensky’s demographic 
explanation is centred on pensions expenditure, the systems 
effect is likely to influence education expenditure as well, 
because with the increase in the proportion in the population 
of those who use the education system, education expenditure 
will expand, although this is the case only if the proportion
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of the young in the total population increased.
4.6 HYPOTHESES AND MODEL
To recapitulate, what links these two competing causal 
models in the 'economic determinant' research programme is 
the concept of need. The programme is premised on the 
assumption that governmental activity is a response to needs 
of different kinds. In particular, the model identifies two 
kinds of 'needs' namely, economic needs and social needs. The 
model itself is based primarily on two assumptions: (a) that
needs are objectively identifiable, and (b) that the modern 
state is automatically responsive to social and economic 
needs.
The hypotheses examined in this chapter can be 
summarised more rigorously as follows:
4.6.1 Economic Needs Hypotheses
HI The growth of industrialisation is associated
with the growth of welfare and total expenditure.
Industrialisation is measured by changes in the 
proportion of GDP contributed to manufacturing.
The values for manufacturing GDP are nominal.
H2 The increase in resources available to a
country leads to an increase in the rate 
of growth of expenditure.
Resources are measured by changes in per capita 
income.
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H3 The increasing concentration of industrial
activity will lead the State to perform ever- 
increasing accumulation and legitimising 
functions.
The consequence of this will be an increasing 
public sector as the degree of concentration 
increases. This is primarily an operationalisa­
tion of O'Connor's theory (not tested for 
Australia). Concentration is measured by changes 
in the number of enterprises with more than 500 
employees.
H4 As the degree of economic vulnerability
increases, the rate of social and total 
expenditure growth increases.
The vulnerability of the economy is measured in terms of
changes in the value of exports.
4.6.2 Social Needs Hypotheses
H5 Increases in population changes are associated
with changes in expenditure.
H6 This hypothesis postulates a relationship
between the growth of the service-dependent 
population and the increase in welfare 
expenditure, in the following terms:
(i) the growth in the size of the population of 
those 65 and over is associated with the 
growth of social security expenditure;
(ii) the growth in the size of the population of 
those under 19 is associated with increase 
in education expenditure; and,
(iii) the growth of total welfare is associated 
with the growth of those over 64 and those 
under 19.
the
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4.6.3 The Model 10
The Model for Australia can be specified as follows
y bx, + bx_ + bx0 + bx,. + e 1 4 J 6
y, bx, + bx + bx. + bx^ + e 1 4  4 6
y. bx + bx + bx,- + bx ^ + 01 ^  3  D
y4 bx, + bx0 + bxr + bx^ + e 1 4  5 6
y annual changes in $s in real level of 
expenditure
where x changes in $s in manufacturing gross 
national product
changes in $s in per capita income
x^ = changes in the proportion of the population 
of those aged 65 and over
x^ = changes in the proportion of the population 
of those aged under 19
xq = changes in the proportion of the population
of those aged 65 and over, and those under 19
x = changes in $s in the value of exports
= changes in $s in real social welfare 
expenditure
y9 = changes in $s in real education expenditure
yQ = changes in $s in real total welfare 
expenditure
y^ = changes in $s in real total expenditure
b = standardised regression coefficient 
e = error term
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y4
y
Canada can be specified as follows:-
bxi + bx9 + bxq + bx _ + 6 bx^ + e
bxi + bx2 + bx.4 + bx,. + 6 bx + e
bxi + bX2 + bx5 + bx^ + 6 bx^ + e
bxi + bx? + bx5 + bx + 6 bx^ + e
annual changes in $s in real level
expenditure
where x changes in $s in manufacturing gross national 
product
changes in $s in per capita income
x0 = changes in the proportion of the population 
of those aged 65 and over
x^ = changes in the proportion of the population 
of those aged under 19
x,_ = changes in the proportion of the population
of those aged 65 and over and under 14
x^ = changes in $s in the value of exportsO
x^ = changes in numbers in the concentration of 
enterprises
y = changes in $s in real social welfare 
expenditure
y9 = changes in $s in real education 
expenditure
= changes in $s in real total welfare 
expenditure
y^ = changes in $s in real total expenditure
b = standardisd regression coefficient
e = error term
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The regression analysis is carried out on social 
welfare, education, health, total welfare and total 
expenditure. All the equations have been corrected for first 
order autoregression. As noted in Chapter 3, the adjustment 
for autoregression is not only a correction of statistical 
noise, but also a control for incrementalism.
The discussion will be in two parts: the first (sections 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2) is essentially descriptive in that it does 
relate the results to the central issues in the literature, 
the second (section 4.7.3), is more interpretive, and seeks 
to place the analysis in terms of the specific context of 
Australia and Canada.
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TABLE 4.2
Econonic Determinants of Real Changes 
in Expenditure for Australia 1950-1980 (n=31)
Independent Social Educa- Total Total
Variables Welfare tion Welfare Expenditure
0.05 -0.25 -0.18 -0.02
M
(0.35) (-1.12) (-0.11) (-0.11)
0.50 0.28 0.65 0.85
PCI X X X
(1.31) (0.34) (1.98) (1.30)
-0.12 0.19 0.49 -0.32
Pn
(-0.93) (0.08) (0.48) (-0.16)
0.89 -0.01 -0.22 0.25
Dem X
(1.32) (-0.02) (-0.56) (0.13)
0.02 -0.26 -0.19 -0.09
Ex
(0.19) (-1.1) (-1.0) (-0.33)
R2 0.71 0.22 0.59 0.30
where = p< 0.10; '**' = p< 0.05; ’***’ = p< 0.01
and, M = Manufacturing; PCI = Per Capita Income;
Pn = Population; Dem = Demography; Ex = Exports.
The main Table entries are beta coefficients; 
the figures in parentheses are *t' values.
For sources see Appendix 1. Raw Expenditure data are provided 
in Appendix 3.
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TABLE 4.3
Economic Determinants of Real Changes 
in Expenditure for Canada 1945-1975 (n=31)
Independent
Variables
Social
Welfare
Educa­
tion
Total
Welfare
Total
Expenditure
-0.04 -0.34 -0.01 -0.69
(-0.10) (-0.26) (-0.02) (-1.70)
PCI
0.80
* *
(3.19)
0.73
X
(1.52)
1.09
X X X
(2.74)
1.03
X X X
(3.85)
Pn
-0.09
(-0.43)
-0.95
(-0.14)
-0.53
(-1.14)
-0.71
(-0.33)
Dem
0.35
x
(1.32)
2.42
X X
(2.23)
0.68
X
(1.53)
0.32
(0.82)
Ex
0.54
X X X
(4.86)
-0.27
(-0.81)
0.37 0.37
X X X  X X
(2.68) (2.08)
Con
-0.85
(-0.27)
-0.71
(-0.33)
-0.59
(-0.74)
-0.39
(-0.72)
R 2 0.78 0.28 0.73 0.82
where = p< 0.10; '**’ = p< 0.05; '***' = p< 0.01
and, M = Manufacturing; PCI = Per Capita Income;
Pn = Population; Dem = Demography; Ex = Exports 
Con = Concentration.
The main Table entries are beta coefficients; 
the figures in parentheses are *t' values.
For sources see Appendix 1. Raw Expenditure data are provided 
in Appendix 3.
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4.7. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
TABLE 4.4
Summary of Statistical Significance of Hypotheses
M PCI Prl Dem E>i Con
A C A C A C A C A C A C
- + + - - + + - + na
- - + - - - + - - na
- + + - - - + - + na
- + + - - - - - + na
Note : C = Canada = confirmed
A = Australia t  » = not conf i r m e d
SW = Social Welfare 
Ed = Education 
TW = Total Welfare 
TE = Total Exp e n d i t u r e
na = not ascertained
Other abbre v i a t i o n s  as in Tables 4.2 and 2.3
4.7.1 The Economic Needs Hypothesis
The general conclusion to emerge from the analysis of 
the data is that there is a striking degree of common ground 
for both Australia and Canada in the analysis of the 
influence of manufacturing on expenditure. The relationship 
is universally negative and the per capita income variable 
is, with one exception, positive for all the expenditures 
examined. In contrast, the pattern of results for demography 
and exports indicated a set of differential policy outcomes
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which point to interesting research problems.
The first important finding was the absence of any 
relationship between the level of industrialisation (measured 
by manufacturing GDP) in both countries, and the growth of 
expenditure in all categories. In fact the beta coefficients 
for manufacturing GDP were negative, that is, they were 
contrary to the expected direction, for all categories except 
for Australian social welfare expenditure which is positive, 
but not statistically significant. These results lend support 
to rejecting the manufacturing hypothesis or more correctly, 
the industrialisation explanation of public expenditure.
The evidence presented is significant in terms of the 
literature for two reasons. The first is that the 
relationship between industrialisation and expenditure growth 
lies at the heart of many theorists who emphasise economic 
explanations of expenditure. The second, and perhaps, a more 
important reason is that late industrialisation in Australia, 
and more so in Canada, provides a classic test of the 
industrialisation hypothesis in the time-span under analysis, 
because it is possible to evaluate the influence of 
industrialisation in a period of time when ’mature' 
industrialised countries were passing through different 
economic transitions.
In the case of Australia, the period of two decades 
following the Korean War was one of sustained economic 
growth. Indeed, a comparable period of economic growth was 
only achieved between 1860 and 1890. In the period under
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consideration, output per-capita grew by an average annual
rate of 2.5%, a figure twice that of the inter-war 
performance. To support the proposition being advanced, it
is necessary to examine not just economic growth but also the
structural changes in the Australian economy. In this
context, it should be noted that the 1950s saw the
historical shift to manufacturing, a change that was delayed
in terms of the European and American experience. Butlin et
al. summarise these changes as follows:
Part of the explanation of the increased per capita 
performance was that Australia experienced for the 
first time the conventional Western structural 
change, a shift to manufacturing, in circumstances 
in which manufacturing output per unit of labor 
input was high and rising relatively to rural 
activity (1982: 112).
Australian expenditure data, in particular, may be 
regarded as a critical test for the hypothesis that the shift 
to manufacturing is accompanied by growth in public 
expenditure. The analysis of the empirical data as reported 
in Table 4.2 fails to substantiate this hypothesis in terms 
of either social expenditure or total welfare expenditure. 
Indeed, the Australian experience presents a somewhat 
puzzling pattern. There exists a relatively high rate of 
public-sector growth, particularly infrastructure growth in 
the pre-war period, and this is associated with low rates of 
manufacturing growth when compared with the high rates 
characteristic of the performance during the period 
immediately following the war. According to Butlin et 
al. (1982), the high rates of public sector growth in the
19th century and the first half of the 20th century - aptly
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described as a period of 'colonial socialism’ are due to
the active intervention of colonial governments through 
'infrastructure’ supports. This pattern of public intervention 
was followed by both the Commonwealth and the States into the 
early part of this century.
Interestingly, the manufacturing hypothesis is not 
confirmed in the Canadian case either. The Canadian shift to 
manufacturing was similarly late in comparison with the 
international experience, although it was twenty years 
earlier than the structural shifts evident in Australia. The 
structural changes in the Canadian economy occurred during 
the 1920s and 1930s, placing it beyond the time-frame of our 
analysis (Officer & Smith 1970). However, given the growth 
of industry in the 1950s, one would have expected a 
confirmation of the hypothesis relating public expenditure to 
manuf acturing.
In summary, the conclusion that one can draw from this 
discussion is that the hypothesis relating to the level of 
industrialisation is not applicable in Australia for the 
growth of public welfare and non-welfare sector. A similar 
pattern of results is found in Canada. This general 
conclusion should, however, be qualified by the fact that 
this kind of comparison is fraught with some difficulty, 
mainly because the structural composition and history of the 
Australian and Canadian economies are different from West 
European economies which were the basis for the formulation 
of the original hypothesis.
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Overall, however, these results suggest that the link 
between industrialisation and expenditure growth does not 
have a great deal of explanatory value. Industrialisation by 
itself does not appear to be sufficient cause for 
expenditure growth. It is the presence of industrialisation 
mediated by other social and political variables which is 
likely to lead to certain policy outcomes.
In contrast to the negative results obtained for the 
industrialisation hypothesis, the ’per capita income 
explanation’ of expenditure obtains some corroboration, as 
indeed one must have predicted from the early results for the 
income elasticity model (Tables 4.2 & 4.3). However, the 
degree of support for this hypothesis differs between the two 
countries. The relationship between per capita income and 
expenditure finds more support with the Canadian than the 
Australian data.
To recapitulate, the purpose of this empirical test was 
to examine whether welfare expenditure increases 
concomitantly with an increase in the availability of 
economic resources. The empirical evidence reported provides 
support for this hypothesis. Within the Australian data, the 
strongest support comes from two categories of expenditure, 
namely, total welfare and total expenditure, with 
coefficients of 0.65 and 0.85 (Table 4.2) respectively. The 
other welfare expenditure categories of education and social 
welfare although positive, fail to show the same degree of 
responsiveness to changes in per capita income. However,
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significant, whereas education with a beta coefficient of 
0.28 is not.
The Canadian data on the other hand yield stronger 
support for linking the per capita income variable with all 
the expenditure categories examined. Here, the coefficients 
range from 0.80 for social welfare expenditure to 1.03 for 
total expenditure (Table 4.3). Indeed the lowest level of 
support is for education expenditure with a coefficient of 
0.73.
An interesting finding of these results is that social 
welfare expenditure in Canada is strongly related to changes 
in per capita income with a partial correlation of over .50, 
whereas a much weaker relationship is found in Australia with 
a correlation of only 0.23. One reason for these findings is 
that changes in per capita income are much more likely to 
have a greater impact in a system where there is 
universalised social insurance programmes as in Canada 
(Bryden 1974) than in a social welfare system that is 
characterised by a greater degree of means-testing (Brennan 
1982). This argument is consistent with the median voter 
argument of public choice theory (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) 
wherein politicians and parties, in order to win office 
appeal to the ’median’ voter. Since benefits are universal, 
governments are more likely to increase benefits in order to 
retain support, and these benefits are more prone to reflect 
the increase in levels of average income.
The results obtained in this study for Canada are
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replicated in Bird’s (1970) analysis of government
expenditure, where a relationship is noted in Canada between
expenditure and per capita income. However, Bird rightly
expresses a cautionary note in observing that the
relationship between per capita income and expenditure is
highly questionable since much of the association 
between the government expenditure ratio and per- 
capita income probably reflects common trends.
There is no presumption at all that changes in per 
capita income over the period were the main causes 
of the observed changes in government expenditure 
ratio (1970 .- 17) .
In terms of the wider literature, the per capita 
hypothesis, which is supported in this study by a time-series 
analysis of Australia and Canada, has received extensive 
support in cross-national studies of public expenditure. As 
we noted, Dye’s (1966) study of inter-state differences in 
expenditure lends support to the explanation that per capita 
income is a central determinant of policy outcomes. In other 
words, the availability of resources forms the basis on which 
policy is built.
However the dominant impression of the per capita 
results is the degree to which expenditure is more responsive 
to income in Canada than in Australia. One of the reasons we 
suggested was the degree to which Canadian income maintenance 
programmes are more universal than comparable Australian 
programmes. Another significant reason for this pattern of 
results is also the extent to which the Canadian federal 
government centralised the income security system during the 
period (post-1945) under analysis (see Banting 1982). The 
availability of resources clearly allowed the government to
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centralise the income security system more rapidly. One
inference to be drawn from this time-series data is that a 
resources hypothesis is not by itself an explanation for a 
set of expenditure patterns. The more interesting issue is 
the degree of responsiveness of expenditure to the 
availability of resources in Australia and Canada. The 
availability of resources might well form the basis of 
policy, but the extent to which it is important depends on a 
variety of other factors.
On the other hand, a variable that was found to produce 
a differential pattern of outcomes for both Australia and 
Canada was that of changes in the level of exports. The 
measure of the level of exports was intended to gauge the 
impact of changes in the international economic environment 
on levels of expenditure. As against other economic 
variables which broadly measure the impact of domestic 
economic factors, this variable is argued to capture the 
impact of economic events outside the domestic sphere.
As we observed earlier, the rationale for the testing of 
this hypothesis lies in the vulnerability of the two 
economies to international economic fluctuations, creating 
the conditions for domestic instability. We inferred from 
this, following Cameron (1978), that governments will be 
pressed to intervene to protect the economy and domestic 
incomes from the destabilising impact of such fluctuations.
The evidence for the importance of the impact of changes 
in the international environment on expenditure differs
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between the two countries. Strong evidence of the link
between changes in exports and expenditure was found in 
Canada for all expenditure categories, with the exception of 
education expenditure for which the sign was not in the 
expected direction. Social welfare expenditure had the 
highest degree of responsiveness with a coefficient of 0.54, 
whilst total welfare and total expenditure had the next 
strongest coefficients at approximately 0.37. In contrast, 
Australian data revealed that there were no statistically 
significant coefficients for change in the level of exports. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that the expenditure 
categories of education, total welfare and total expenditure, 
had negative coefficients. In fact, of the expenditure 
categories examined, only social welfare had a sign in the 
positive direction.
The main conclusion to emerge from the analysis of the 
relationship between changes in the level of exports and 
expenditure is that the two countries have responded to 
different stimuli. Canadian expenditure, except in the area 
of education, has been responsive to changes in the interna­
tional economic environment. On the other hand, Australian 
public expenditure has not displayed the same degree of 
sensitivity. It will be recalled that Cameron (1978) 
suggested two ways in which fluctuation in exports might 
influence the economy: through its impact on labour centrali­
sation or by the need for government to intervene to 
stabilise the economy through public expenditure. Given the 
low rates of unionisation in Canada (Myles 1984) it is likely
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that the second explanation is more applicable in Canada. 
(This finding is the most interesting of all the variables 
and will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.)
The final ’economic need’ variable to be examined is the 
concentration-of-capital hypothesis (H3). As operationalised 
by O ’Connor, this postulates that with increasing 
concentration of capital, that is, the growth of monopoly 
capital, expenditure tends to increase. A two-fold explanation 
may be posited to account for this relationship.
On the one hand, the need for accumulation leads to the 
externalisation of the key costs of production, while on the 
other, the need by the state for legitimisation leads to 
increased social spending. These accumulating and legitimis­
ing functions correspond broadly (though not mutually 
exclusively) to total welfare and public expenditure. Hence, 
the existence of a positive empirical relationship between 
capital concentration and changes in both total and welfare 
expenditures would tend to support O ’Connor's explanation of 
public expenditure in terms of both legitimation and 
accumulation.
But the data failed to locate any relationship between 
concentration and expenditure growth. Indeed all the Canadian 
expenditure coefficients for concentration have negative 
coefficients, that is, the signs were in a direction opposite 
to that predicted by the hypothesis. The conclusion that can 
be reached from an analysis of this quantitative evidence is 
that in Canada, concentration is not related to expenditure.
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The link between industrialisation and the 'concentration' 
variables was noted in our previous discussion of the
hypotheses. Both these variables attempted to capture the 
impact of 'infrastructural need’ on expenditure. The
empirical data presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicate that 
infrastructural need was not a major determinant of the
growth of the public sector in the periods under review.
The analysis so far has been on the 'economic need’ 
hypothesis for expenditure growth. Excluding the 
'concentration-of-capital’ and 'industrialisation* hypotheses 
which were negative, the analysis has focussed on two major 
hypotheses which could be termed the resource level and 
international economic explanations respectively. In terms 
of the diagram presented (see Diagram 4.1), these are the
two variables, reflecting changes in economic structure that 
are causally associated with expenditure.
4.7.2 The Social Needs Hypothesis
We turn next to the analysis and the assessment of the 
impact of social structural changes on expenditure levels 
examined in terms of the argument developed. Here, we 
consider the impact of two key variables, namely, population 
and demographic changes.
In the case of the 'population* variable, the evidence 
fails to confirm the hypothesis for any of the expenditure 
categories. Certainly, for Canada, the direction of all the 
coefficients are negative (see Table 4.3). In a similar 
manner, the Australian data, with negative coefficients for
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social and total expenditure, do not lend support to the 
hypothesis. In fact, the only positive coefficients are for 
education, which is 0.19, and for health which is 0.49, 
neither of which is sufficient to establish an empirical 
relationship between population changes and these expenditure 
levels. The obvious conclusion from an analysis of this 
evidence, is that expenditures in both countries have been 
similarly unresponsive to changes in population.
The ’social needs’ model of expenditure explanation 
is central to the demographic explanation. This model focuses 
on the pre-eminent role of social need in driving the engine 
of expenditure, and more particularly, the welfare state 
locomotive. As suggested above, one particular type of social 
need which is the main lubricant of the social need engine 
of the welfare state is the change in demographic structure. 
(By 'demographic', we mean expenditure implication of changes 
in the composition of the service-dependent population.) 
Here, the work of Wilensky is critical in developing an 
empirical account of the impact of demographic changes.
Wilensky (1975) has argued that economic development 
mediated by demographic changes was critical in accounting 
for expenditure. In particular, he observes that changes in 
the proportion of those aged 65 and over in the population 
was the major determinant of the growth of social 
expenditure. We attempt to test this demographic argument in 
three ways. Firstly, it is tested to some degree by 
examining the relationship between changes in the population 
of those 65 and over and social welfare expenditure.
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Admittedly, this is not strictly a proper test of Wilensky’s
hypothesis, because the manner in which social welfare
expenditure has been measured makes it more related to
social welfare programmes than to those dealing with
pensions. Secondly, by an extension of the demographic
explanation, we can study the responsiveness of education
expenditure to changes in the population of those under the
age of 19. Finally, we examine the changes in the combined
proportions of those over 65 and under 19, in order to test
the total impact of demographic changes on total welfare,
which includes social welfare and education, as well as
health expenditure. A similar test is carried out for the
total expenditure categories to serve as an indication of the
weight of the demographic structure on changes in the entire
public budget.
In the first test of the demographic explanation, that 
is, the relationship between changes in population of those 
aged 65 and over and social welfare expenditure, both 
countries have statistically significant coefficients of 
0.89 for Australia and 0.35 for Canada (see Tables 4.2 &
4.3), indicating a high degree of responsiveness to changes 
in demographic structure. It is moreover a relationship in 
the same direction. Hence, in terms of social welfare, 
regardless of the impact of other economic structural 
variables, 'need' has a similar impact on Australia and 
Canada.
With regard to the second test of the demographic
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explanation, that is, in terms of its impact on education, 
the two countries produce dissimilar effects. Canadian 
education expenditure is highly responsive to demographic 
changes, with a beta coefficient of 2.42 suggesting a high 
degree of responsiveness. This should be interpreted with 
caution for two reasons. First, the role of Canadian federal 
government in educational expenditure is relatively small, 
and second, most federal funding is to the post-secondary 
sector. However, in the Australian case education 
expenditure is not responsive to demographic changes.
In the third and final test of the demographic 
explanation, that is, in terms of the relationship between 
the two demographic categories already examined, demographic 
changes do not appear to have an impact on either the overall 
welfare budget or the total budget in Australia. This is not 
the case with the Canadian data which reveal that the growth 
rate of both expenditure categories do reflect the impact of 
demographic changes. The total Canadian welfare budget no 
doubt reflects the cumulative impact of the demographic 
determinants of social welfare and education discussed 
earlier. An interesting, and to a degree unexpected, finding 
is the impact of demography on changes in the total Canadian 
budget. This reflects the importance of change in the 
welfare budget in the rate of growth of total expenditure 
caused by demography.
A caveat in the analysis of demographic hypotheses in
general and Wilensky's model in particular, is that time
lags are critical in the overall analysis of the
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responsiveness of the policy-making process to changes in
'need'. A problem with these types of analyses is the 
underlying assumption that policy processes automatically
reflect changes in need rather than adjustments over a time 
period. In this context, it should be noted that our analysis 
of this relationship is more appropriate than Wilensky’s 
because of its time-series focus. A major flaw in Wilensky’s 
research design - a design which constrained him from 
analysing the influence of demographic changes over time 
was its cross-sectional methodology. Demographic explanations 
require an examination of the responsiveness of expenditure 
to changes in demographic structure over time. But even 
within a time-series framework, it is not possible to examine 
the impact of time lags.
4.7.3 Interpretation
One final comment on the virtue of the time-series mode 
of analysis as against cross-national research design is that 
most structural hypotheses tested have been confirmed only at 
the cross-national level. The importance of this structural 
model lies in the fact that its empirical examination is 
carried out with time-series data. The main problem with 
cross-national analysis of expenditure is that it might be 
prone to the fallacy of assuming that findings from a large 
range of countries can be generalised and applied to a 
smaller group of countries. Most of the empirical work 
supportive of convergence theory has been based on large 
sample studies. Thus, Wilensky, for example, has a sample of
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sixty-four countries. As Castles and McKinley (1979b) have 
shown, the distribution of countries around the measure of 
economic development is bi-modal in character, with developed 
and developing countries clustered together. In this 
situation, one is bound to find a relationship between 
economic development and social expenditure. The results 
obtained in this study tend to contradict the cross-sectional 
analysis of the impact of industrialisation. On the other 
hand, the time-series data are consistent with some of the 
cross-sectional studies in indicating a positive relationship 
between resources and demographic structure and expenditure. 
The evidence provided is important not only because of the 
time-series data employed, but also as an empirical test for 
incrementalism.
In summary, the empirical results obtained, apart from 
industrialisation and population variables which had no 
impact on expenditure, can be classified into three main 
effects: resource, demographic and international economic 
effects.
In terms of the resource effect, we obtained two 
important findings. First, the finding that the availability 
of resources is important for the determination of social 
welfare expenditure in both countries. Resources are clearly 
a central element in the building block of the welfare state. 
Moreover, these findings are consistent with the analysis of 
the data from the test of the income elasticity model where 
the elasticity coefficients of all expenditure categories
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were greater than one.
However, the degree of responsiveness of social welfare 
to resources varies greatly, and warrants some explanation. 
One may argue that the greater responsiveness of social 
security expenditure to the availability of resources in 
Canada arose for two main reasons. One relates to the 
particular character of federal-provincial relations with 
regard to welfare in Canada that allows for greater 
availability of resources for the Canadian federal 
government, thereby enabling it to centralise the social 
security system as well as to expand its involvement in 
education and health expenditure (Banting 1982). 
Consequently, resources may be seen as a lever by which the 
federal government expanded into the welfare sector.
The other and analytically more interesting reason is 
the degree of means-testing of social security payments, in 
terms of the explanation about the greater impact of per 
capita income on social welfare than on the other 
expenditure categories. This has been explained as being 
related to transfer payments as a dominant composition of 
the social welfare expenditure examined. With regard to this 
median voter argument, it might be suggested that the 
universalised and contributory system of income-maintenance 
in Canada during the period under review (Guest 1980) is 
subject to greater pressure for the increase of benefit 
levels in line with increasing average incomes than would a 
more predominantly means-tested and flat-rate benefit system 
such as that prevailing in Australia (Jones 1983). The
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empirical evidence is consistent with such an interpretation.
The second important finding with respect to the 
responsiveness of expenditure to resources (the resource 
effect) is the differential impact of resources on the growth 
of educational expenditure. The results are paradoxical in 
that Canadian expenditure is significantly related to 
resources, whereas Australian expenditure is not. This is of 
interest in that resources do not seem to play any part in 
the determination of the level of federal education 
expenditure in Australia. The result suggests support for 
expenditure trends examined earlier which indicate that 
educational expenditure as a federal responsibility expanded 
rapidly in Canada during the post-war period. The 
relationship between expenditure and demographic changes also 
represents the impact of the higher Canadian participation 
rate in secondary and post-secondary education in comparison 
with Australia (Jones 1983). Moreover a high proportion of 
federal funds earmarked for education consisted of assistance 
to the tertiary sector.
These analyses of the positive impact of resources on 
public expenditure support the findings of many Canadian 
expenditure determinant studies. Bird’s study (1970) has 
already been noted. However, political science studies of 
policy output such as those of Kornberg et al. (1972) and 
Falcone (1974) suggest the importance of socio-economic 
factors in determining policy output. Limited studies of 
provincial expenditure differences by Poole (1972) and Hogan
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(1972) also suggest the importance of socio-economic 
variables. In addition to the above research which have been 
broadly in the tradition of output studies, one important 
qualitative analysis which emphasised the importance of 
resources in influencing social welfare public expenditure is 
that of Bryden (1974). The present work, by virtue of its 
employment of a comparative time-series framework as well as 
controlling for factors such as demography, suggests issues 
which have not been examined in the studies referred to 
previously.
A problem in these studies is that they do not indicate 
how resources translate into the political process. For this 
reason, in the subsequent chapters we attempt to evaluate the 
impact of resources through measures such as unemployment and 
revenue to which policy-makers respond directly.
In terms of the demographic effect, social welfare 
expenditure responds in a similar manner in both countries. 
On the other hand, education and total welfare expenditures 
are statistically significant, and is related to demography 
in Canada, but show no impact in the Australian scene. 
The main conclusions to emerge from this analysis of need are 
two-fold. The first is that changes in the proportion of the 
service-dependent population have an impact on social 
welfare expenditure in both countries. Given the demographic 
changes in both countries in the move towards a static and 
ageing population (UN 1974;), these findings with regard to 
Australia, as Jones points out, have great significance:
The aged have gradually become more important in
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Australian society. Part of the reason is simply 
the decline in mortality: more aged now survive 
(1983: 115).
Secondly, a major finding of the study is that need is 
associated with resources. If resources vary positively with 
expenditure, so does need. This assertion is borne out by an 
examination of the Australian and Canadian data, and partly 
accounts for the differential impact of need on education 
expenditure in the two countries. However it should be 
recognised that a problem with need-based explanations of 
expenditure determinants, in this instance the demographic 
explanation, is that they do not indicate the causal agency 
by which ’need' is linked to policy outcomes. The missing 
element as with the resources explanation is an account of 
how political pressures determine the manner in which need 
affects policy - a topic which will be the subject of the 
next two chapters.
In terms of international economic effects, the evidence 
for the relationship of exports to expenditure comprises the 
most important and interesting finding of the analysis. A 
main objective of the study was to examine the influence of a 
primary product and raw material exporting economy, such as 
that characteristic of both Australia and Canada, on 
expenditure patterns. There is a positive relationship in 
the pattern of results for Canada whereas it is negative for 
Australia. This is partly explained by variations of the 
rates of internationalisation and external dependence of the 
Canadian and Australian economies. As many have observed 
(see section 4.5.2), the period under study, namely, 1945-
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1975, witnessed an increase in the dependence of the Canadian
economy on the American economy. By contrast, the
Australian economy, though remaining dependent on
agricultural exports, was not internationalised in the same
manner. This was mainly because the mode of industrialisation 
was of the import substitution variety (Boehm 1971).
There is however a more substantial theoretical reason 
for this pattern of results, and this lies in the 
institutional framework of the Australian economy. 
Katzenstein (1984) in a recent work entitled: Small States
in World Markets, has drawn attention to the influence of 
international economic patterns on the institutional 
structures of the domestic economy. The argument being 
advanced is that the significant feature of Australian 
history has been the development of institutions to cushion 
against the effects of the instability of the international 
economy on local producers and consumers. This is reflected 
in the ensemble of structures such as trade protection, 
arbitration and agricultural marketing authorities. As 
Macintyre observes:
The search for balance is a persistent theme of the 
regulatory activities of the Australian government.
It as a colonial government administration sought 
to provide for all; so the federal government 
strove to maintain the fragile equilibrium between 
all the states, between producers and consumers, 
between urban and rural interests. (1986: 105.)
In this context, it should be noted that the
institutional innovation of the first decades of federal
government followed the collapse of export prices and the
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financial crisis of the 1890s (Macintyre 1986).
This argument is consistent with the recent work of
Castles (1985) on the Australian welfare state in which he
argues that arbitration diffused the pressures for social
expenditure. In terms of our argument, the instability of 
the domestic economy, or more particularly of domestic
incomes, caused by external forces was stabilised through an
ensemble of institutions rather than through expenditure.
Canada, on the other hand, lacked the kind of federal 
institutions that were evolved in Australia in the early part 
of this century to protect ’domestic income' (Denoon 1983). 
Consequently, public expenditure was the means by which fluc­
tuations in the domestic economy were stabilised in the sense 
argued by Cameron. Moreover, recent years have witnessed the 
increasing vulnerability of the Canadian economy to inter­
national movements. Two main features of this vulnerability 
are its dependence on the American economy and the floating 
of the Canadian dollar. These pressures on domestic incomes 
have created conditions for the increasing use of social 
expenditure to stabilise incomes.
To conclude, the evidence suggests, firstly that 
resources and demography are broadly similar in their 
influence on social expenditure, and indeed, given the 
international literature, one would expect the pattern of 
results to be similar in the direction of causation. 
Resources and demography are the basic building blocks of the 
welfare state. Secondly, given the structure and the 
particular vulnerability of the Australian and Canadian
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economies to movements in the international economy, the 
analysis suggests that these movements have a differential 
influence on expenditure. In Australia, the responsiveness 
of expenditure is minimal, because of the growth of 
institutions which could absorb the adverse impact on the 
domestic economy caused by fluctuations of the international 
economy. On the other hand, social expenditure in Canada is 
positively related to fluctuations in export income, 
suggesting that expenditure is perhaps one means of 
stabilising national income.
NOTES
1. Wagner's basic work was Finanzwissenschaft, extracts of 
which are produced in Musgrave and Peacock (1958).
2. Lakatos’s notion is more useful than the Kuhnian concept of 
a paradigm because it identifies the solution of problems 
as the key enterprise of science.
3. For an excellent overview and summary of Wagner's model see 
Bird (1971). This study is also a landmark analysis of 
Canadian expenditure.
4. For a critical discussion of the models employed by those 
attempting to test Wagner’s model see Gandhi (1971).
5. For two such important studies from Wagnerian standpoint, 
see Veverka (1963); O ’Donoghue and Tait (1968) which are 
interesting studies of Britain and Ireland respectively.
6. Mann (1980) has a useful discussion of the utility of 
these different specifications.
7. Ian Gough (1979) has attempted to develop a Marxist theory 
of the welfare state which emphasises both the interest of 
capital and the pressure from labour. However, his theory
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is not easily operationalisable.
8. Claus Offe (1972; 1985) has developed a more theoretical 
account of the welfare state based on O ’Connor's account.
9. There has been a developing literature on the interaction 
effect of the international economy on the domestic 
political economy. See Katzenstein (1984) for an incisive 
analysis of such aspects; also a recent work by Aitkin 
and Castles (1987).
10. The sources of data for both countries are set out in 
Appendix 1; section 3.4.1 outlines the method of 
deflation of expenditure data.
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CHAPTER 5
THE IMPACT OF PARTY ON PUBLIC POLICY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In any evaluation of modern democratic government, an 
assessment of the impact of the party in government on 
public policy is crucial, because parties are the central 
element of modern democratic societies. They provide the 
mediating link between the variety of ’interests’ that 
constitute modern society and government. In other words, 
participation in democratic politics is through the party 
system (Sartori 1969).
The main purpose of this chapter is to present an 
analysis of the influence of governing parties on public 
policy in terms of the conceptual problem and research 
strategy sketched in Chapter 1. The paramount analytical 
problem of this thesis is an examination of the influence of 
political administration or parties in government in 
countries with ’strong' and ’weak’ party systems. This is 
considered in terms of the two models identified in the 
introductory chapter as the ’structural’ and ’strategic 
actor' models of policy.
The lack of class-based cleavages in Canadian politics 
and especially the absence of a major social democratic 
party, with a consequent diminution of policy differences, 
allow us to analyse the proposition that the socio-economic 
structure of the party system is the major contributing 
factor in determining policy outcomes. In relation to the
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models identified in Chapter 1, this conception of the link 
between party and policy (Model 1) is what has been 
identified as the 'structural model'. It denotes the 
influence of the socio-economic constituency of parties in 
defining the objectives of party policy. If the structural 
conception of party is to account adequately for the 
determination of policy, it could be expected that the 
organisationally and ideologically, as well as the socio­
economically divided Australian parties would have a greater 
influence on policy when in government. By the same token, 
one would expect the ideologically and socio-economically 
non-distinctive Canadian parties to have little influence 
whilst in government.
The alternative conception to the structural model 
examined is the ’strategic actor’ model (Model 2 in Chapter 
1). This model, it will be recalled, places emphasis on the 
ways in which parties operate on the strategic environment 
rather than on the socio-economic basis of party support. The 
link between party and policy here is the set of strategic 
incentives which propel parties to act in a particular 
manner. From this model, one would expect parties in 
government to have a significant impact in both countries, 
regardless of the strength of the party system.
The Canadian literature, as remarked in Chapter 1, often 
laments the lack of a strong party system capable of 
aggregating the different social interests in society. 
Implicit in this argument is the fact that the Canadian party
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system, with its weak organisation and lack of class
cleavages, has negligible policy impact; and hence, is not
capable of producing distinct policy differences.1 (See 
Meisel 1975; Regenstreif 1965: 84-106; and Chapter 1.)
Further evidence from Canadian scholars such as Mallory
(1967) Engleman and Schwartz (1975: 209-11) seem to support
the conventional wisdom that party does not influence policy
in the Canadian context. In relation to policy differences
over the welfare state, Scarrow (1964) cites survey
evidence which suggests that the Liberals and the
Conservatives do not differ in terms of their attitude to
social welfare. Chandler cogently sums up the
conventional view when he notes that:
It is commonly held that the traditional and
predominant parties of Canadian federal politics 
are in a policy sense very much alike. Both are
seen as brokerage parties with rather broad and
diffuse clienteles (1977: 759).
The absence of policy differences is due to the fact 
that according to the conventional wisdom, the Canadian
party system is based on brokerage and clientelism, 
conditions which are thought to inhibit the influence of 
party on policy. Porter's (1965) classic and influential 
work, The Vertical Mosaic, argued that Canadian politics was 
characterised by a system of competitive elites which allowed 
little room for the influence of parties on public policy. 
Indeed the thrust of his argument was that if parties had any 
role, it was to function as agents of elite accommodation. 
The two major parties which perform this role at the federal 
level are the Liberal and Conservative parties. These are the
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only parties to have held governmental power in the period of 
review in this study. Consequently, as this is a study of 
federal expenditure, only the Liberal and Conservative 
parties are considered; the minority parties and in 
particular, the NDP are excluded from the analysis.
Australian historiography, in marked contrast, has a 
long tradition of emphasis on the role of party on policy, 
particularly the emphasis on the role of the Labour Movement. 
It has been aptly noted that this theme is the Australian 
version of the ’Whig’ interpretation of history, in which the 
story of Australian society is the story of a general 
progress towards the enhancement of liberty. In the 
Australian context the 'Whig’ interpretation took the form 
of 'the Labor Party acting positively as an agent of progress 
and its opponents negatively as the enemies of progress' 
(Loveday 1985: 94). The 'initiative-resistance' debate served 
to bring these issues to the forefront in a more explicitly 
political-science context. The seeds of this debate were 
sown much earlier by the work of Hancock (1929), but the 
argument was revived in Mayer’s (1956) classic analysis of 
the notion of a party of initiative, and continued in 
Rawson's (1968) and Goot's (1969) consideration of the issues 
raised.
The most recent renewal of debate concerns the impact of 
the Whitlam period of Labor government on public policy. 
Castles (1987) examines the influence of the Whitlam Labor 
period on social expenditure, while collections of articles
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edited by Patience and Head (1979) deal with the policy 
differences between the Whitlam and Fraser governments in 
several areas. Although useful as descriptive sources, none 
of the articles in the latter collection tackles the
conceptual issues considered in this study. Adopting a 
distinctly social policy perspective, Graycar (1979), Jones 
(1983) and Tulloch (1979) concentrate on the impact of the 
Whitlam period on aspects of social welfare. Apart from the 
larger analytical issues of concern in the thesis, an
examination of the role of Australian parties, especially the 
Labor party provides a basis for the evaluation of debates 
in both Australian historiography and political science.
5.2 TWO EXPLANATIONS OF THE ROLE OF PARTY IN GOVERNMENT
Two distinct explanations of the impact of party on
policy have appeared in the empirical literature over the
last decade. The first explanation could be termed the
’turnover' hypothesis, which posits that a new
administration will set priorities which are distinct from
2those of its predecessors. The policy effect of changes in 
administrations is that expenditure will take on distinct 
patterns and reflect changes within each period. This 
hypothesis would be consistent with the strategic actor 
model. The basis of the hypothesis is that new
administrations will attempt to get new policy priorities to 
consolidate support. In terms of the models outlined above, 
the turnover hypothesis emphasises the strategic incentive 
rather than structural factors for parties in government.
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The second explanation, which might be termed the 'social- 
democratic' hypothesis, seeks to locate policy changes in 
party systems. In particular, it lays causal emphasis on the 
influence of class-based cleavages on policy and is 
consistent with the structural conception of party outlined 
above. It highlights the importance of party constituencies 
on policy. Applying this to the Australian context, one would 
expect the Australian Labor Party administrations to have 
considerably greater impact on social expenditure than would 
Coalition (Liberal/National) administrations. Likewise, it 
could be argued along these lines that by and large Canadian 
social expenditures would not be responsive to changes in 
administration. This may be seen as a consequence of the lack 
of a major social democratic party in the Canadian party 
system.
5.2.1 Turnover Hypothesis
Empirical support for the turnover hypothesis comes 
mainly from the work of Bunce (1980; 1981). She tested the 
impact of elite succession (measured by changes in 
administration) on seven democratic countries viz., Austria, 
Britain, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, 
Japan and the United States. In this study, a significant 
feature was the use of time-series data to examine 
expenditure changes which were identified as the dependent 
variable in the study design. The major conclusion of this 
study was that:
chief executives and elections do in fact influence
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the policy process in democratic states. "The 
routines of politics” to borrow Sharkansky’s
(1970) phrase, are disturbed by elections and changes in administrations; elections rotate 
policies as well as leaders in nations as diverse 
as Sweden and the United States (1980: 391).
Despite the uncertain theoretical basis for this
conclusion, the clear inference is that leadership succession
prompts new elites to consolidate support by altering
budgetary priorities. Bunce's analysis is conceptually
unclear as it does not recognise the difference between
elections and administrations. The rationale for arguing that
elections are a determinant of expenditure is distinct from
the argument that a change in administration results in the
adoption of different policy priorities. A restatement of the
position would be that the influence of elections on policy
is based on the assumption that the proximity of an election
leads to strategic behaviour by the incumbent administration
a behaviour manifested in the adoption of different
expenditure priorities. The essential proposition is that
the basis for the impact of party on policy lies in the
strategic incentives for new ’political elites’ to change
policy priorities rather than influence of party ideology.
A more serious problem with this study, a
methodological one that will be discussed later, is the
absence of variables which control for the influence of
3economic and incremental factors. An approach which attempts 
to analyse average changes of differences in patterns of 
expenditure of various administrations cannot by this 
research design rule out the influence of other factors,
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especially incremental change. The formulation of a 
comprehensive model of the influence of political 
administration requires the delineation of a clear set of 
incremental and bureaucratic variables.
45.2.2 Social Democratic Explanations of Policy
In contrast to the turnover hypothesis, what we have
termed the social democratic explanation rests on a different
set of theoretical assumptions. In essence, what this
emphasises are the policy implications of class-based
parties. A classic work in this regard is that of Hibbs
(1977) on cross-national differences in unemployment and
inflation. It is worth summarising the approach and main
outlines of Hibbs's paper, as they help to elucidate many of
the underlying assumptions of the party explanation.
Hibbs noted that amongst industrial democracies during
the postwar era, average levels of unemployment and inflation
yielded negative correlations. Thus, countries with lower
levels of unemployment generally experienced higher levels of
inflation. A reason for this relationship is the unfavorable
trade-off between unemployment and inflation illustrated in
the so-called Phillips curve. As a result, governments are
unable to maximise both the economic objectives of full
employment and price stability. As these objectives may be
contradictory, economic policy invariably involves a 
choice between employment and price stability. However, 
this policy choice is not class-neutral. In tight 
labour markets, lower-income-earners will, in theory and 
in practice prosper from higher employment. On the other 
hand, upper-income-earners, who are less vulnerable to 
unemployment, will tend to favour price stability. In 
fact, this class-differential impact of unemployment
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and inflation was confirmed by Hibbs in his later 
research (1979).
Hibbs maintains that because economic class is a major 
basis for electoral and ideological cleavages on questions 
like unemployment and inflation, parties are prone to respond 
to the interests of their core constituencies. From this, it 
could be predicted that Labor and social-democratic 
governments will tend to favour the achievement of full 
employment even at the cost of price stability.
The empirical evidence marshalled by Hibbs to support 
this contention is indeed impressive. He shows, among other 
things, that cross-national differences in unemployment and 
inflation were closely correlated (-.68 and .74 respectively) 
with the number of years during which social democratic 
parties controlled the government. A re-analysis of this 
data, carried out in response to criticism that Hibbs failed 
to include countries such as Japan did not alter the basic 
explanation that he proposed. The Table below outlines the 
correlations between rates of unemployment and inflation and 
electoral and parliamentary shares of social democratic 
parties.
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TABLE 5.1
Linear Correlation for Eleven Industrial Democracies
Average Average
Unemployment Inflation
Rate: 1960-1969 Rate: 1960-1969
Average Left Share
of Vote (1960-1969) -.70
Average Left Share of 
Cabinet (1949-1969) -.38
Average Left Share of 
Cabinet (1960-1969) -.27
Average Percent Years
Left in Cabinet -.41
(1945-1969)
.48
.36
.31
.50
Source:- From Table 1, Hibbs (1979). The countries are 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
Japan, Sweden. U.K., U.S., and West Germany.
The explanation offered for these differences in Table 
5.1 is that cross-national differences in unemployment and 
inflation reflect the degree to which social democratic and 
conservative parties have influenced the specific nature of 
the trade-off between unemployment and inflation.
While this evidence is both interesting and impressive, 
especially in that the work of others such as Cowart (1978) 
and Tufte (1978) has tended to support Hibbs's conclusions, 
it has nevertheless been challenged by analysts such as Payne 
(1979), Schmidt (1982), Beck (1982a) and Kernell (1980). 
Although a full discussion is outside the terms of this 
thesis, one problem encountered by Hibbs and others studying 
the impact of social-democratic parties on public policy
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warrants mention. This pertains to the fact that the party
composition of government and macro-economic policy may be
viewed as products of a third variable, and therefore,
spuriously correlated with each other.
Kernell offers an alternative explanation of Hibbs's
data along these lines by stating that the relationships
reflect the coincidence of party control and a 
nation’s specific unemployment/inflation tradeoff. 
Various estimates agree that the United States has 
an especially unfavourable tradeoff such that to 
drive unemployment to Europe's low levels would 
require unprecedented levels of inflation.
(1980: 4).
The same argument may well be extended to welfare 
expenditure. Thus for example, the high Scandinavian and 
Northern European levels of welfare could be explained on a 
variety of grounds other than party composition, such as the 
presence of Christian democratic and Catholic parties as in 
the Netherlands. Likewise, the degree of corporatism and the 
openness of the economy measured in terms of exports as a 
proportion of GDP have also been offered as explanations. 
(See Cameron 1978; Schmidt 1982; Stephens 1979; and 
Wilensky 1976.)
In the area of welfare and public expenditure, there
exists an extensive literature which has examined the impact
of partisanship on policy. Three studies, in particular,
those of Cameron (1978), Stephens (1979), and Castles (1982a;
1982b) deserve special attention; Cameron argues that
politics is important in influencing the scope of 
the public economy. The partisanship of government 
is associated with the rate of expansion, and 
whether a nation’s government was generally
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controlled by social democratic (and their leftist 
allies), or by non-leftist parties, provides a 
strong clue to the relative degree of change in the 
scope of the public economy (1978: 1251).
Yet he does not come out fully in favour of a
partisanship theory of public policy. He argues instead, that
the openness of the economy, a variable examined in Chapter
4, is a prior causal factor creating the conditions for
social democratic domination of the governmental apparatus.
Stephens (1979) has provided perhaps one of the better
statements of what has been termed the labour mobilisation
theory of social policy. In a cross-national analysis of 17
countries he found that the distribution of power within
civil society, measured in terms of the power of both the
industrial and political labour movement, is an important
factor of welfare state development. For Stephens, the
centralisation of wage bargaining, a variable used by him as
a measure of the strength of corporatism is related to the
level of the development of the welfare state. He argues that
corporatism operationalised by the presence of centralised
wage bargaining is a product of a strong trade union
movement. Consequently, he stresses the importance of the
interaction of social democratic control of government and
trade union strength in producing distributional outcomes
favourable to the labour movement.
Castles (1982b), while supporting a partisanship theory
of public policy, maintains that welfare policy is not
necessarily the sign of a strong Left, but may also belong to
(or be associated with) a weak and fragmented Right. The
1 8 4
contention here is that a weak and fragmented Right will 
provide the conditions for the growth of a strong Left party, 
whereas a strong Right party serves to inhibit the expansion 
of welfare policies. This is however an extension of, rather 
than an alternative to, the social democratic explanation.
Summary of the Social Democratic Model
As the literature on the impact of social democracy is 
extensive, it is worthwhile attempting to trace the main 
assumptions of the argument, and the underlying hard core 
(Lakatos 1970) of the research programme. Before outlining 
the assumptions of the research programmes, two key meta- 
theoretical propositions of the party explanation need to be 
unveiled. Following Castles (1982a) (1982b), two main 
propositions within the Lakatosian hard core are: first, the 
denial that socio-economic structure or any technological 
imperative is more important than the political factor or 
political arrangements; secondly, that political parties are 
seen as capable of both responding to, and shaping social 
change. Consequently, the distribution of political power 
or, rather, governmental power, does make a difference to 
public policy outcomes.
Turning to the theoretical 'core* of the research 
programme, three key assumptions can be identified. The 
first assumption of the social-democratic thesis is that 
public policy involves different class interests. Public 
policies are not seen as ’class-neutral' but as class-biased, 
in so far as the benefits of public policies, which can be
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both economic and political, are not distributed equally 
among all classes. The logical deduction from this 
proposition is that the Labour Movement will, both 
politically and industrially, support policies that will 
benefit its constituencies, especially where these lead to 
favourable distributional outcomes. Hibbs's thesis about 
macro-economic policymaking argues that the core constituency 
of social democratic parties will benefit from a favourable 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation. The assumption 
leads us to qualify one of the meta-theoretical propositions 
about the autonomy of parties. Parties are autonomous in so 
far as they are agents which shape social change. However, 
such autonomy is constrained by their constituencies. Parties 
are not principal actors so much as constrained agents.
With respect to social welfare expenditure, the central 
thesis of the social democratic argument has been that 
welfare policies involve a given set of distributional 
outcomes that are likely to benefit the social democratic 
constituencies. Hence, it is argued that under these 
circumstances, social democratic parties will tend to 
increase welfare expenditure. (See Stephens 1979, for a 
further elaboration of this argument.)
The second assumption, closely related to the first, is 
that policy is not seen in functional terms. Social welfare 
policy and the distributional outcomes that flow from it are 
not the automatic responses of the state to the emergence of 
immanent social and economic needs (see section 4.2 for 
review) or the response to the ’need' for the reproduction
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of capitalist society. Public policy and social welfare
policy are seen as outcomes of conflict between groups which
have different interests. As Shalev puts it:
The outcomes of this moreover, are by no means 
pre-determined by socio-economic or any other 
imperative ...they depend on the balance of class 
forces in the policy making arena (1983: 31).
The final and most questionable assumption of social
democratic theories is more methodological in nature, and
equally applies to the administrative turnover hypothesis.
The problem concerns the logic of the research design
employed which excludes consideration of the influence of
incremental and bureaucratic factors in these studies of the
impact of party on policy. This is reflected in the fact that
no attempt has been made in these study designs of typically
time-series studies of expenditure (see Castles 1982, for an
initial approach to time-series design), to control for
incrementalism, by which is meant the influence of previous
expenditure on current expenditure. Compared with these
earlier studies, an important advance of the present study
is the delineation of bureaucratic and incremental variables
which are discussed more fully later on.
5.3 TESTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT MODEL 
5.3.1 Descriptive Model
Before proceeding to formulate a model of administrative 
impact which takes into account bureaucratic and incremental 
factors, it is useful to analyse the mean changes in nominal 
expenditure growth by political administration for Australia
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and Canada. This is done for two purposes; first, to give an 
analysis of nominal rates of expenditure growth under 
different administrations, and second, to examine a familiar 
model of the influence of party on policy which is based on 
the descriptive statistics. This allows a contrast to be made 
between this model and a more complex administrative impact 
model.
Rather than test for the impact of party, we have broken 
the time-series into different administrative periods. (For 
an analysis of the United States macro-economic policy broken 
down by Presidential administration see Beck 1982a.) This 
method can be defended on three main grounds. First, the 
turnover hypothesis requires an analysis of the policy 
changes of different administrations. This is because 
central to the turnover hypothesis is the fact that it is the 
different political administrations even of the same party 
that produce distinct policy changes. Second, in the period 
under examination, the long periods of one-party dominance by 
the Liberal-NCP Coalition governments in Australia from 1950 
to 1972, and by the Liberal Party in Canada in all the years 
except during the Diefenbaker period from 1956 to 1961, make 
it possible to examine the policy outputs of different 
governments of the same party. Third, coincidentally, the 
period covered in the time-series contains only one Labor 
administration in Australia, and similarly, one period of 
Conservative rule in Canada. Hence for both Labor and 
Conservatives, it is a test of party as well as of 
administration.
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In the case of Australia, four distinct administrative 
periods are tested. The first is the Menzies period, that 
is, the period of the Menzies Prime Ministership from 1950 
to 1966. The second, the period from 1966 to 1972, is 
described simply as the *post-Menzies period' because it 
includes the short tenures of four Prime Ministers (Holt, 
McEwen, Gorton and McMahon); this makes further divisions 
technically untenable. The third is the Whitlam period, from 
1973 to 1975, the only period of Labor rule under study. 
The final period is the Fraser Prime Ministership between 
1976 and 1980.
The administrative periods tested for Canada are also 
defined by the Prime Ministerial stewardship and tenure, The 
first, the St Laurent period covers the period from 1948 to 
1957; the second, that of Diefenbaker from 1957 to 1963 is as 
noted the only Conservative regime during the period under 
examination. The other two periods tested in the study are 
those of successive Liberal governments, namely, Pearson's 
tenure as Prime Minister from 1963 to 1967, and the period of 
Trudeau Prime Ministership from 1968 to 1970.
The mean rates of growth of expenditure by 
administrations for Australia are indicated in Table 5.2 
presented below.
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Descriptive Model: Australial
TABLE 5.2
Percentage Rates of Nominal Expenditure Changes by 
Administration in Australia
(in percentages)
Admin. Social
Period Welfare
Educa­
tion Health
Total
Welfare
Total
Expenditure
Menzies
(1950-1966)
8.9 2.5 1.6 10.4 3.9
Post-Menzies
(1967-1972)
9.6 32.1 15.1 12.6 15.7
Whitlam
(1973-1975)
34.0 56.2 50.1 39.7 31.3
Fraser
(1976-1980)
14.8 9.1 2.2 10.1 10.1
Note:- The figures are calculated on the basis of
changes in current expenditure over the previous 
year's expenditure as a proportion of expenditure (in 
percentage terms). The main Table entries are the 
mean values for the different time periods. For data
sources see Appendix 1.
The most striking feature in these expenditure changes 
is the marked growth in all welfare expenditures as well as 
in total expenditure during the Whitlam period. The two 
largest areas of growth in expenditure in this period were in 
education and health, both of which experienced mean rates of 
annual change in excess of 50%. The rate of change between 
the post-Menzies period and Whitlam period for these two
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expenditure categories were 24.1% and 35% respectively. With 
the introduction of Medibank as a universal health insurance 
programme, health or rather medical insurance policy became 
one in which there was the greatest amount of policy 
innovation. Education also witnessed considerable growth 
with a great expansion in grants to the States as well as the 
Commonwealth assumption of funding responsibility for the 
Universities and Colleges. Social welfare too became 
identified as another area in which there was a significant 
expansion. An explanation for these figures may lie in the 
universalisation of the pension programmes, a significant 
innovation of the Whitlam government. However, the growth of 
expenditure in social welfare was not as great as that in 
health and education. It should be noted though, that social 
welfare did not have to expand from the relatively low base 
levels of health and education expenditure prevalent at the 
time of the election of the Whitlam government.
The post-Menzies expenditure figures indicate that 
compared to the Menzies period, there was considerable 
expansion in the areas of health and education - a jump of 
29.6% in education expenditure and of 13.5% in health. In 
fact, the mean rates of expenditure for education changed 
more between the Menzies and post-Menzies periods than 
between post-Menzies and Whitlam periods. By contrast, the 
mean changes of social welfare expenditure were almost the 
same between the Menzies and post-Menzies periods, the 
difference being only 0.7%.
While both post-Menzies and Whitlam periods saw
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expansions in the rate of change of expenditure from the 
levels of preceding administrations, the Fraser period 
witnessed declines in the rate of change of expenditure 
comparable to its increase in the two preceding 
administrations. The rates of change in education and health 
expenditure declined by 47.1% and 47.9% respectively. The 
decline in expenditure was greater during the Fraser period 
than the comparable increase of expenditure in the Whitlam 
period from the preceding post-Menzies period. This decline 
is also positively reflected in social welfare. However, 
given the high rates of expenditure growth during the 1970- 
1975 period, the scope for expansion was somewhat limited.
All three Liberal/NCP administrations exhibited 
different patterns of expansion in the areas of health and 
education, with the post-Menzies period having relatively 
high rates of growth for these categories. Indeed, the 
Whitlam period reflected the acceleration in expenditure that 
was apparent under the post-Menzies period. The rate of 
growth of the social welfare budget was approximately similar 
in all three administrations, ranging from 8.9% to 14.8%. 
This pattern is reflected in the growth of the total welfare 
budget; but this masks the fact that the Fraser period 
witnessed a decline from the Whitlam period, in the rate of 
change in welfare expenditure.
While the analysis of these figures must of necessity be 
tentative at this juncture, it is apparent that the results 
provide a basis for two major conclusions. First, the
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significant role of the Whitlam period is reflected in the 
rapid growth of all the welfare expenditure categories 
examined. In terms of the models outlined earlier, this 
evidence provides some support for a social democratic 
explanation of social expenditure change. Further considera­
tion of results, however, contains puzzling evidence which 
tends to cast a cloud of doubt over the former conclusion. 
This refers to the fact that a main feature of the results is 
that Liberal-NCP periods of political office exhibit 
different patterns of expenditure growth, revealing the 
different priorities of the respective political administra­
tions. In terms of the social democratic argument, this 
suggests that Right-party administrations do not reveal a 
common pattern of policy priorities. This suggests that these 
administrations have different policy objectives, and 
therefore no single set of consistent objectives can be 
ascribed to Liberal administrations. For example, the 
difference between the Fraser and post-Menzies periods is as 
marked as the difference between the Fraser and Whitlam 
periods. A noteworthy feature of these results is the 
significant influence of the Fraser period in slowing down 
expenditure which is as notable as the positive impact of the 
Whitlam period in increasing expenditure. A pattern of 
results emerges from this descriptive analysis which points 
to the usefulness of the turnover hypothesis in explaining 
expenditure changes.
The mean rates of expenditure growth by political 
administrations for Canada are indicated in Table 5.3
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presented below.
Descriptive Model: Canada 
TABLE 5.3
Percentage Rates of Nominal Expenditure Changes by 
Administration in Canada
(in percentages)
Admin.
Period
Social
Welfare
Educa­
tion Health
Total
Welfare
Total
Expenditure
St Laurent 
(1948-1956)
11.0 36.7 11.0 11.1 11.9
Diefenbaker
(1957-1962)
9.2 81.5 36.2 13.0 57.0
Pearson
(1963-1967)
11.1 57.7 10.1 10.9 9.9
Trudeau
(1968-1975)
18.4 14.4 21.2 18.3 15.7
Note:- For the method of calculation of the main Table 
entries, see Note in Table 5.2.
It is apparent from the information set out in Table 5.3 
above, that the mean rate of change in Canadian social 
welfare expenditure has remained broadly similar across the 
four periods of Prime Ministers in tenure we have
identified. The only significant escalation occurred in the 
Trudeau period when the annual rate of increase of social 
welfare expenditure rose from 11.1% to 18.4%, a change of 
7.3%. This change is not so remarkable if it is compared
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with changes in other expenditure categories; and more 
importantly, the expenditure effect of social welfare policy 
innovation does not seem to be greatly marked. As noted in 
Chapter 2, the period under study witnessed the gradual 
universalisation of the pension programme culminating with 
the enactment of a contributory insurance scheme in the 
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) in 1963. One of the problems with 
the use of descriptive statistics lies in the fact that one 
cannot control for such factors as growth over time, and 
influences such as unemployment and inflation. Therefore what 
appears to be a fairly similar administrative effect might 
mask significant differences between administrations once 
factors such as those mentioned above are controlled.
In contrast to the relatively slow growth of social 
welfare during the four periods being examined, education 
and health expenditure expanded rapidly. The Diefenbaker 
period saw the annual expansion of health expenditure growth 
from 11.0% under the preceding St Laurent period to 36.2%, an 
increase of 25.2. Similarly, education expenditure grew from 
36.7% under St Laurent to 81.5% under Diefenbaker, a growth 
rate of 44.8%. It should be noted that the percentage change 
in the St Laurent period reflects not the increase in 
educational expenditure as much as the volatility of 
fluctuating levels of educational expenditure. In both 
areas, the Diefenbaker period established the highest annual 
rates of changes in expenditure for all the periods 
considered. The growth of health expenditure under 
Diefenbaker can be partly explained by the introduction of
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the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act of 1957.
The Pearson administration brought about a decrease in 
the growth rates in the annual expenditure of health and 
education by around 26.1% and 23.8% respectively. In terras of 
relative growth rates, the most marked and noticeable decline 
was in the area of health where the rate of change was a 
modest 10.1%. On the other hand, while the rate of growth in 
education expenditure declined during the Pearson period, yet 
at 57.7% it recorded an exceptionally high rate of change in 
relation to the patterns of other expenditures.
In the Trudeau period there was an increase of 11.1% in 
the rate of growth of health expenditure as compared with the 
preceding Pearson administration; and a reduction in the 
growth rate of education expenditure to 14.4%, a decline of 
43.3%. The total welfare budget in the Trudeau period grew 
from 10.9% under Pearson to 18.3%, an increase of over 7.4% 
which is by far the highest increase of all the previous 
administrations that had an average growth rate of around 
11%. The Diefenbaker administration however, had a very high 
rate of total expenditure growth of 57.0% reflecting a change 
of growth of 45.1% from the preceding St Laurent period.
The Canadian figures indicate that it is not possible to 
generalise about the influence of parties in government 
across all expenditure areas. The growth of expenditure 
categories differs significantly between the four periods of 
Prime Ministerial tenure. The St Laurent period had high 
rates of growth for health expenditure; the Diefenbaker
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period saw a very high rate of growth in the areas of 
health, education and total expenditure; Pearson maintained 
high rates of expenditure growth in the area of education, 
while the Trudeau period witnessed growth in health, social 
and total welfare expenditure.
In terms of the Canadian literature, these results, 
still tentative (because the bureaucratic and internal 
variables are not controlled), appear to contradict the 
conventional wisdom that administrations do not have 
significant impact on policy. As with the Australian data, 
the pattern of evidence tends to support a turnover 
hypothesis. In terms of the comparative perspective adopted 
in this study, it appears that the influence of party in 
government does not vary between different types of party 
systems. This suggests tentative support for the strategic 
actor model of party policy.
5.3.2 Formulation of the Administrative Impact Model
A problem with the descriptive analysis and more 
generally with both the turnover and the social democratic 
models is the lack of specification of the internal
determinants of expenditure. By 'internal' is meant
bureaucratic and incremental factors which operate
independently of the influence of the political executive.
In the absence of a specification of these variables, no 
analysis can be made of the relative preferences of policy­
makers as distinct from the impact of political actors. The 
fact that most research designs are based on a cross-
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sectional rather than a time-series design is an additional
factor which further precludes the systematic analysis of
internal and external factors of policy output.
Research designs which control for economic variables do not
causally link the preferences of policymakers with these
variables. Economic variables are important but their effect
is indirect, largely through the mediation of bureaucratic
processes. A means of characterising this problem in research
design is as an ’internal-external’ dichotomy where there is
no means of changing the preferences of policymakers and the
influence of the party in government.
A means of resolving the ’internal-external' dichotomy,
mentioned earlier as a problem in policy output studies is
provided by the concept of a policymaker’s ’reaction
function'. It is assumed that policymakers adjust their
policy instruments to some degree, at least in response to
the actual levels of the policy targets observed. The basic
purpose of a reaction function is the specification of the
way in which policy instruments are adjusted to changes in
the levels of policy targets. The underlying
idea of the approach is that when some economic 
conditions (the target) differ from what authorities 
would find ideal, they react by manipulating other 
economic variables (the ’instruments’) in order to 
bring about a more stable set of affairs” (Alt and 
Wooley 1982: 710).
The reaction function is a behavioral equation which 
is specified directly rather than being deduced from utility 
functions and constraints (Alt and Chrystal 1981). In the 
case of the current study, we attempt to specify the way in
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which expenditure (policy instruments) might change with the 
movements of policy targets which we use to make inferences 
about the importance of bureaucratic factors. A feature of 
this approach therefore is the 'attempt to use observable 
outcomes, (for instance, levels of unemployment or government 
spending) to make inferences about the intentions of 
policymakers’ (Alt and Wooley 1982: 711). The use of this 
approach to make inferences about policymakers' intentions 
represents a significant departure from earlier approaches 
to policymaking.5
'Reaction functions' present obvious difficulties. 
Perhaps the most significant one is the 'difficulty of 
avoiding a situation in which a weight a government places on 
a target of policy, or its desired value for that target, or 
both, must be presumed to be constant over the entire 
estimation period’ (Alt and Wooley 1982: 725). In other 
words, a weight placed by a government on a target or 
targets, must be presumed to be constant over time; the 
parameters are assumed to be static. In addition there are 
problems in most policy studies of specifying rigorous 
behavioral functions. A further deficiency in the use of a 
reaction function is that the division between policy 
instruments and targets might not be as clear-cut. Indeed, in 
some cases it could be argued that policy instruments 
themselves are policy targets, an argument that could be 
applied to government expenditure. Yet the great advantage of 
the reaction functions approach to policy is that it allows 
the analyst to focus on policy outcomes in drawing
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inferences about the intentions of policy makers, and
provides a method for estimating in a rigorous manner the 
influence of what we have termed 'internal’ factors.
Reaction functions can be used in several ways in 
examining policy output. Cowart (1978), in examining fiscal 
and monetary policy, used the reaction-function approach to 
examine whether the coefficients of targets differed under 
social-democratic and conservative governments. The approach 
utilised in this chapter is rather different. Reaction 
functions are assumed to represent internal or bureaucratic 
objectives, which in the terms outlined earlier represent 
'internal' factors which govern policy output. Hence 
'external' impacts are inferred from shifts in the reaction 
functions. Interestingly, Beck (1982b) uses a similar model 
to examine monetary policy in the United States.
The model being developed here assumes that policy­
makers behave in an 'incremental' fashion. By this is meant 
that policymakers tend to base current budgetary 
appropriations on the previous year's appropriation. As we 
noted in section 1.2.3, the strategy deployed to account for 
incrementalism is to utilise a filter to control for the 
effect of time. The method involved is akin to using an auto­
regressive filter to remove noise in the time series (see 
section 3.5). Thus, since all the equations exhibited 
significant first order autocorrelation, we have assumed 
that all expenditures are subject to incremental process.
Two targets to which policymakers are customarily
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assumed to react are unemployment and inflation. 
Policymakers use public expenditure as an instrument for 
stabilising policy objectives as in an orthodox Keynesian 
model. In this method, public expenditure is used as an 
instrument to reflate the economy, stabilisation being the 
key policy objective. (For the test of such a function see 
Cowart 1978, and Alt and Chrystal 1981.) The coefficients 
for unemployment would be expected to be positive as an 
example of a classic Keynesian economic ’stabilisation 
function’. In other words, expenditure is a counter-cyclical 
policy instrument which is adjusted in response to variations 
in the target variables of unemployment and inflation.
There are two possible alternative explanations for 
positive coefficients for unemployment, one of which is 
O ’Connor's (1973) hypothesis relating to public welfare 
expenditure. O'Connor asserts that welfare has two functions: 
(a) it socialises the cost of the reproduction of labour 
power, and (b) it performs a legitimising function. Both 
functions are outcomes of the increasing concentration of 
capital and the growing cost of labour power. This 
proposition it will be recalled, was examined in section 
4.5, but the analysis here is in terms of the interventions 
of policymakers. A further explanation of the significance of 
unemployment relates to its impact in unemployment 
compensation, since the rate of unemployment is likely to 
have an impact in this expenditure area. In terms of the 
expenditure categories tested in this study, the only impact 
this has in both countries would be on social welfare and on
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the total welfare budget, but not on health or education 
expenditure.
The final variable in the reaction function is modelled 
on the previous year's revenue level. Thus, increases in 
public expenditure follow increases in revenue. This variable 
is intended to capture explanations of fiscal drag which 
occurs when tax revenue increases automatically as a 
consequence of inflation (Peacock and Wiseman 1967; Lowery 
and Berry 1984). Hence, growth in revenue becomes an internal 
structural factor which then leads to changes in expenditure. 
The inclusion of a revenue term is designed to test some 
conventional public choice models of expenditure which lay 
stress on the importance of 'fiscal illusion’ in enhancing 
the ability of governments to increase expenditure. It could 
be argued that revenue and expenditure measure the same 
effect. If governments desire to increase expenditure, they 
need to adjust revenue. This problem is partly dealt with by 
measuring the previous year's level of change in revenue 
(t-1) rather than changes in current levels of revenue.6 
Therefore, the revenue effect is not dependent on current 
levels of expenditure. It consequently is a measure of the 
structural influence of revenue on expenditure.
5.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design utilised in this chapter is a subset 
of quasi-experimental designs (Campbell and Stanley 1966) 
called Interrupted Time Series (ITS). Following Carposo and 
Pelowski (1971), the ITS design has three main features: (i)
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periodic measurements of some variable over equally spaced
points in time; (ii) the introduction of a quasi-experimental 
variable somewhere in the series; and (iii) the assumption
that the introduction of the new variable occurs between two
measurements. The results of these are indicated in a
discontinuity in the measurement recorded in the time series.
(For a useful description of this form of analysis see Judd
and Kenny 1981.)
The objective of intervention analysis is to make the 
time series stationary, that is, to filter out of the series 
that component which is dependent on time.^7 This has been 
accomplished by a first order autocorrelation (AR1) filter, 
that is, by filtering out the influence of first order 
autocorrelations for all the regressions tested, as well as 
the inclusion of a time trend which controls for the 
influence of growth over time. As noted earlier, however, 
the presence of AR1 is not merely statistical noise, but 
indicates the presence of an incremental process within the 
expenditure series.
The logic of the research design used here is first to 
specify and estimate a reaction function which models the 
impact of bureaucratic and internal factors on public 
expenditure. We then proceed to the second stage of analysis 
which is to examine whether the reaction function shifts for 
the four political administrative periods in both countries 
as outlined earlier in this chapter. If party in government 
is a significant influence in shaping policy, the reaction
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function will shift. If the time series does not shift, we 
can infer that ’administration' itself has little or no
impact on policy output.
Rather than enter for dichotomous variables in the 
equation and suppress the constant, in the analysis below we 
have allowed the constant to be given an administrative 
period. In the analysis which follows the constant is the 
Menzies period for Australia, while for Canada it is the 
Trudeau period. For this reason, coefficients are not 
reported for these administrative periods.
204
THE MODEL8
The 'reaction function' for Australia is specified 
follows:
y = a+bx1+bx2+bx3+bx^+bw1+bw2+bw^+e
where
x^  = time trend (TRy: 1950 = 1 and 1980 = 31
x2 = changes in annual rate of unemployment (u^-u^^)
x3 = changes in the previous annual rate of revenue 
(reVt-l-reVt-2)
x. = changes in the annual rate of inflation (CPI)4
t = value for current year 
b = standardised regression coefficient 
y = changes in real expenditure
e = error term
The intervention variables for Australia are as follows: 
a = Menzies Period (1950-1966)
f
= Post-Menzies Period (1967-1972) 
w2 = Whitlam Period (1973-1975) 
w^ = Fraser Period (1976-1980)
All intervention variables are dichotomous.
as
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The 'reaction function for Canada is specified as
follows:
y = a+bx^+bx2+bx3+bx^+bw1+bw2+bw3+e 
where
x = time trend (TR): 1947 = 1 and 1975 = 29
x2 = changes in annual rate of unemployment ( u ^ )
x3 = changes in the previous annual rate of revenue
<r e v t _ l - r e v t - 2 )
IIX changes in the annual rate of inflation (CPI)
t = value for current year
b = standardised regression coefficient
y = changes in real expenditure
e = error term
The intervention variables for Australia are as follows
a = Trudeau Period (1968-1975)
Wf = St Laurent Period (1948-1956)
W2 = Diefenbaker Period (1957-1962)
W3 = Pearson Period (1963-1967)
All intervention variables are dichotomous
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TABLE 5.4
Test of Reaction Function with Intervention DuMies 
for Australia, 1950-1980 (n=31)
Changes in Real Expenditure GLS AR1
Independent Social Educa- Total TotalVariable Welfare tion Health Welfare Expenditure
0.15 -0.26 0.50 -0.10 -0.16
TR * x
(1.41) (-1.19) (1.50) (-0.54) (-0.52)
0.96 1.46 0.30 1.18 -0.58
Revenue * * * * % x X X X
(t-1) (7.34) (7.10) (1.32) (8.17) (-0.15)
0.12 -0.43 0.33 -0.17 0.08
Unemploy- t x * t X
ment (1.82) (-3.40) (2.38) (-1.25) (0.16)
-0.19 -0.28 0.24 -0.19 -0.63
CPI i * x X X
(-2.05) (-2.23) (1.31) (-1.92) -(0.40)
-0.42 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 0.10
Post-Menzies
(-0.44) (-0.53) (-0.15) (-0.78) (0.66)
0.24 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.08
Whitlam x X
(1.64) (0.53) (0.15) (1.97) (0.33)
0.15 -0.88 -0.77 -0.30 -0.82
Fraser t i t X X X X X X X
(0.99) (-4.35) (-5.72) (-1.77) (-4.62)
t
Menzies (0..86) (1..07) (-1.62) (0.45) (0.,64)
R2 0.91 0.71 0.61 0.89 0.72
Note.- a) The main entries are beta coefficients; the figures 
in parentheses are *t’ values; * * * = p<0.10;
***’ = p< 0.05; '***' = p<0.01
b) For sources and the raw data see Appendices 1 and 3 
respectively.
c) The administration periods are entered as dummies 
with one (Menzies) being the constant in the 
equation. Therefore no standard errors are provided.
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TABLE 5.5
Test of Reaction Function with Intervention Dummies 
for Canada, 1947-1975 (n=29)
Changes in Real Expenditure GLS AR1
independent Social Educa- Total Total
Variable Welfare tion Health Welfare Expenditure
0.97 0.23 0.29 1.03 0.52
TR *** * * * * *
(3.03) (0.36) (1.40) (6.36) (1.67)
-0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.20
Revenue
(t-1) (-0.31) (-0.52) (-0.11) (-1.02) (-0.18)
-0.11 0.14 0.22 -0.13 1.18
Unemploy- * *
ment (-0.83) (0.67) (1.60) (-0.18) (1.59)
0.59 -0.18 0.05 0.66 0.22
CPI *
(4.24) (-1.21) (0.31) (8.85) (1.84)
0.82 -0.39 -0.57 0.30 0.93
St Laurent * * 11
(1.92) (-0.56) (-1.27) (1.40) (3.84)
0.45 -0.28 -0.42 0.28 0.27
Diefenbaker * * * *
(1.75) (-0.66) (-1.16) (1.31) (2.55)
0.08 -0.56 -0.50 -0.19 0.05
Pearson * * *
(0.11) (-2.01) (-2.73) (-1.70) (0.61)
t * * * * * *
Trudeau (-2.70) (0.13) (0.13) (-3.19) (-5.62)
R2 0.62 0.23 0.63 0.77 0.88
Note: a) The main entries are beta coefficients; the figures 
in parentheses are ’t' values; =’*' = p<0.10;
'**’ = p< 0.05; '***’ = p<0.01
b) For sources and the raw data see Appendices 1 and 3 
respectively.
c) The administration periods are entered as dummies with 
one (Trudeau) being the constant in the equation. 
Therefore no standard errors are provided.
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5.5 FINDINGS
The main task of this analysis is to examine the 
influence of parties in government on policy and expenditure
in terms of the displacement of the reaction function
specified above. The discussion of the results for each of
the two countries is divided into two sections. The first is
an analysis of the results of the test of the reaction
function. The second is an examination of administrative
impact. The focus of the analysis, however, is on the latter
aspect.
5.5.1 Australia
Internal Bureaucratic Variables
The most striking result for Australia is that there is 
no overall pattern which could be discerned for any of the 
expenditure categories examined. Perhaps a good example of 
this is that a consideration of the results for total welfare 
could not be used to draw inferences about individual 
expenditure categories.
Looking at the Australian data, the impact of past 
changes in revenue on welfare expenditure presents the 
strongest relationship of any of the economic variables
examined. The result indicates that, at least for the social
welfare expenditures, we can confirm the hypothesis that 
revenue leads expenditure. The essential feature of the 
results presented in Table 5.4 for revenue is its wide
variation. The beta coefficients for social welfare,
education and total welfare expenditures lie in the range of
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0.96 to 1.46, and the significance level is above the 0.05 
level. As against the strong relationship between these 
expenditure categories, health is relatively weakly related 
(significant at 0.10 level) to revenue with a coefficient of 
0.30.
More interestingly, the beta coefficient for revenue has 
a negative coefficient) in relation to total expenditure. In 
other words, changes in revenue have no influence on total 
expenditure levels. The conclusion to be drawn from these 
findings is twofold. Firstly, welfare expenditure is 
strongly associated with changes in revenue, while total 
expenditure reflecting the impact of non-welfare expenditure 
is not positively related to revenue. This is because the 
total welfare budget being strongly related to revenue, the 
coefficient for total expenditure must reflect the weight of 
non-welfare expenditure of which a large part is defence and 
capital expenditure. Hence we may conclude that while changes 
in revenue lead to increases in welfare expenditure, a 
trade-off occurs whereby non-welfare expenditure does not 
increase by a similar proportion.
A second and obvious conclusion to be drawn is that 
welfare expenditures, especially transfer payments, as 
evidenced by the coefficient for social welfare, are greatly 
influenced by changes in revenue. For these expenditure 
categories, fiscal drag and other structural factors which 
lead to rises in revenue are reflected in increases in the 
level of expenditure. This is supported by the Peacock and 
Wiseman (1967) finding that in the case of national
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emergencies and crises, there is a temporary rise in 
expenditure; and that furthermore, to accommodate this 
increase, there is a rise in the level of revenue. However, 
this increased revenue is then used to finance a permanently 
higher level of expenditure. A similar process, of the 
phenomenon of revenue leading expenditure, can be observed 
from the analysis of welfare expenditure data.
Turning to examine the stabilisation hypothesis, the 
coefficients for unemployment are broadly and generally 
consistent with the Keynesian hypothesis that expenditure is 
increased in response to higher unemployment as a 
reflationary measure. Three expenditure categories - social 
welfare, health and total expenditure - have coefficients 
that are positive, and hence, in the direction posited by the 
hypothesis. Of these, only social welfare and health 
expenditures are statistically significant, and could be said 
to be related to unemployment, whereas total expenditure 
with a coefficient of 0.08 lies outside the range of 
statistical significance.
The O'Connor hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the 
positive coefficients for social welfare and health. The 
pressure for legitimising and for expenditure to reproduce 
labour power is more likely to be reflected in these 
expenditures. On the other hand, the weight of the 
stabilisation objective for policymakers will be reflected 
in the coefficients for total expenditure which, while in the 
right direction, are not statistically significant.
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Overall, both explanations stress the counter-cyclical 
objectives of expenditure policy. In terms of these 
objectives, we can conclude that transfer payments and health 
expenditure are more responsive to changes in unemployment 
than to changes in total expenditure. As noted above, social 
welfare expenditure appears to increase as unemployment 
rises, because its share of the budget contains an increased 
proportion of unemployment compensation payments.
In contrast to these expenditures, total welfare 
expenditure, with a coefficient of -0.17 is not affected by 
unemployment, and is therefore neutral to changes in 
unemployment. Education expenditure, on the other hand, with 
a statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.43, is 
associated negatively with unemployment. The reason for this 
might lie in the fact that education expenditure consists of 
transfer payments to States which are more likely to be 
affected by ’bad times'. To sum up, unemployment seems to 
have contradictory effects on the welfare budget with income 
maintenance and health expenditure increasing, while 
education expenditure decreases, and the total welfare budget 
remaining neutral to movements in unemployment.
The coefficients for inflation are in the expected 
direction for social welfare, education and total welfare 
expenditures. All of these coefficients, are statistically 
significant. Total expenditure with a coefficient of -0.63 
is statistically not significant and neutral to movements in 
inflation. Health expenditure, once again, moves in a 
direction contrary to that of other welfare expenditures with
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a statistically significant positive coefficient.
The difference in results between total welfare and 
total expenditures is interesting in that they suggest that 
welfare expenditure is more responsive to counter-cyclical 
policy than is non-welfare expenditure. Indeed, an emerging 
result of the Australian data is the extent to which these 
economic variables (bureaucratic variables) have differential 
impact on welfare and non-welfare expenditures. In the case 
of revenue, it was observed that while all welfare 
expenditures were positively related to revenue, total 
expenditure was neutral to changes in revenue. Similarly, in 
the case of unemployment all the welfare expenditures (with 
the exceptions noted) were related to unemployment. Total 
expenditure exhibited no such relationship. This pattern of 
results was repeated in the case of inflation. In general, 
welfare expenditure rather than non-welfare expenditure is 
more likely to vary in response to change in economic 
circumstances. Social welfare expenditures in particular are 
more prone to be liable to the influence of changing economic 
events and the resultant policy responses.
An interesting point to emerge from this analysis of 
health expenditure and its positive relationship to inflation 
is that it seems to bear out the result that health 
expenditure is subject to cost pressures. In the discussion 
of results for Canada we note that one of the reasons for the 
positive relationship of inflation to real expenditure may 
lie in the fact that cost pressures are particularly
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important in explaining the growth of welfare expenditure. A 
further reason for this positive relationship might lie in 
the high rate of inflation in the early 1970s which also saw 
the introduction of a new health insurance programmes with 
the introduction of Medibank in 1974.
So far, we have analysed inflation and unemployment 
separately. If however, we were to examine whether 
expenditure follows an orthodox Keynesian stabilisation 
objective, we would need to look at the sign of the 
coefficients of both inflation and unemployment. As noted 
above, if a stabilisation function is being followed, the 
sign of unemployment and inflation will be in the opposite 
direction. Turning to the data, (see Table 5.4) we find that 
only two expenditure categories - social welfare and total 
expenditure - have the signs on unemployment and inflation 
coefficients in the direction posited by a stabilisation 
hypothesis. Social welfare has the strongest significant 
relationship of the two expenditures, with coefficients of 
0.12 and -0.19 for unemployment and inflation respectively. 
It could be inferred from these data that income maintenance 
expenditure is highly responsive to counter-cyclical policy. 
On the other hand, while the signs for the coefficients for 
total expenditure are in the correct direction, the 't ' 
values indicate that they do not achieve an acceptable level 
of statistical significance. Hence, any conclusion about 
the impact of stabilisation policy by analys-is of the data on 
total expenditure rests on rather weak ground.
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The Impact of Administrations
One central research objective of this chapter has been 
to examine the displacement of bureaucratic internal factors 
by the influence of political administration. Two general 
assertions can be made about the impact of administration. 
First, as analysed above, the dominance of incremental and 
bureaucratic objectives is apparent. Every expenditure 
category is dominated by the influence of bureaucratic forces 
which cuts across all the administrative periods. Second, 
this dominance of incremental bureaucratic variables is 
offset to a degree in the Whitlam and Fraser periods of 
government. The Whitlam period saw some expenditures rising 
faster than could be predicted from the 
incremental/bureaucratic model, while the Fraser period saw 
some categories of welfare expenditure rising slower than 
could be deduced from the model.
The Menzies period saw the dominance of the incremental 
bureaucratic model for most expenditures. Expenditure itself 
is neutral to the influence of the governing party, the only 
exception being health expenditure which is significantly 
negative. The figure for health expenditure is one that 
should be expected from an analysis of the descriptive 
statistics. The mean annual rate of increase was only 1.6%. 
In similar fashion, the post-Menzies period exhibits no 
displacement of incremental and bureaucratic factors. In 
fact, the beta coefficients are all negative except for total 
expenditure but none of these are significant. The only 
conclusion that one can reach from this data is that
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expenditure is not responsive to the influence of parties in 
government.
The analysis of the Whitlam period runs contrary to the 
results of the descriptive statistics. The descriptive 
statistics indicated that this period witnessed a substantial 
jump in expenditure in all categories. However, after 
controlling for economic variables, the relationship between 
the various expenditure categories and the Whitlam 
administration appears to be much weaker. While the 
coefficients are positive for all the expenditure groups, 
only social welfare and total welfare, with 't' values of 
1.64 and 1.97 respectively, reach a satisfactory level of 
statistical significance. These relationships, though 
significant, are somewhat weaker than could be inferred from 
the analysis of only the annual mean changes of expenditure.
The most surprising result is that the growth in health 
expenditure is not significantly related to the Whitlam 
period, given the obvious escalation of health expenditure as 
seen in Table 5.2. However, the model, if set up without a 
time trend, shows a strong relationship with health 
expenditure during the Whitlam period. Without a time trend, 
the coefficient for health expenditure is 0.37 with a 't' 
value of 2.3 which is statistically significant. These two 
contradictory results demonstrate that some of the increases 
in health expenditure during the Whitlam period are captured 
by the time trend. In other words, while there is a 
significant rise in health expenditure reflected in the
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descriptive data, this increase is a result of growth over 
time rather than the impact of the government in power. It
is not an increase which could be attributed to any
particular political administration. Put differently, if one 
sets up a counter-factual experiment in terms of the re-
election of a Liberal-NCP Coalition government in 1972, the
analysis suggests that health expenditure would have 
increased by approximately the same margin.
The results obtained also show that in the Australian 
context, the support for the social democratic hypothesis is 
not very strong. As noted, these results contradict the
descriptive statistics in Table 5.2, but the crucial point 
is that after controlling for economic variables and
incrementalism, real expenditure changes show only a weak 
relationship to the Whitlam administration. However, the 
analysis of the Whitlam period is complicated by the fact 
that there is only a small number of years over which the 
impact of this government could be measured (n=3). Moreover, 
this period was accompanied by high levels of unemployment 
which may tend to bias the empirical findings.
The Fraser period is noteworthy for two reasons. 
Firstly, it displayed what could be termed de-incrementalism 
in the sense that changes in real expenditure are below what 
could be predicted from an incremental and bureaucratic 
model. The coefficients for health, education, total welfare 
and total expenditures were both negative and statistically 
significant. Indeed the only positive coefficient is for the 
category of social welfare expenditure, but this is not
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statistically significant. In fact, the Australian data 
yielded more evidence for the negative impact of conservative 
administrations, than for the positive effect of social- 
democratic parties. (See Castles 1982b for argument 
concerning the impact of the Right on politics.) A further 
important feature of the Fraser period is this de­
incrementalist mode of policymaking, distinguishing the 
Fraser period from the other two previous Liberal 
administrations which were overwhelmingly incremental in 
policymaking.
The conclusion from the analysis of the influence of 
administration on expenditure in Australia is threefold. 
First, the import of the evidence which has emerged clearly 
indicates that the Australian expenditure adjusts more to 
incremental and bureaucratic forces than to the manipulations 
of political administrations.
Within this context of the dominance of these forces, 
the second noteworthy feature of the results is the lack of 
strong support for the social democratic explanation of 
policy. Indeed, the only areas which provide a significant 
result were social welfare and total welfare expenditures. 
The thrust of the results suggests that ideology is not a 
markedly strong influence on policy priorities of government. 
The evidence for the Whitlam period indicates that without 
the time trend the coefficients for health expenditure would 
indicate a significant relationship with the party in 
government. What this indicates is that the process at work
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in accounting for the large increase in health expenditure 
observed in the descriptive model is political competition 
and not ideology. A similar argument can be applied to 
changes in real levels of social welfare expenditure which 
without the time trend shows a greater degree of
responsiveness to the influence of Labor in government in the 
period between 1973 and 1975. The shift in social welfare 
expenditure can be attributed to a change in government 
rather than an effect of party ideology. The evidence 
therefore suggests support for the turnover hypothesis.
Finally, more support for the turnover hypothesis is 
found when the analysis of the Fraser period is considered. 
The analytical significance of the period for our research 
lies in the fact that it differs distinctly from previous 
Liberal-NCP Coalition administrations. This is amply 
demonstrated by the fact that the Whitlam administration is 
closer to Menzies and post-Menzies administrations in the 
area of health and education than it is to the Fraser 
administration. The logic of these results therefore suggest 
that the turnover and the strategic actor model might be a 
better explanation of the influence of administration than 
the structural model. However, a final conclusion as to the 
efficiency of these models must await a comparative analysis.
5.5.2 Canada
Internal Bureaucratic Variables
As with the Australian data the overriding impression of 
the impact of the bureaucratic variables on Canadian
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expenditure is the degree to which they are not consistent
across the expenditure categories. A consistent set of 
patterns for the coefficients examined does not emerge from
the analysis.
However, the Australian and Canadian data diverge 
sharply as regards the impact of economic and bureaucratic 
factors on social expenditure. Indeed, the first factor to be 
noted about the differences between the two are that the time 
trend captures a far greater proportion of the variance in 
expenditure in Canada than in Australia for the major 
categories of expenditure - social welfare, total welfare and 
total expenditure.
The impact of previous year's revenue on changes in real 
expenditure in Canada is one important point of divergence 
between the Australian and Canadian data. All the expenditure 
categories for Canada indicated that revenue was not a 
significant determination of expenditure. Indeed, the extent 
of this lack of influence of revenue is indicated by the fact 
that all the coefficients are negative. However, none of 
these are significant. In fact the only similarity between 
the coefficients for Australia and Canada lie in the neutral 
impact of revenue on total expenditure; but interestingly, 
the Canadian expenditure does not suggest that trade-off 
between welfare and non-welfare expenditure noted for 
Australia.
The isolation of changes in welfare expenditure from 
changes in previous year's revenue suggests that Canadian 
programmes are immune from the influence of changes in
220
revenue. In the area of social welfare the entrenchment of
universal contributory schemes means that the growth of these 
programmes are immune to changes in revenue. In fact once 
these programmes are entrenched, they are not vulnerable to 
short term pressure brought on by changes in economic 
circumstances. By contrast, Australian programmes are more 
prone to respond to changes in economic circumstances because 
they are in general means-tested and provide flat rate 
benefits (Brennan 1982). The signs of the unemployment 
coefficient are positively associated with health and total 
expenditure, with coefficients of 0.22 and 1.18 
respectively. The only other positive coefficient is for 
education which is not significant. The other two expenditure 
categories of social and health expenditure, whilst having 
signs in the direction opposite to that which would be 
predicted by a counter-stabilisation policy, are not 
statistically significant.
The main conclusion to emerge is that Canadian welfare 
expenditure, with the exception of health expenditure, is not 
affected by changes in the rate of unemployment. On the other 
hand, the Canadian data suggest that total expenditure is 
responsive to reflationary objectives as formulated in the 
Keynesian hypothesis. From this it could be inferred that 
non-welfare expenditure rather than welfare expenditure is 
subject to the pressures of stabilisation policy. The 
Canadian evidence suggests that Canadian expenditure is 
’locked in' and is not sensitive to movements in revenue and
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unemployment, though these expenditures still exhibit 
incremental changes. It might be relevant to note that 
unemployment in Australia in the 1970s was much higher than 
in Canada. This relationship is in contrast to the pattern of 
results obtained for Australia. In fact, with the exception 
of health expenditure which is related to unemployment, none 
of the welfare expenditure coefficients reveal a degree of 
responsiveness to changes in either revenue or unemployment. 
In the case of social welfare expenditure, it was suggested 
that its relatively more universalistic and contributory 
form in Canada was a plausible explanation for the 
contrasting pattern of results between the two countries.
A second difference between Australia and Canada lies 
in the fact that, except for changes in unemployment in 
Canada, no difference can be found in the behaviour of 
Canadian welfare expenditure and non-welfare expenditure. 
But, as we observed with the Australian data, there exists a 
striking difference between total expenditure and welfare 
expenditure.
In contrast to the revenue and unemployment 
coefficients, the coefficients for inflation are significant 
for three expenditure categories, namely, social welfare, 
total welfare and total expenditure. In fact the inflation 
coefficient is the best regression variable in predicting 
expenditure variance for all these three dependent variables, 
the lowest positive coefficient being 0.22 for total 
expenditure, and the highest at 0.66 for total welfare 
expenditure. Although contrary to this pattern, both health
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and education expenditures are neutral to the impact of 
inflation.
If the stabilisation objective was dominant, that is, if 
price stability was a major macro-economic objective, 
expenditure would be one instrument utilised to bring about 
this objective. Hence, inflation would be associated with 
negative expenditure coefficients. This is not manifestly the 
case with the inflation coefficients for Canada where all 
excepting one, are positive.
The Canadian results for this variable contrast sharply 
with the Australian data, the only similarity being in the 
area of health expenditure where the Australian figure is 
positive. However, these aggregate results clearly require 
explanation. It was argued that in the case of health 
expenditure, the positive relationship to changes in price 
levels might reflect the influence of cost pressures unique 
to health expenditure. This is probably true of the Canadian 
health expenditure as well. However, given that health 
expenditure is the lowest of positive relationships observed 
for inflation, the explanation needs to be generalised to 
other welfare expenditures as well. It could be that the 
cost of government services increase by a greater amount than 
inflation, and consequently, the growth in expenditure needed 
to maintain real levels is much greater than the CPI 
increases (Baumöl 1967: 22).
As it would have been inferred from the above Canadian 
data, little support is formed for the hypothesis that
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Stabilisation is a key objective of policymakers. Evidence 
for this proposition comes from the British context, where 
Price argues that:
By the end of the 50's the avowed strategy had become to ensure that public spending was neutral vis-a-vis 
internal stability, with public sector expanding at a 
rate consistent with the long run growth of the 
economy, so that at least one sector would be free 
from disturbance (1978: 77).
Likewise, in the British context Alt and Chrystal (1981) 
have failed to find evidence of the pursuit of stabilisation 
objectives. As previously suggested, the lack of support for 
such an objective in the Canadian context does not imply 
that changes in unemployment and inflation lack significance 
in explaining the determination of expenditure; but they do 
require a different explanation.
The Impact of Administrations
In respect of the influence of party in government on 
policy, the evidence indicates that the influence of 
political administrations in setting Canadian policy 
priorities is strong. The impact of government in power is 
an important factor in accounting for the growth of certain 
areas of expenditure after accounting for ’internal' 
factors. An important finding in this context is the 
differential impact on policy of the political 
administrations of St Laurent, Pearson and Trudeau. The data 
show clear differences in policy impact with respect to 
these periods of Prime Ministerial tenure, all of which 
belong to the same party. Canadian policy output studies 
such as those by Kornberg et al. (1973) and Falcone (1974),
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by focussing on party rather than the government in power, 
have failed to bring out the differences in policy and 
expenditure priorities between administrations of the same 
party.
One area in which administration does not have a 
substantial impact on policy is educational expenditure. 
The only influence is the negative effect of the Pearson 
administration on education expenditure. These figures 
however should be put in the context of rapidly rising 
education expenditures during the preceding Diefenbaker 
period (see Table 5.3). In terms of the descriptive data, 
education expenditure still grew substantially during the 
Pearson period.
The St Laurent period had a positive impact on social 
welfare, total welfare and total expenditures, but only a 
neutral impact on health and education expenditures. While 
these expenditures have negative coefficients, they are far 
too small to be of any significance. Clearly, the main impact 
of expenditure lies in relation to social welfare. As 
mentioned earlier, the Prime Ministership of St Laurent saw 
the gradual extension of Federal pension programmes with the 
introduction of Old Age Security programmes (OAS). The 
statistically significant influence on total welfare 
reflects the weight of social welfare expenditure in the 
total welfare budget. A noteworthy feature of the results is 
that the St Laurent government also had a strong impact on 
total expenditure, a relationship that is somewhat stronger
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than those with some welfare areas. This finding suggests 
that while the government had a major influence on the growth 
of real welfare expenditure, its impact on non-welfare 
expenditure was even greater.
The Diefenbaker period has a pattern identical to that 
of the St Laurent period. Education and health expenditures 
are neutral in terms of administrative impact. The two 
welfare areas where an administrative influence can be 
discerned, are again, social welfare and total welfare. A 
pattern similar to both administrations is that they had a 
greater impact on total expenditure than on total welfare. 
This pattern of results is interesting because it indicates 
that non-welfare expenditure may have been more responsive 
than welfare expenditure to administrative influence.
In terms of the influence of both St Laurent and 
Diefenbaker governments, the evidence clearly indicates that 
social welfare was the dominant political issue in the 1950s. 
Consequently the policy priorities of both governments 
reflected the politicisation of social welfare. Indeed, 
Bryden (1974) notes that social welfare was an important 
issue in the 1956 election. As against the positive 
relationship between government in power and social welfare 
expenditure, no relationship was found between political 
administration and health expenditure. Pre-empting the 
results of the next chapter, the study does find evidence to 
link inter-party competition to health expenditure, whereas 
no such link can be found for social welfare. The evidence 
therefore indicates that social welfare is possibly subject
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to an administrative effect, whereas health expenditure is 
subject to a competition effect.
The Pearson period is markedly different from both the 
Diefenbaker and the St Laurent periods in broadly having no 
positive impact on welfare expenditure, except for social 
welfare which has a positive coefficient. All the other 
coefficients are negative and significant. These results 
suggest that Pearson had a negative influence on education 
and health expenditure. This argument is consistent with the 
pattern of expenditure changes for health and education 
expenditure observed from an analysis of the descriptive 
statistical data in Table 5.3. Turning to total expenditure 
which while being positive is not significant, and is neutral 
to the influence of government in policymaking for non­
welfare areas. This incremental style of policymaking sharply 
distinguishes it from the two preceding political 
administrations of Diefenbaker and St Laurent, both of which 
had significant roles in non-welfare policymaking.
The Trudeau period has statistically significant 
negative values for all expenditures except for education and 
health. In this it differs from the Pearson period which 
had a strong negative influence on these expenditure. These 
negative relationships between social welfare, total welfare 
and total expenditure should be placed in context. The rate 
of change of all welfare expenditures during the previous 
period was comparatively high. The data for the Trudeau 
period reflect the decline in these rates of expenditure
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growth. Nevertheless, this analysis shows up the important 
differences in policy priorities of the Trudeau period in
comparison with not only the Pearson regime, but also with
the Diefenbaker and St Laurent governments.
The Canadian data tend to suggest that an 
'administrative turnover’ hypothesis is appropriate as an 
explanation of Canadian expenditure changes. Not only does 
the Canadian evidence tend to support the turnover hypothesis 
in terms of the emergence of distinct policy priorities of 
various regimes, but the results of the test of the reaction 
function suggest that changes in government was a strong 
influence on the rate of expenditure change. In terms of the 
analytical issues examined in this chapter the Canadian 
evidence indicates a pattern of evidence which suggests that 
the type of party system is not a factor relevant to the 
determination of the influence of political administration. 
Hence, it provides a basis for supporting the strategic actor 
model of party policy.
5.6 CONCLUSION
In terms of the research issues addressed in this study 
the evidence strongly supports the 'administrative turnover’ 
hypothesis as against the 'social democratic explanation’ of 
policy. The weight of the evidence tends to support the view 
that 'political administrations' tend to have different 
expenditure priorities whatever the nature of the party 
system. In terms of the model outlined in Chapter 1, it was 
expected that if the structural explanation of policy was to
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hold, administrations would have significant influence in 
Australia, and that the opposite, that is, the absence of any 
impact, would be true of Canada. On the other hand, if the 
strategic explanation was to hold, administrations would be 
more similar in both countries, irrespective of the type of 
party system. Given the evidence for the impact of party in 
government on expenditure in both countries, the evidence 
tends to strongly support the strategic actor model of 
policy. In sum, the main conclusion of this chapter is that 
the influence of political administration on policy is not a 
function of the structure of the party system. A more 
plausible explanation of its impact on policy would be in 
terms of the strategic incentives for government, regardless 
of ideology, to pursue different policy priorities.
The clear test of the social democratic explanation lay 
in the analysis of the impact of Whitlam period of 
administration on expenditure in Australia. The Australian 
evidence was by no means strongly supportive of this 
hypothesis. The Whitlam period was significant for only 
social welfare and total welfare. While the other 
coefficients were positive, none of them were significant. 
More importantly, the evidence indicates that different 
administrations have different expenditure priorities. The 
clearest indication of this lies in the results for the 
Fraser period of administration, which not only stands out 
against previous Liberal/NCP administrations, but is also 
more significant (albeit in a negative fashion) than the 
Whitlam period.
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The Canadian evidence tends to place in sharp focus the 
evidence of policy output studies (Kornberg et al. 1972); 
Falcone 1974), that party is not a significant influence on 
policy. It is clear that the testing of administration
instead of party yields a pattern of results markedly
9different from that obtained in earlier studies. In the 
Canadian context, this suggests that strategic incentives 
for parties to set new expenditure priorities are more 
important than the structural basis of the party system. The 
results also run counter to the conventional wisdom outlined 
in the introduction that if there is no major ideological 
difference between the parties, administrations will have 
negligible influence on policy. Indeed, if at all, the 
argument could be made that Canadian governments have greater 
influence in setting policy priorities than their Australian 
counterparts. In policymaking Australian governments are 
dominated to a greater extent than the Canadian governments 
by ’internal’ factors. The results of these early policy 
output studies in the Canadian context therefore need 
reassessment in the light of conceptual methodological 
changes marked in this study.
NOTES
1. Analysis of provincial expenditure provides some evidence 
for the impact of the New Democratic Party. See Chandler 
(1977) for extensive discussion.
2. In this study, the term 'administration' relates to 
political administration or to the influence of party in
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government.
3. Bunce bases her study on a descriptive analysis of 
expenditure data. For an approach which uses similar 
methodology, see Gruen (1984).
4. 'Social Democratic' meaning in this thesis, a member of 
the Socialist International.
5. For the first rigorous analysis of economic policy from 
such a perspective see Thiel (1968).
6. The ’reaction functions’ were also tested by using the 
changes in the previous year's levels of unemployment and 
inflation. However, the direction of the coefficients were 
similar to those obtained when levels of current 
expenditure were used.
7. There are other techniques to achieve a stationary times- 
series. The most important of this is Box-Jenkins's (1976) 
procedures. However the problem with Box-Jenkins analysis 
is that first, it needs a large number of time points, at 
least 74; second, the use of Box-Jenkins or AIRMA analysis 
does not allow one to use the reaction function approach 
used in the analysis. For a description of the technical 
and conceptual issues raised see Hibbs (1974).
8. For the method of deflation of expenditure data, see 
section 3.4.1.
9. Cameron (1986) is a recent study of party and government 
growth in Canada which has come to my attention following 
completion of work on this study. Interestingly, it deals 
with issues somewhat similar to those addressed in this 
chapter. However it would appear that Cameron's study is 
not strictly comparable because it differs from this study 
in key respects, especially as regards the dependent 
variables and also the time period covered. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of theoretically specified bureaucratic 
variables which constitutes a significant feature of the 
present design, is absent in Cameron's work. It is the 
latter feature of the design which makes the present study 
a significant innovation in the field of comparative public 
policy.
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CHAPTER 6
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL COMPETITION 
ON EXPENDITURE
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the impact of democratic institutions 
and practices on public policy is a question which has 
stimulated much scholarly inquiry; indeed the roots of this 
speculation reach back into the eighteenth century. 
Political theorists such as Montesquieu and later de 
Tocqueville (Myles 1984) argued that democracy would have an 
egalitarian impact because the growing enfranchisement of 
the population would lead to the powerless having the means 
of gaining political power. It was argued, to put it in terms 
of contemporary experience, that the advent of democratic the 
process and practices created the conditions for altering 
existing distributional practices within the capitalist 
economy. As described by one theorist, the many were able to 
'combine against the few; even though individually the many 
are weaker, in combination they may be as strong or stronger’
(Lenski 1966: 318). This chapter sets out to examine the
public policy impact of democratic processes in the two
countries under review, particularly in the area of welfare 
expenditure.
The analysis is conducted at two different levels. The 
first level is an examination of the impact of the variables 
of political competition on policy. This part of the 
analysis follows on from Chapter 5, which examined the impact
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of party, and more specifically, the impact of political 
administration on policy. At this level the analysis in this 
chapter is descriptive in the sense that it is an examination 
of the influence of central elements of the democratic 
process on public policy, quite apart from the general 
argument of this thesis about the link between party and 
policy framework.
The second level of analysis is interpretive, and is 
intended to provide the explanatory flesh to the descriptive 
body. Here the analysis is concerned with the understanding 
of the causal basis of political competition, and thus, with 
an evaluation of the differing models of explanation of party 
and policy outlined in Chapter 1, by considering empirically 
the influence of competition on policy.
6.1.1 Descriptive Level
Two strategic political variables are examined for their 
impact on expenditure and policy. These are: (a) the role of 
elections on policy; and, (b) changes in the level of inter- 
party competition. Inter-party competition is examined in the 
two dimensions of electoral and parliamentary competition. 
Electoral competition is measured by differences in the 
electoral share of the government and opposition; 
parliamentary competition is measured by the difference 
between the parliamentary seats of the government party and 
opposition. While the latter tests the impact of party 
competition on policy, both variables are important aspects 
of the political process, and hence critical to our
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examination of the impact of political competition. In 
clarification of the terminology used here in the analysis, 
the term 'political competition’ denotes the influence of 
both elections and inter-party competition on policy as they 
are the most general aspects of the competitive democratic 
process. The term 'inter-party competition’ refers more 
specifically to electoral and parliamentary competition.
The literature focussing on the impact of political 
competition on public expenditure is substantial, though 
confined in the main to the analysis of American state 
government expenditure. This American literature, as we noted 
in Chapter 1, has tended to ignore the impact of incremental 
changes on expenditure, and has instead examined the role of 
economic and political variables in policy formation. The 
cross-national literature, although theoretically better 
formulated than the American State expenditure literature, 
has two main limitations. Firstly, as in the American state 
literature, it does not explicitly focus on the influence of 
incremental and bureaucratic process. Secondly, because its 
dominant concern lies with the influence of party in 
government on policy, it ignores the impact of the major 
elements of a democratic society such as elections and party 
competition. Indeed, the literature contains scarcely any 
analysis of the role of competition in influencing policy.
In this study, however, we will consider the role of 
political competition in the light of the operation of both 
incremental and bureaucratic processes - processes which have
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already been examined in Chapter 5. Again, the research 
design has deployed models of the bureaucratic and 
incremental processes, and examined variables relating to 
changes in (a) revenue, (b) unemployment and (c) inflation. 
These are in effect proxies for the influence of
bureaucratic and economic variables.1
6.1.2 Explanatory Level
The important conceptual issue dealt with in this
chapter is the impact of the type of party system on the
structure of political competition. Following the
discussion in Chapter 1, two explanatory frameworks for the 
analysis of the impact of competition on policy can be 
discerned: first, what is termed a 'structural' conception, 
and the other, a 'strategic' conception of democracy. The 
'structural' view stresses the importance of democratic 
structures, such as strong organised parties with a solid 
socio-economic constituency in affecting the nature of public 
policy. The other, the 'strategic actor’ view, emphasises 
the importance of strategic incentives in determining the 
behaviour of parties. In a democratic framework these 
incentives exist regardless of the type of party system.
The structural explanation of policy assumes that strong 
party systems have identifiable consequences for public 
policy. In particular, as we have argued in section 1.2.2, 
the theory assumes that these parties will provide the 
electorate with distinct electoral programmes because they 
are governed by socio-economic cleavages and contrasting
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ideologies. Where socio-economic class provides the primary
cleavage between parties, the nature and character of their
'core constituencies' will provide incentives for parties to
cater to the economic preferences of these core
2constituencies. In terms of social welfare expenditure, this 
leads to the proposition that social democratic parties are 
more pro-welfare than their conservative opponents, because 
welfare expenditure benefits the core constituency of social 
democratic parties. This was essentially the proposition 
examined in the last chapter (see 5.1).
Apart from this 'core constituency' effect, one
inference which can be drawn from the 'party' explanation is 
that party systems are ideologically and organisationally 
characterised by higher degrees of competition. In other 
words, competition depends on ideological and policy 
distinctiveness.
The clearer these policy alternatives are (and
depending on how real the opposition threat is 
perceived to be) the more likely it is that contagion 
can be observed. Where all significant political 
forces espouse identical policy alternatives, or where 
all share power (as in grand coalition and
consociational cases), there is little or no room for 
policy contagion (Chandler 1977: 757).
Competition is thus a function of the level of the
organisation of the party system, and the nature and extent
of competition is causally dependent on the structure of the
party system.
In contrast to this structural explanation, as we have 
already seen, an alternative assessment of parties views 
them as 'strategic actors', who attempt to maximise their
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positions within the democratic polity. The strategic actor 
notion of politics is an outgrowth of Schumpeter’s (1950)
conception of politics as analogous to market processes. From 
this perspective it is competition which is the defining 
feature of politics (or rather democratic politics) rather
than ideology.
In his well known argument concerning the dynamics of 
party competition, Downs (1957) stated that party programmes 
tend to converge ideologically. This is largely because 
parties in a two-party system are competing for votes in the 
centre of the system. While Downs's simple model of party 
convergence has given way to a more sophisticated conception 
of party competition, the basic logic of the original 
conception of Downs (1957) and Schumpeter (1950) remains 
relevant, namely, that it is the process of democracy, 
particularly its competitive nature, and not the social- 
structural basis of party, which is central to an
3understanding of politics. The nature of the competitive 
environment in which parties find themselves is responsible 
for their behaviour. In the context of politics, it is the 
need to win elections that determines the nature of party 
policy. The process of politics provides incentives for 
parties to maximise their interests.
The 'party' conception stresses the importance of party 
support in policy, whereas the strategic actor conception 
emphasises the nature of the electoral environment. 
Proponents of the latter perspective would contend that while 
programmes are important, they will be based on strategic
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electoral goals. In this connection, Kernell's comment 
exemplifies the importance of 'strategic’ interests in 
framing party goals:
Internal party conflicts arising from the tension 
between strategic electoral goals and ideological 
commitments have long been documented, but Downs’ 
contribution is in showing that this tension is 
inherent and that political parties will either be 
strategic when they must or they will atrophy 
(1980: 4),.
These perspectives can be set out more simply: the
structural view says that parties will look after their 
supporters; the strategic actor view says parties will look 
after whatever set of voters will place them in power. Of 
course the second could include the first, but it implies 
that parties have to look further than simply their habitual 
supporters.
In terms of the models outlined in Chapter 1, these 
perspectives correspond to Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. 
The structural perspective of Model 1 should posit the view 
that a strong party system determines the level of
competition, whereas the strategic actor perspective of Model 
2 contends that the type of party system is irrelevant to the 
determination of the level of competition.
A principal objective of this chapter is therefore not 
only to examine the impact of political competition on 
policy, but also to assess the impact of differently
structured parties on competition and processes of democratic 
politics. This is achieved by a research design set out in 
Chapter 3, which examines the impact on political competition
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of the differently structured party systems of Australia and 
Canada. These differ in the extent to which they depend on 
class-based structural cleavages and the organisational and 
ideological commitment of the parties. Australian parties, 
having a greater dependence on class support, are 
organisationally and ideologically more distinctive than 
their Canadian counterparts which are not differentiated by 
strong socio-economic cleavages. Crucially, for our purposes, 
the Canadian party system lacks major national parties that 
offer the electorate a clearly defined ideological choice. A 
final note of terminological clarification: party structure 
or system means the strength of socio-economic cleavages, 
and the organisational strength and ideological commitment of 
parties within the polity.
From the alternative strategic actor perspective, 
competition is endogenous and is not determined by the social 
structural basis of the party system. In terms of the 
differences in party system discussed one would expect 
competition to have equal impact in both Australia and Canada 
(Model 2). On the other hand, as we have noted, it could be 
inferred from the structural viewpoint that the stronger the 
party system the greater would be the degree of competition. 
In this case one would expect that competition would have 
more impact on the Australian party system (Model 1). The 
two explanations make distinctly different claims about the 
impact of competition on Australian and Canadian polity.
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The Electoral Shares of the ALP and NDP
One hypothesis that cannot be as easily incorporated
within this research design is the examination of the
particular influence upon policy of the electoral shares of
the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Canadian New
4Democratic Party (NDP). There are two reasons for this
examination in the Australian context. First, the
relationship between ALP and NDP electoral share and 
expenditure provides for the examination of an alternative 
measure of the impact of social democracy on policy. This is 
because while some have argued that impact of social 
democracy occurs through its possession of governmental power 
(for example, Castles 1987), others (for example, Shalev 
1983) suggest that the extent of the social democratic 
electoral share is the critical element in the casual link 
between left parties and policy. Second, and conceptually 
more important, given that the ALP was out of power for all 
but three years of the period covered in the study, it will
be argued that the ALP electoral share is in fact a proxy for
electoral competition.
The case of the Canadian NDP is somewhat different. 
While its electoral strength is a test of social democracy 
on policy, there are other perhaps more important strategic 
explanations for examining its influence on expenditure. In 
particular, the NDP, not being a dominant federal party but a 
third party within the Canadian national political 
system, can hold a decisive and influential role. Therefore 
its impact on policy could be due to it holding this
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bargaining position in the political system.
6.2 CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
6.2.1 Introduction
Before proceeding to test the political competition 
model, it is relevant to place this in systematic context by 
outlining briefly the conceptual history of the two major 
processes being examined. Two factors, viz., the impact of 
elections and inter-party competition, are highlighted in 
this brief overview.
6.2.2 Elections
The term 'political business cycle' has been used to 
denote the manipulation of policy instruments and macro- 
economic outcomes by a government seeking victory at the 
next elections. (See Nordhaus 1975; Macrae 1977; Frey 1978a, 
1978b; Frey and Schneider 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1979, 1982; 
and Tufte 1978.) This political business cycle explanation 
stresses the importance of the strategic incentives 
available to government to manipulate certain outcomes. 
Voters are assumed to have homogeneous preferences for some 
commodities the supply of which the government can influence. 
The upshot of this is that parties in governments are pushed 
to increase the supply of these commodities just before 
election time in order to improve their prospects of being 
returned to power.
Another strand of the literature analyses policy 
reaction to a government’s current level of popularity (Frey
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1978a, 1978b). The first analyst to examine in a rigorous 
manner the impact of elections on macro-economic outcomes was 
Nordhaus (1975) who argued that after an election a 
government raises unemployment and attempts to depress 
inflationary expectation. Towards election eve, unemployment 
is gradually decreased, at the expense of an increase in 
actual inflation. The net effect of these changes in the 
political economy is that the government attempts to 
manipulate the electorate on election eve by having low 
unemployment and high actual inflation rate. As Borooah and 
Van Der Ploeg claim,
it thereby lumbers the next administration with the 
inflationary consequences of this myopic policy. On 
election eve, the government has secured the lowest 
unemployment rate and the highest inflation rate 
(1983: 81).
The existence of a political business cycle of the kind 
that Nordhaus envisaged requires three assumptions, viz., 
that (a) a government must be able to exploit the dynamic 
properties of the economic system in the formation of 
expectations about price levels; (b) electors are backward­
looking; and, (c) the only interest of an incumbent 
government is to maximise its electoral share.
In similar vein to the analysis of Nordhaus, Tufte 
argues that two basic components of macro-economic outcomes 
can be observed:
The United States has experienced two types of 
political economic cycles: two-year cycle of 
acceleration and deceleration in disposable income, 
and a four year presidential cycle of high employment 
early in the term followed by economic stimulation, 
increasing prosperity and reduced unemployed late in 
the term (1978: 56-57).
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According to Tufte, in the period 1947-1978 real income 
grew in 70% of the election years, but in only 20% of the 
non-election years. Clearly, within this analysis an increase 
in disposable income is expected to win votes for the 
government.
Nordhaus, however, argues that policymakers can set 
unemployment at any level they wish through the use of fiscal 
and monetary policy. Tufte is more cautious about the use of 
fiscal and monetary policy instruments, arguing that they 
have uncertain time-lags, and do not seem to play a dominant 
role during election periods. His contention is that in pre­
election times the dominant instrument in stimulating the 
economy lies in the expansion of transfer payments in general, 
and of social security and veteran payments in particular.
Frey and Schneider (1978b) also propose a four-year 
cycle in policy instruments. Their model predicts that 
governments will increase expenditure, transfers, and jobs if 
popularity is low shortly before an election, but that 
governments pay no attention to such timing if their 
popularity exceeds a security threshold.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the impact 
of elections on two policy instruments, viz., welfare 
expenditure and total public expenditure. In so far as we 
examine total public expenditure, the model will attempt to 
test the hypothesis that there is a fiscal policy instrument 
cycle, that is, the proposition that governments manipulate 
public expenditure before an election to enhance their
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chances of retaining government.
6.2.3 Inter-Party Competition
The concept of competition is critical to process 
theories of democracy. As mentioned earlier, Schumpeter's 
(1950) observation about the similarity of democracy and 
markets emphasises the competitive aspects of both,
particularly the pursuit of strategic interest by parties in 
either the market or the political context.
The inter-party competition hypothesis was tested in the 
work of V.O.Key in his classic, Southern Politics (1951). 
Key’s basic research objective was to account for the low 
level of social welfare and educational programmes in the 
south in comparison with other States. He argued that this 
low level was associated with the nature of electoral 
politics. In particular, it was a product of personalised and 
disorganised electoral politics, where Republican opposition 
was minimal. The implication of this form of uncompetitive 
politics was that elected officials had little incentive to 
change:
Over the long run the "have-nots” lose in a 
disorganized politics. They have no mechanism through 
which to act and their wishes find expression in 
fitful rebellions led by transient demagogues who gain 
in confidence but often have neither the technical 
competence nor the necessary stable base of political 
power to effectuate a programme (1951: 327).
Key’s work led to the testing of what came to be called the
'inter-party hypothesis’. The logic of the hypothesis, at
least in the context of the American States, was that the
have-nots constituted the largest pool of potential voters
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designed to attract have-nots. As Gray put it, a two-
party competitive state will offer more policies beneficial 
to have-nots than will one-party competitive states' 
(1976: 293).
The inter-party competition hypothesis has been 
extensively tested in the American context, Lockard (1959) 
being the first to examine Key’s proposition. His work was 
followed by that of others such as Dawson and Robinson 
(1963), Dye (1966), and Fry and Winters (1970). The 
conclusion to emerge strongly from this work was that the 
’effects of inter-party competition are largely spurious and 
that a state's socio-economic environment determines both 
policies and politics' (Jennings 1979: 416). That is, in 
the original example, welfare systems were poorly developed 
in southern States because they were relatively poor, rather 
than because there was no competition between parties.
A major difficulty with some of the American studies 
has been that the inter-party competition hypothesis has not 
been rigorously specified. It is clear that Key’s original 
conceptualisation of the problem left much to be desired. In 
particular, his resolution of the problem of the lack of 
welfare in the south by attributing it to the absence of 
inter-party competition, failed to answer the underlying 
question as to why a competitive party system should move 
towards more liberal welfare as a consequence of the 
properties of the party system itself. It was assumed that 
since the majority of the people were poor, the voters would
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prefer a more liberal welfare state. What was not examined 
however, is the mechanism by which a more liberal welfare 
state was produced.
In terms of the levels of analyses explained above, 
most of the American studies have remained at a descriptive 
level unilluminated by an explanatory framework. In defence 
of Key, it must be pointed out that this was not his central 
concern; he was interested broadly in analysing the politics 
of the south because it differed from politics in other 
regions of the United States.
Key's understanding of inter-party competition is, in 
our terms, a party explanation in that competition is a 
function of party structure. Additionally, for Key, a party 
which drew support from a pro-welfare constituency would be 
more likely to push for more favourable welfare outcomes than 
a party (such as that which existed in the South) which was 
based predominantly on patronage. The implicit explanation 
of inter-party competition is that competition is a function 
of the structure of the party system. In our analysis, this 
view is consistent with a structural conception of the 
determination of party policy.
The notion of inter-party competition can be more 
rigorously recast within a Downsian framework to incorporate 
aspects of the strategic party explanation. The simple 
Downsian interpretation has voters distributed along a 
continuum of policy preferences. While the distribution of 
preferences is uni-modal, it is skewed in favour of liberal 
welfare policies because all those who would benefit from
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welfare policies make up such a large proportion of the
population. In this context, Jennings argues that
both parties are encouraged to move their welfare 
policy formulations towards the midpoint of the 
distribution (which represents more generous welfare 
policies) because they can acquire most votes 
(1979: 415 ).
It is this competitiveness of the party system which 
leads to specific policy outcomes. It would appear that under 
conditions in which the median voter prefers more welfare, a 
competitive system irrespective of the nature of the party 
system is likely to lead to increased social welfare 
expenditure. The essence of this concept of inter-party 
competition is that it is the properties of the competitive 
environment in which parties operate that produce certain 
sets of policy outcomes. In our analysis, this concerns the 
bidding up of welfare expenditure to maximise a government’s 
chance of re-election.
The fundamental distinction between the two explanations 
lies in the disagreement over the bases of party preference: 
the strategic actor explanation locates the basis of party 
preferences in the process of competition, while the other 
highlights the factors relating to the structure of the party 
system. The literature has thus far failed to differentiate 
conceptually between these two distinct explanations of 
inter-party competition. Important in any analysis of these 
two perspectives is therefore a need to examine the nature of 
the party system. The analysis of inter-party competition in 
the Australian and Canadian context is an attempt to examine
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these issues discussed above.
One final methodological note should be made about the
measure of inter-party competition used in this analysis. In 
order to capture the full impact of inter-party competition, 
two different measures are utilised: the first is termed 
electoral competition, and is assessed by subtracting the 
electoral share of the runners-up from that of the governing 
parties; the second is termed parliamentary competition, and 
is measured by subtracting the number of seats of the 
opposition from that of the government. (It should be noted 
that for Australia the Liberal and the National Country Party 
are considered together.) These two measures in fact test 
two different conceptions of inter-party competition: one 
places emphasis on the closeness of electoral shares to party 
behaviour, whereas the other emphasises the importance of the 
division of parliamentary seats in influencing behaviour. 
While the two would obviously move in the same direction, 
the extent of competition may vary between the two forms of 
party competition.
A problem that arises from a consideration of the 
electoral shares of the Australian parties is the aggregate 
electoral stability of electoral share of the major parties. 
It could be argued that the measure of electoral competition 
used, that is, the difference in the electoral shares of the 
opposition and government, is not a satisfactory guide to the 
degree of inter-party competition. In terms of the stability 
of the electoral shares a more plausible measure should be 
one that involves an index constructed on the basis of
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deviation of electoral share of the major parties from their 
average electoral support. In order to test this contention, 
we examined deviations from mean electoral share for the 
major parties in the manner described above. The results of 
the two methods were broadly consistent.
6.3 HYPOTHESES AND MODEL 
6.3.1 Hypotheses
The examination of the empirical literature suggest four 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between political 
competition and expenditure. The first concerns elections 
and its role in ’bidding up’ expenditure. The second and 
third hypotheses examine the response of expenditure to 
party, and the last examines the role of the ALP and NDP 
electoral share on policy. These four hypotheses are 
outlined more rigorously below.
HI: The approach of an election will lead to an
increase in welfare expenditure (referred to 
as election hypothesis).
H2: As inter-party competition increases, public
and welfare expenditure also increases. 
Inter-party competition is measured by the 
changes in the difference between the 
electoral share of opposition and government. 
(Electoral competition is referred to as IPC 
(1 ). )
H3: As the difference between the parliamentary
numbers of government and opposition narrows, 
expenditure on welfare increases. 
(Parliamentary competition is referred to as 
IPC (2). )
H4: The share of the left party is associated
with increased social and public expenditure 
(referred to as electoral share).
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These hypotheses are tested with controls for 
bureaucratic variables, changes in revenue and unemployment. 
The rationale for the use of these variables was set out in 
section 5.3.2 and we do not report the coefficients for 
these variables because the coefficients are approximately 
the same size as those detailed in that chapter. As there are 
technical difficulties in the use of lagged dependent 
variables in linear regressions (see Hibbs 1974; and 
section 3.5), incrementalism was tested, as previously 
explained, by a first order autocorrelation (AR1) process. 
In order to test for such correlation the regressions were 
tested by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and all the equations 
exhibited for first order autocorrelation. (See section 3.5 
for a discussion of these procedures.) The reason for this 
procedure is not merely to engage in a statistical exercise, 
but an attempt to examine the impact of time on expenditure.
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6.3.2 Political Competition Model'
The political competition Model for Australia and Canada 
is set out as follows:
y = a + bx, + bxn + bx0 + bx. + bx._ + bx^ + bx^ + e1 2  3 4 5 6 7
where a = constant
X t—1 II election coded 1 for an election year and 0 for a non-election year
X2 the changes in the difference between the electoral share of the main governing party 
and that of the opposition.
X3 changes in the difference between the seats of the government and those of the opposition 
in Parliament.
X4 = the electoral share of the ALP in Australia and that of the NDP in Canada
X5 ■ annual rate of change in $s of previous year's total revenue
X6 ■ annual rate of change in unemployment
x^ = annual rate of change of inflation 
y = changes in real expenditure
b standardised regression coefficient
e = error term
The rationale of this research design is to control for 
the impact of time on expenditure, the influence of which 
taken together with the economic variables is a measure of 
bureaucratic influence on expenditure. In the light of these 
variables, the study examines the impact of competition on 
expenditure.
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TABLE 6.1
The Impact of Political Competition on 
Real Changes in Expenditure for Australia, 1950-1980 (n=31)
Independent Social Educa- Total Total
Variables Welfare tion Health Welfare Expenditure
-0.05 -0.14 -0.19 -0.06 0.13
Elections X *
(-0.44) (-1.71) (-0.98) (-0.54) (1.95)
IPC (1) -0.05 0.41 -0.02 0.02 0.06
Electoral X X
Competition (-0.29) (3.9) (-0.08) (1.13) (0.01)
IPC (2) 0.45 -0.54 0.42 0.35 0.01
Parliamentary * X X X X X
Seats (1.57) (-3.21) (1.31) (1.38) (0.01)
ALP 0.20 0.01 0.43 0.30 0.16
Electoral X X
Share (0.74) (0.01) (1.31) (1.34) (0.79)
R2 0.73 0.87 0.26 0.73 0.87
Note:- The main Table entries are beta coefficients;
Numbers in parentheses are ’t’ values;
* p<0.10
** p< 0.05
*** p<0.01
For sources see Appendix 1. Raw Expenditure data are 
provided in Appendix 3.
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TABLE 6.2
The Impact of Political Competition on 
Real Changes in Expenditure in Canada, 1945-1974 (n=31)
Independent Social Educa- Total Total
Variable Welfare tion Health Welfare Expenditure
-0.17 -0.07 o<NO1 -0.21 -0.10
Elections
(-1.25) (-0.38) (-1.17) (-1.08) (-1.14)
IPC (1) -0.35 -0.38 -0.36 -0.31 -0.64
Electoral *
Competition (-1.1) (-0.01) (-1.3) (-0.10) (-0.27)
IPC (2) -0.72 0.98 0.49 0.34 -0.13
Parliamentary t * * *
Seats (-0.23) (2.75) (1.77) (1.41) (-0.59)
NDP -0.01 0.45 0.42 0.19 0.07
Electoral * *
Share (-0.72) (1.80) (1.29) (0.71) (0.22)
R2 0.49 0.35 0.61 0.57 0.70
Note.-- The main Table entries are beta coefficients;
Numbers in parentheses are ’t' values;
* p<0.10 
** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01
For sources see Appendix 1. Raw Expenditure data are 
provided in Appendix 3. .PA
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6.4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
TABLE 6.3
Summary of Statistical Confirmation of Hypotheses
Independent
Variables
Social
Welfare
Educa­
tion Health
Total Total Ex- 
Welfare penditure
A C A C A C A C A C
Elections +
IPC (1)
Electoral
Competition
- + - - - -
IPC (2) 
Parliament: 
Competition
+ + + + + + -
ALP/NDP
Electoral
Share
- + + + + -
Note.-- ' + confirmation
no confirmation or negative relationship 
A: Australia;
C: Canada
significance only for coefficients in the expected 
direction
Social Welfare
The pattern of results for social welfare (Table 6.1) 
indicates that elections and electoral competition in 
Australia are not positively associated with social welfare 
expenditure. In fact, for both variables have coefficients 
which are negative. As against this lack of association with
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electoral competition, parliamentary competition is 
positively associated with social welfare expenditure, 
yielding a coefficient of 0.45. This indicates that in 
Australia, one measure of inter-party competition is related 
to expenditure Another additional feature of the Australian 
data is the positive (though not statistically significant) 
coefficient for the electoral share of the ALP at 0.2.
The Canadian results (Table 6.2) for social welfare 
present a pattern that is very different from the Australian 
social welfare pattern. None of the competition or ’process’ 
variables examined, namely, elections, electoral competition, 
parliamentary competition or the electoral share of the NDP, 
has a positive sign. Of these variables, electoral 
competition and elections have no relationship to expenditure 
in both countries. The difference between Australian and 
Canadian social welfare expenditure is that the former is 
significantly related to changes in parliamentary 
competition. Moreover, the ALP electoral share, while not 
being statistically significant, indicates a positive 
coefficient. But in the Canadian context, these variables 
have no relationship to social welfare expenditure; the 
coefficients for the equivalent variables do not reveal any 
association with social welfare expenditure.
These results appear to suggest that social welfare 
expenditure is unresponsive to competitive pressure in 
Canada. An explanation for this may be in the dominant 
universalistic and contributory characteristics of social
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insurance which contrast sharply with similar Australian 
programmes. These features may indicate that the scope for 
extending benefits in response to competitive pressure in 
Canada is limited because the extent to which the government 
can increase welfare benefits is highly circumscribed. 
Further evidence for this proposition is found in the 
analysis presented in Chapter 5, where it was noted that 
political administrations in the 1950s were significantly 
associated with changes in social security expenditure. Once 
these programmes were established they were immune to 
political pressure.
Education
Australian education expenditure (Table 6.1) differs 
from the pattern of results obtained for Australian social 
welfare and health expenditures in three main respects. The 
first and perhaps most important difference lies in the 
positive and significant coefficient of 0.41 for electoral 
competition which shows no association with the other 
expenditure categories examined. The second difference lies 
in the association of parliamentary competition with rates of 
growth of social welfare and health expenditure on the one 
hand, and the lack of any positive association with education 
expenditure on the other. Indeed, the direction of the 
coefficient for parliamentary competition of -0.54 which is 
significant, indicates a negative relationship between 
changes in parliamentary seats and expenditure. The final 
cleavage between social welfare and health expenditure on the
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one hand and education expenditure on the other is in the 
very weak ALP electoral share coefficient of 0.01 for 
education expenditure, a coefficient which suggests that the 
relationship between the two variables is negligible. The 
only similarity between education and the other welfare 
expenditure categories for Australian data is in the 
direction of the coefficients for elections which is negative 
for all the expenditures examined. The pattern of results for 
education expenditure is clearly aberrant to the general 
pattern observed in the behaviour of the other welfare 
expenditures. A reason for this pattern of results may be in 
the fact that education expenditure, being for the most part 
effective in the States, is not responsive to competitive 
federal pressures.
The Canadian education expenditure results exhibit a 
pattern similar to that of Canadian health expenditure. The 
results fall clearly into two distinct groups. Those in the 
first group, namely, elections and electoral competition, 
are not related to education expenditure, and as with all the 
expenditure categories examined thus far, present a sign 
in the negative direction. The second group, namely, 
parliamentary competition and NDP electoral share, reveals 
significant positive coefficients of 0.98 and 0.45 
respectively. While the direction of the coefficients for 
education and health are similar, education expenditure 
reveals a greater degree of responsiveness to parliamentary 
competition.
These Canadian results are significant in that they
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reveal that the bidding-up of expenditure was in the areas of
health and education expenditure rather than in income 
maintenance payments. The differences between Australian and
Canadian education figures are marked. The only similarity 
between the figures lies in the coefficient for election 
which is negative for both countries. The primary difference 
between Australian and Canadian education expenditure rests 
with the other variables considered and lies in their 
relative scores on the two measures of inter-party
competition. Whereas in Australia electoral competition is 
significant, in Canada it is parliamentary competition which 
is positively related to the growth of education expenditure.
Health
The coefficients for the competition variables for 
Australian health expenditure (Table 6.1) indicate a 
similarity in the direction of the relationships with social 
expenditure. Two variables - elections and electoral 
competition - do not have any positive impact on health 
expenditure. As with social welfare expenditure, the 
coefficients for these variables are negative. Australian 
health expenditure is responsive to the other two
coefficients examined, namely, those of parliamentary 
competition and ALP electoral share, with coefficients of 
0.42 and 0.43 respectively. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant. While the direction of the 
relationship between these two independent variables and 
health expenditure and social welfare are similar, the
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Statistical significance of the variables differ. The
electoral share of the ALP is significant for health 
expenditure and has a coefficient similar to that of 
parliamentary competition. This is contrary to the pattern 
of relationship between parliamentary competition and the 
ALP electoral share where the latter is not statistically 
associated with social welfare. These results may indicate 
the importance of the Whitlam period in health expenditure.
Like Australian health expenditure, the Canadian data 
(Table 6.2) too are unresponsive to elections and electoral 
competition. Indeed the signs of these coefficients are 
negative for both countries. On the other hand, 
parliamentary competition and the electoral share of the 
NDP are positive and statistically significant; and the 
coefficients of the variables are approximately of the same 
size (0.49 and 0.42 respectively). Unlike social welfare 
expenditure, health expenditure appears to be responsive to 
competitive pressure, reflecting the degree to which health 
policy became a major political issue in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Taylor (1978). Canadian and Australian health expenditures 
appear to be broadly responsive to the same variables. Both 
reveal a lack of association between health expenditure and 
elections or electoral competition, and the presence of a 
positive relationship between parliamentary competition and 
the electoral share of the ALP/NDP.
Total Welfare
Australian aggregate or total welfare expenditure (Table
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6.1) reveals a pattern of results that is similar to that 
obtained for social welfare and health expenditure. Both 
parliamentary competition and the electoral share of the ALP 
are positively associated with total welfare expenditure. 
With coefficients of 0.35 and 0.30 respectively, the 
coefficients for parliamentary competition and ALP electoral 
share are statistically significant. Moreover these two 
coefficients are broadly similar in the degree of their 
association with total welfare. While there is a positive 
coefficient of 0.02 for electoral competition, the size of 
the coefficient suggests that its impact on expenditure is 
negligible. Canadian total welfare expenditure, produces a 
set of results broadly similar to the Australian data. The 
two variables found to have positive association with 
Canadian total welfare are parliamentary competition (0.34) 
and NDP electoral share (0.19). Of these only the latter 
coefficient fails to achieve statistical significance. Here, 
it differs from the Australian pattern of results which 
revealed the importance of the electoral share of the ALP in 
influencing the rate of change of Australian aggregate 
welfare expenditure.
A significant feature of this pattern of results 
obtained with the Canadian data for total welfare lies in its 
similarity to health and education expenditure especially in 
the degree of its association between parliamentary 
competition and NDP electoral share and expenditure. The 
only deviation from this pattern of results for the welfare
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expenditure categories is with social welfare expenditure.
Total Expenditure
The Australian total expenditure figures (Table 6.1) are 
interesting in that all four coefficients of the independent 
variables examined are positive. Two of these coefficients, 
electoral competition (0.06) and parliamentary competition 
(0.01), indicate no relationship to total expenditure, and 
in this respect, total expenditure stands out from the other 
welfare expenditures in not being related to a measure of 
inter-party competition. The coefficient for elections (0.13) 
on the other hand, reveals an association with total 
expenditure. This is a noteworthy feature because none of the 
coefficients for elections in the relationship with welfare 
expenditure categories is positive. This does suggest that 
if there is any link between elections and expenditure, it is 
in a relationship with non-welfare expenditure. In other 
words, if governments bid up expenditure before elections, 
they are likely to do so in non-welfare areas. The other 
feature of the Australian total expenditure results worthy of 
mention is that the electoral share of the ALP is positively 
associated with total expenditure.
The Canadian total expenditure figures are contrary to 
the Australian data in that, barring one variable, none are 
positive. The exception is the coefficient for NDP electoral 
share which is only 0.07. As such, the relationship with 
total expenditure is negligible. The other variables, namely, 
elections and the two measures of inter-party competition, 
failed to indicate a positive relationship with total
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expenditure. In fact, all the signs of the coefficients are 
negative. Canadian total expenditure indicates a pattern of 
behaviour similar to that of social welfare expenditure 
although it differs from the latter in its positive 
coefficient for electoral share of the NDP. The general 
conclusion to bear in mind is the positive responsiveness of 
total welfare to competitive pressure.
A critical feature of the results detailed so far is the 
consistent difference between total expenditure and total 
welfare expenditure for both Australia and Canada. Total 
welfare expenditure in both countries is associated with 
competition, especially parliamentary competition. In Canada, 
the coefficient for parliamentary competition is 0.34 (Table 
6.2), and in Australia it is 0.35 (Table 6.1). The comparable 
figures for the parliamentary competition coefficient for 
total expenditure are 0.01 and -0.13 respectively for 
Australia and Canada. An inference to be drawn from these 
results is that while welfare expenditure appears to be 
influenced by competition, non-welfare expenditure seemingly 
does not respond to it in a like fashion.
g 6.5 DISCUSSION
The discussion of results is based on the two levels of 
analysis set out in the introduction to this chapter. This 
discussion is divided into two sections. The first is 
concerned with the results of the analysis conducted at the 
descriptive level. The second is concerned with the results 
in the context of the explanatory issues discussed in the
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introduction.
6.5.1 Descriptive Level
The conclusions that can be reached from an analysis of 
the data for the rate of change of expenditure in relation to 
competition are threefold. First, a significant feature of 
the models examined was the lack of any positive relationship 
between ’elections' and ’social expenditure’ variables, in 
that there was no significant link for any of the welfare 
categories examined. Indeed the only positive significant 
relationship between expenditure and elections found in the 
analysis was with Australian total expenditure. Therefore the 
inference to be drawn from this pattern of evidence for both 
countries is that social expenditure is not manipulated by 
governments at election time in order to retain office. 
However, it should be pointed out that the absence of a 
positive association between elections and expenditure does 
not necessarily mean that governments in policy terms, are 
non-responsive to the timing of elections. In particular, as 
we know, governments may adjust macro-economic policy to such 
factors as levels of inflation and unemployment which are 
linked to governmental popularity. Although this issue is 
outside the scope of this thesis, it is worthwhile noting 
Tufte's (1978) contention that governments wishing to 
maximise re-election chances are most likely to use 
expenditure instruments rather than macro-economic policy if 
only because the former are more flexible.
While some overseas research tends to support this
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finding about elections and expenditure, the work of Tufte 
(1978) on the relationship between expenditure data and 
elections in the United States contains some contradictory 
findings. One possible explanation for the differences 
between Tufte's findings for the United States and our 
results for Canada and Australia might be due to the nature 
of the control of transfer payments. The United States system 
allows a higher degree of Presidential discretion in 
determining the level and timing of benefits. This discretion 
allows for the rapid adjustment of the level of transfer 
payments in response to political influence. On the other 
hand, the nature of the annual budgetary process in Australia 
as well as in Canada precludes the rapid adjustments of 
transfer payments for electoral purposes. Apart from this, 
as Frey and Schneider (1978a) argue, even from a rational- 
choice framework the explanation for the public policy 
impact of elections appears to be weak. In particular, they 
contend that, if public opinion polls suggest that an 
incumbent is certain of re-election, it might not be in his 
interest to pursue an inflationary strategy. Therefore they 
maintain that the use of expenditure instruments depends 
strictly on the level of popularity of governments.
The second feature of the results lies in the impact of 
inter-party competition on expenditure. The main aspect of 
this impact of ’competition' lay in the significance of 
parliamentary rather than electoral competition in those 
expenditure categories where the inter-party competition was
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significant. Indeed of all Australian expenditures, only 
educational expenditure was associated with electoral 
competition as an independent variable. On the other hand, 
social welfare (0.45), health (0.42) and total welfare 
(0.35), were related to parliamentary competition. In the 
Canadian context health (0.49), education (0.98) and total 
welfare (0.34) expenditures, were all associated with 
parliamentary competition. So in comparative terms, health 
and total welfare expenditures revealed a similar pattern of 
results not only in terms of the positive association with 
parliamentary competition, but also in their relationship 
with ALP and NDP electoral share. This aspect of the results 
will be discussed in more detail in the concluding section of 
this chapter.
The third feature of the empirical results lies in the 
pattern of relationships between the electoral share of the 
ALP in Australia and the NDP in Canada, and the growth of 
expenditure. The electoral share of the ALP was significantly 
associated with the expenditures for health (at 0.43) and 
total welfare (at 0.30). Both total and social expenditures 
were positively associated with ALP electoral share. In 
Canada, the electoral share of the NDP was significantly 
linked to health (at 0.42) and education expenditures (at 
0.45), while total welfare and total expenditures had 
positive coefficients of 0.19 and 0.07 respectively. A 
revealing feature of these results for social democratic 
electoral share is that they seemed to be associated with 
parliamentary competition. In Australia, health and total
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welfare expenditures were significant and related to 
parliamentary competition as well as to the electoral share 
of the ALP. In similar fashion Canadian expenditure was also 
related to these same variables of parliamentary competition 
and NDP electoral share.
In terms of the Australian literature, the importance of 
inter-party competition has been a singularly neglected topic 
in the policy literature. While emphasis has been placed on 
the importance of the impact of ALP administration on policy, 
no similar effort has been directed to study the influence of 
inter-party competition on policy. The findings of the 
present study indicate a need for a reassessment of this 
position, and and for more attention to be directed to the 
importance of party strategy in the determination of policy. 
A surprising feature of these results is the continuing 
importance of inter-party competition despite high levels of 
stability in the political system (Aitkin 1977). However, 
high levels of stability by themselves cannot rule out 
competition because such competition is at the margins.
The Canadian results on inter-party competition places 
this study at some variance with the work of Kornberg et al. 
(1972) and Falcone (1974) who find little evidence for the 
impact of inter-party competition. These results could be due 
to three factors First, the studies mentioned do not all 
focus on welfare expenditure. Indeed all of these are studies 
of legislative output rather than of expenditure which is the 
main focus of this present study. Second, the time period in
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which legislative output was considered is more expansive 
than the period covered in the present study. Kornberg et al. 
and Falcone consider broadly a period from about 1900 
onwards. Finally there are technical and methodological 
differences in the research. Unlike in this study, there is 
no control for the influence of autocorrelation and, more 
pertinently, for the specific economic variables considered 
in this study.
In terms of the more general Canadian policy literature, 
this analysis indicates that ideological distinctiveness does 
not imply the diminution of party competition. In 
comparative terms, the analysis indicates the presence of 
class cleavages, and ideologically distinctive parties do not 
by themselves increase competition between the parties. 
This issue will be discussed further in the next section.
6.5.2 Explanatory Level
In this section we turn to the analytical issues 
outlined above, the evaluation of the competing claims in 
accounting for the influence of competition on expenditure 
in Australia and Canada provided by the 'structural' and 
'strategic' conceptions of policy. The relevant empirical 
results were of a twofold nature: first, the association 
between inter-party competition and expenditure was positive 
for both countries; and secondly, with the exception of 
Australian educational expenditure, all those expenditures 
related to inter-party competition were positively associated 
with parliamentary rather than electoral competition.
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In particular, it should be pointed out that total 
welfare for both countries was associated with inter-party 
competition. The relationship between inter-party competition 
and total welfare expenditure is critical because it may be 
argued that if a competitive logic is operating, governments 
may tend to view welfare as a whole rather than in separate 
categories.
This examination of the two competing models of party 
and policy, viz., the structural and the strategic actor 
conception, has been considered in the experimental context 
of evaluating the influence of competition on policy in 
Australia and Canada. One of the main propositions tested 
was, as explained previously, the proposition that political 
competition was a ’function’ of structure. Because the 
party systems differed markedly in terms of class cleavages, 
organisation and ideological strength, this proposition was 
amenable to testing with the Australian and Canadian 
evidence.
Two distinct explanations concerning the impact of 
competition were identifiable. One pertains to a structural 
explanation: this emphasises that competition is a function 
of the structure of the party system, the latter defined in 
organisational and ideological terms. The causal sequence in 
this account consisted of a strong party system which leads 
to competition and thereby to its impact on policy output. 
The other explanation stresses that competition is not a 
function so much as a consequence of the process of 
'strategic interaction’ between parties.
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The results reveal that not only was competition a 
significant factor in the determination of most of the 
welfare expenditure, but also that its impact was felt in 
both countries. This conclusion therefore lends support to 
the strategic conception of policy output which argues that 
it is the competitive environment rather than the structure 
of the party system which is important in influencing 
outcomes, and hence expenditure. This is the first important 
conclusion in relation to the explanatory issues examined.
A further significant feature of the inter-party 
competition results is that, of the several variables 
examined, it is only the parliamentary measure of inter-party 
competition which was positively associated to welfare 
expenditure (with the exception of Australian education). 
The consistent strength of parliamentary competition in its 
influence on expenditure and policy is a marked and important 
feature of the results obtained. This evidence tends to 
suggest that parliamentary competition is a better indicator 
of competitiveness than electoral competition because parties 
take greater account of parliamentary competition when it is 
viewed as a struggle for seats. The latter may serve as a 
good indication of the hold parties have on the government, 
or alternatively, the closeness of opposition to government.
It is not entirely clear, however, that parliamentary 
competition is the dominant form of competition in Australia. 
A feature of the findings reported for Australia (Table 6.1), 
is the relationship between the electoral share of the ALP
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and expenditure. In this regard, all four dependent 
variables were positively associated with ALP electoral 
share. The coefficients of the electoral share of the ALP 
are.- social welfare (0.20), health (0.43), total welfare 
(0.30) and total expenditure (0.16). Only education 
expenditure was negligibly related to the electoral share of 
the ALP. By and large these results tend to support the view 
that the electoral share of the ALP is a vital determinant of 
expenditure.
However an important pattern to emerge from the results 
is the association between the electoral share of the ALP and 
parliamentary competition. The expenditure categories related 
to ALP electoral share are also associated with parliamentary 
competition. These categories with their respective 
parliamentary coefficients (indicated in parentheses) are, 
social welfare (0.45), health (0.42), total welfare (0.35) 
and total expenditure (0.01). The two expenditures which are 
statistically significant were health and total welfare 
expenditures. The latter category suggests that Australian 
governments manipulated the total welfare budget in response 
to competitive pressure. The coefficient for parliamentary 
competition is negligible at 0.01. This analysis then leads 
to the inevitable conclusion that the electoral share of the 
ALP is linked to parliamentary competition.
It will be recalled that in the introduction to this 
chapter, it was argued that the measure of the electoral 
share of the ALP was intended to capture the impact of the 
presence of a social democratic party on expenditure. In
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this sense, this variable was seen as a test of the party 
explanation, or more precisely, a test of the constituency
effect: what we called the social democratic hypothesis. 
Hence it appears from the finding reported that the 
Australian evidence lends support to both the strategic 
actor and social democratic hypotheses. A resolution of this 
apparent paradox may be found in the evidence linking 
parliamentary competition and ALP electoral share, and this 
evidence would seem to indicate that the electoral share of 
the ALP does not reveal the impact of party as such, but 
serves as a proxy measure for competition. Indeed, given 
that the ALP was out of government for all but three years of 
the time tested in our analysis, the coefficient for the 
impact of the ALP electoral share tends to capture the effect 
of electoral competition. Consequently, it could be 
reasonably argued that these results, rather than being 
contrary to a political competition perspective provide a 
further basis of support for this standpoint.
In short, the argument suggested is that for Australia, 
both parliamentary and electoral competition indicated by the 
electoral share of the ALP were important determinants of 
expenditure. This of course differed from the Canadian 
results (Table 6.2) in that electoral competition was not 
related to any of the expenditure categories examined. 
However, it should be noted that the electoral share of the 
NDP was, as with the ALP, related to expenditure areas that 
are associated with parliamentary competition. Nevertheless,
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an argument analogous to that advanced for Australia 
concerning the role of the electoral share of the ALP cannot 
be made about the NDP in the Canadian context because of two 
salient aspects of the NDP: its regional character and its 
minor party status.
To sum up the argument, a major inference to be drawn 
from the findings reported in this chapter is that, whilst 
for Canada, parliamentary competition is the only variable of 
significance, for Australia both parliamentary and electoral 
competition appear to be of central importance.
One speculative proposition to account for the lack of 
importance of electoral competition in Canada may lie in the 
factors related to the nature of the Canadian party system. 
As noted earlier (see section 3.3), one of the significant 
features of the Canadian party system is its fragmentation or 
its lack of a nationalised electorate; it could therefore be 
argued that fragmentation makes electoral competition less 
important than parliamentary competition in its impact on 
expenditure. Similarly, in the Australian context, the high 
levels of electoral stability may serve to strengthen the 
role of electoral competition rather than diminish it, 
because competition for the limited ’marginal' electorate is 
more intense.
In addition to the systematic factors outlined here, 
there is one further reason for the significant relationship 
of parliamentary competition to expenditure in Canada. This 
is the extent to which Canadian politics was characterised by 
the presence of minority governments in the period of
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analysis. Support for this explanation is found in the 
evidence which links the electoral share of the NDP to 
parliamentary government. If the contention about minority 
government was valid, it could be assumed that the NDP as a 
major third party should have enhanced its strategic position 
in the party system. These results therefore give strong 
credence to the strategic actor explanation.
The proposition being developed, bearing in mind its 
speculative nature, is that inter-party competition in 
general is not a function of the party system. The type of 
competition, whether it be electoral or parliamentary 
competition however, is related to the structure of the party 
system. This aspect of the argument reinforces the need not 
only to empirically differentiate between measures of 
competition, but to examine whether these measures of 
competition have different theoretical bases.
The conclusions of this analysis are twofold. The 
first conclusion is that competition is not a function of the 
party system. In terms of the analytical models set out at 
the start of this chapter, the analysis confirms the 
proposition that competition is not limited to Australia, as 
the structural perspective would contend, but is present 
(albeit at different levels) in Canada as well. The evidence 
therefore confirms the strategic actor perspective of party. 
Indeed, the results presented in this chapter as well as in 
Chapter 5 conclusively point to the support for the strategic 
actor model (Model 2) of party.
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The second conclusion is that while competition is 
present in both countries, the type of competition whether it 
be electoral or parliamentary competition, differed between 
the two countries. In Canada, parliamentary competition was 
the major determinant of expenditure whereas in Australia, 
both parliamentary and electoral competition played a 
determining role. The proposition that was advanced to 
support this pattern of evidence was built around the nature 
of electoral support: its fragmentation and regional basis in 
Canada, and its degree of stability in Australia. While this 
proposition is speculative, it indicates that competition in 
general is not determined by the nature of the party system 
even though the specific form of competition may well be 
influenced by the nature of the party system.
This final point serves to underline the importance of 
the examination of party strategy in influencing policy. In 
both Australia and Canada, what appears as critical in an 
analysis of expenditure is the manner in which parties react 
to the processes of political competition. No doubt 
individual studies such as Regenstreif (1965) on 
Diefenbaker, and Patience and Head (1979) on Whitlam and 
Fraser, contain important aspects of this subject. The policy 
determinant literature would be enhanced if this aspect was 
considered in more detail. This will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis.
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NOTES
1. See Chapter 5 for an explanation for the rationale for the 
inclusion of these variables.
2. The term ’core constituency’ refers to the dominant socio­
economic basis of party support. The basis of this 
description lies in the structuralist conception outlined in 
Chapter 1 (see Hibbs 1977).
3. For such an analysis see Robertson (1975). Robertson in
particular eraphasies the need to take into account the
position of the median party supporter as well as the median 
voter. He notes that the differing positions of the two might 
result in a degree of tension in party strategy. More 
recently, neo-Downsian theory has moved to consider the
nature of party competition when the issue space dominated by 
a variety of considerations rather than one dominant issue. 
Indeed the Downsian theory of the median voter rests 
critically on the assumption of a uni-modal rather than
multi-dimensional issue space
4. For an analysis of the NDP in the Canadian context see 
Courtney (1973). More generally, on third parties see Pinard 
(1971; 1973).
5. The method of deflation of expenditure data is outlined in 
section 3.4.2.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The research outlined and reported in earlier chapters 
had, as noted in Chapter 1, two broad and distinct 
objectives. The first was largely to examine, in the light of 
the similar economic and political structures existing in 
Australia and Canada, the role of social and economic 
variables in shaping expenditure policy. In particular, it 
was suggested that the differences of their economic 
structures from those of other Western countries provided a 
vantage point from which one could reasonably examine the 
significance and impact of the international economy on 
policy developments in Australia and Canada.
The second objective of the research was more 
analytical, and centred on developing an understanding, 
through comparative study, of the significance attaching to 
two key determinants of policy, namely, the influence of 
party structure and party organisation. Hence, a central 
research problem posed in this study has been that of 
determining whether the strength of the party system in 
liberal democratic countries makes a critical difference in 
accounting for differential levels of public expenditure in 
relation to the countries being compared. For this purpose 
two models of party functioning describing the link between 
party and policy, identified as the structural and the 
strategic actor models of policy (see section 1.2), were
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studied to determine the nature of their influence on
variations in expenditure, as both models make distinct 
claims about the relationship between type of party system 
and policy output.
This final chapter provides an overview of the research 
by drawing together the distinct but related findings of the 
study as outlined and presented in Chapters 3-6. Additionally 
we will also endeavour to place these findings within the 
context of public policy research.
7.2 THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY ON 
PUBLIC POLICY
Turning to findings of the study relating to the 
economic determinants of expenditure, we have been able to 
show that factors pertaining to economic resources and 
demography have similar effects on social welfare 
expenditure. For this category of expenditure, demography and 
resources form the bedrock on which nations construct their 
different policy superstructures. A feature of the 
Australian and Canadian economies that distinguishes them 
from those of other industrialised countries is their 
dependence on commodity exports. Consequently a major 
research problem concerns the analysis of the impact of 
movements in the international economy on expenditure. Put 
differently, the issue becomes one of the extent to which the 
vulnerability of these economies to international economic 
movements is reflected in expenditure policy.
One conclusion that may be drawn from a consideration
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of the analysis of international economic developments is 
that in Australia changes in the levels of exports have had 
little or no direct influence on expenditure levels, whereas 
in in Canada expenditure does appear to have responded to 
changes in the levels of exports. In explaining this 
difference we have argued that the Australian pattern of 
results was a function of the existence of a matrix of 
institutions, foremost of which was the arbitration system. 
The existence of the latter enabled Australia to absorb with 
greater ease fluctuations in domestic income caused by 
movements in the international economy. Canada on the other 
hand, lacking a comparable set of institutions, had to 
resort to a strategy of stabilising fluctuations in income 
through expenditure outlays.
Two fairly general conclusions or generalisations may be 
drawn from these results. First, at a conceptual level, they 
indicate the need for policy studies in general and 
expenditure determinant analyses in particular, to pay 
greater heed to the impact of international economic events 
on policy. The works of Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1984) 
provide evidence of the utility of such an approach. In the 
Australian and Canadian contexts such a perspective is all 
the more necessary because of the vulnerability of these 
economies to changes in the price of commodities. The policy 
output literature reviewed earlier fails to examine 
systematically the constraints of the international trading 
system on domestic policy. Clearly, this indicates the need
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in studies of this nature to take account of the different
strategies adopted by countries in the face of movements in 
the international economy.
A second and more speculative issue arising from these 
results is of more practical utility and relates to the 
likely impact of international economic forces on expenditure 
in the foreseeable future. As regards the Australian findings 
it should be noted that the time span covered by this study 
precedes a dramatic decline of commodity prices and the 
worsening of the terms of trade. But, in general, a main 
contention has been that in the past the matrix of social 
economic institutions has served to insulate from, as well 
as to act as a buffer against adverse effects in the domestic 
income sector caused by the heightened vulnerability of the 
economy. But it is also suggested that, if the policy and 
ideological consensus underpinning these institutions were to 
break down, then pressure on expenditure, particularly on 
social expenditure, may be quite different and be comparable 
to that of Canada (see section 4.7.3).
In the immediate future, however, as Denoon (1983) 
points out, both Australia and Canada face major problems of 
structural adjustment. Both economies will be subject to 
great economic pressures, and a significant feature of the 
political economy of the two countries will be the extent to 
which social policy and public policy in general cope with 
the social consequences of that structural adjustment. In the 
Canadian context the effect of these adjustments may place 
great pressure on the extent to which social expenditure in
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the future is able to respond to and accommodate these 
rapidly changing circumstances.
At a more general level, it is clear that the results of 
this study point to a potential goldmine for comparative 
policy studies in the evaluation of the differential impact 
of the international economy, especially on policy 
determination. In this respect a major task for researchers 
in this area must be to identify valid and reliable 
indicators of economic vulnerability.
7.3 THE LINK BETWEEN PARTY AND POLICY
As pointed out earlier, an important feature of the 
research problem has been to consider the influence of party 
structure and party organisation on policy outcomes. Two 
explanations, termed the 'structural’ and 'strategic actor’ 
models, were offered to account for the link between party 
and policy, and these conceptual models, when subjected to 
empirical tests, revealed an interesting pattern of results. 
Before examining the empirical conclusions, some comment 
needs to be made on the methodology adopted in the empirical 
part of the study.
Methodologically, the approach of the present research, 
when considered along with the international literature, is 
important for several reasons. In particular, the research 
design used here - the Interrupted Time-Series design (ITS) - 
may have relevance and utility for policy output studies in 
general. The value of the ITS design, or intervention 
analysis as it is sometimes called, is that it allows the
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analyst to model the influence of time on policy, and thereby 
estimate the influence of intervention on the variables being 
examined. In similar fashion the notion of 'reaction 
function' employed in Chapter 5 has the potential to be of 
considerable value in future political science research. 
Moreover, by examining specific economic variables such as 
revenue, inflation and unemployment in a context where the 
causal influence between these variables and policy output 
are specified, it becomes possible to uncover the nature of 
the bureaucratic mechanisms in the delivery of policy output. 
This operationalisation of bureaucratic 'inputs’ in terms of 
economic variables is a considerable advance over 
conventional models of policy output. In these models 
economic variables have often been defined too generally for 
any rigorous specification of causality between them and the 
response of policymakers to these economic conditions. In 
sum, what is most attractive for policy analysis in the 
notion of the 'reaction function’ is that it enables 
inferences to be drawn about the intention of policymakers in 
an analytical manner.
Moreover, the reference to distinct periods of 
government rather than party in a time-series study is 
valuable, not merely for its theoretical significance in 
underpinning a strategic actor model of policy (an issue 
discussed below), but also showing the effects of variations 
in policy priorities of governments at different times. 
Indeed, more light is likely to be shed on this aspect of the
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analysis by a more detailed disaggregation of policy sectors.
Finally, the distinctive methodological aspect of this 
study is that it escapes the conceptual and empirical 
straight- jacket of society-centred theories of policy output 
(section 1.3). By using time-series techniques, the study is 
able to detect the influence of incrementalism on policy. 
Furthermore, the use of a 'reaction function’ approach, along 
with an ITS design, allows us to demarcate the impact of 
bureaucratic from that of political factors in policy output. 
These twin features of the research design of this study 
makes it a substantial methodological improvement to 
conventional accounts of policy output. Moreover, as noted in 
Chapter 1, this methodological improvement is not merely an 
issue of technical complexity, but reflects a different 
conceptual approach to policy analysis. Specifically the 
methodological advances reflect the need to move to state- 
centred conceptions of policy output.
Looking at the empirical findings, we note that some of 
the results go against the grain of convention. Thus, in the 
Australian context an important and counter-intuitive 
finding is of a two-fold nature: (a) that the impact on 
expenditure of the Whitlam administration was not as great 
as suggested in the literature,- and (b) that the sources of 
change in this period can be attributed to a change of 
government rather than ideology. It will be recalled that the 
analysis of these results offered in Chapter 5 indicated that 
it was a 'turnover' effect rather than a 'party' effect.
More support for this type of explanation comes from the
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finding in Chapter 5 that the influence of the Whitlam 
Government on spending, in the education and health areas in 
particular, tend to disappear when a time trend is 
introduced. A word of caution is needed here lest this 
finding be viewed as merely a statistical artefact. It is 
certainly possible to construct a plausible and interesting 
theoretical rationale to account for this finding. In brief, 
the explanation offered was one that highlights the 
importance of intense political competition in relation to 
welfare issues - a competition especially marked in the 
area of health expenditure - between several governments and 
opposition parties during this period. It was a feature first 
evident in the Gorton, McMahon and Whitlam years. Especially 
important was the competition between the McMahon Government 
and Whitlam Opposition.
To place this in sharp focus one needs to examine more 
closely the descriptive statistics presented in Table 5.2 in 
Chapter 5. An inference to be drawn from these figures is 
that the rate of change of expenditure appears to be marked 
for the Whitlam period, but the growth of expenditure seems 
to increase across both the post-Menzies and Whitlam periods.
Indeed, this is in effect what is captured in the
regression analysis of Table 5.4, and is explained by
reference to the f act that welfare issues seem to have
acquired a crucial strategic importance because of the
intense political competition surrounding them during both 
periods of government. This explanation is also supported by
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the distribution of the coefficients of competition reported 
in Chapter 6. As previously observed, most Australian welfare 
expenditure categories were significantly associated with 
electoral and parliamentary competition.
Thus, welfare issues, relatively absent during the 
Menzies period, had become part of the political agenda by 
the Whitlam era, and this is exemplified by the priority 
assigned to them in Whitlam’s 1972 policy speech. The 
appointment of the Henderson Poverty Commission by the 
McMahon government is further demonstration of the importance 
of welfare issues over this period.
The analysis of the Australian data clearly 
demonstrates the importance of strategic imperatives in the 
formulation of policy. It is these imperatives rather than 
ideology which seem to account for policy, and for this 
reason we may conclude that the Australian data are 
consistent with what has been termed a 'strategic actor’ 
model of party.
The negative influence of the Fraser administration on 
expenditure also stands out as a significant general finding 
of the study. This is important for two reasons. First, it 
demonstrates that the consideration of negative influences on 
policy may be no less important than the positive role of 
parties in government in expanding the rate of change of 
social expenditure. This, in passing, lends justification for 
the methodology of this study, especially the time-series 
design, because it is critical to have a baseline by which 
such influences may be judged. For our purposes
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'incrementalism' served as the baseline. Second, the 
evidence of the Fraser period points to the existence of a 
distinct set of policy priorities that marked it out from 
the two previous Liberal-Country Party administrations.
The Canadian evidence too lends support to the 'turnover 
hypothesis’ advanced in the study (Table 5.5). Two findings 
in particular deserve mention. The first relates to the 
significance attached to social welfare during the 
Diefenbaker period. In terms of the turnover model, it was 
imperative for the new Diefenbaker Government, being the 
first Conservative government to come into power after the 
long period of Liberal Party hegemony stretching from the 
1930s, to establish new policy directions. Its response is 
perhaps best reflected in the reported expenditure figures 
(Table 5.4).
The second finding of interest is that, whereas social 
welfare expenditure appears to have been significantly 
altered by government intervention in the 1950s in the St 
Laurent and Diefenbaker periods, it was not subject to much 
governmental impact (in the sense defined in Chapter 5) in 
the 1960s. Similarly the coefficients for the political 
competition variables for social welfare indicate that it did 
not respond to any of the competitive variables examined.
If we look at comparable data for Australia in terms of 
the relationship between political variables and expenditure 
(see Tables 5.4 and 6.1), the difference from the Canadian 
findings warrants explanation. One interpretation of this
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difference may lie in the fact that Canadian social security 
programmes became an accepted part of Canadian politics. 
Admittedly, in this connection there was much debate in the 
1950s (Bryden 1974), but social welfare policy changed
sharply because, once a universal social insurance programme 
was established, it entrenched itself politically: 
governments find it hard to ’wind back' such programmes 
once established. Indeed, as Stephens (1979) points out, a 
somewhat similar pattern can be discerned in Europe, where 
the 'frontiers' of politics have moved beyond social
insurance programmes to encompass other welfare measures. In 
Canada, too, it was clearly health policy which became a 
major part of welfare policy agenda in the 1960s (Taylor 
1978), and this is well reflected in our findings. These 
data (Table 6.2) point to the positive association between 
health expenditure and inter-party competition, and are 
incidentally consistent with a strategic actor conception of 
party, where the basis of competition shifts from one issue 
(social welfare) to another (health policy).
In the period under consideration in Canada there were 
five minority governments. These were the Conservative 
minority administrations of Diefenbaker in 1957 and 1962, the 
Liberal administrations of Pearson in 1963 and 1965 and the 
Trudeau administration of 1972. While we did not test 
directly for the impact of minority governments on 
expenditure, it could be reasonably expected that a sequence 
of minority governments would have contributed to a 'bidding 
up’ of welfare expenditure. This inference is supported by
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the stronger influence of parliamentary competition than of 
electoral competition on Canadian expenditure. The minority 
status of the governments intensified the parliamentary 
competition, with the incumbent government under constant 
threat of losing office.
This pattern of results also explains the influence of 
the NDP electoral share on expenditure. It will be recalled 
that one of our findings (see Chapter 6) was that the NDP 
electoral share was associated with parliamentary competition. 
If the influence of minority governments was critical in 
determining the level of parliamentary competition, then the 
NDP as the major third party would have strategic bargaining 
power. This finding is therefore supportive of a strategic 
notion of party.
Overall the strategic actor policy model is further 
strongly supported by the data relating to the impact of 
administration and competition on expenditure. These data 
suggest that, in considering the influence of 'partisanship' 
within a 'turnover' model, it is the strategic imperatives of
establishing new policy priorities rather than the
ideological composition of the party in power that are
important. Individual administrations, even of the same
party, reflected distinct patterns of expenditure priorities 
in Australia and Canada, lending further strength to the 
strategic actor model.
The influence of party competition does not appear to 
differ significantly between the two countries. But a major
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conclusion of the study was that the type of competition, 
that is, electoral or parliamentary competition, differed 
between the two countries. The influence of parliamentary 
competition in Canada was explained by reference to the 
fragmented nature of electoral support for the party. Other 
than this general systematic factor, the influence of 
minority governments is, as pointed out earlier, of paramount 
consideration in explaining this pattern of results.
It was argued that, by contrast in Australia, electoral 
competition was a major determinant of expenditure. Following 
from this, an inference may be drawn to the effect that, 
while political competition is not a function of the type of 
party system, the form of the competition may depend on it. 
Clearly what this points to is the need for more research on 
indicators of inter-party competition. Indeed, different 
indicators of inter-party competition may be conceptually 
linked to different aspects of the party system.
It will be recalled that in Chapter 1 the impact of 
'weak' and ’strong’ party systems on policy was identified as 
an important research issue. A proper consideration of this 
would inevitably lead to the evaluation of the two competing 
theories of party. The first of these, in the language of 
this research, advances the ‘structural’ viewpoint. This 
emphasises the importance of a 'strong' party system, defined 
in terms of clear socio-economic cleavages, ideological 
distinctiveness and organisational strength. Through the 
influence of this ‘strong’ party system factor, the variables 
of partisanship and competition, it is suggested, would have
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a greater impact on policy outcomes. But according to the 
alternative or competing viewpoint, i.e., the strategic actor 
conception in a ’weak' party system, partisanship and 
competition would apparently have little or no effect.
At the heart of this dispute between the strategic actor 
theorists (e.g., Schumpeter and Downs) and the structural 
theorists (e.g., Hibbs and Castles) is the question of the 
manner in which party policy is formulated. The structural 
perspective is consistent with the view that party policy is 
defined by the nature of the constituency served by the 
party. Party is an ’agent' for a given set of interests. The 
strategic actor conception, on the other hand, is consistent 
with a notion of parties as groups of ’autonomous actors’ 
responding to competition within the party system.
Indeed, one of the reasons for selecting Australia and 
Canada for purposes of comparison lay in the differences 
between these countries in regard to three main features that 
serve to define what we have termed ’strong' and ’weak’ party 
systems. These three defining features or characteristics 
are: first, the representation of interests (the Canadian 
party system is based on the representation of regional 
interests, and its parties are best viewed as brokerage 
parties, in contrast to the Australian party system, which is 
based on the representation of distinct economic interests); 
second, Canadian parties, unlike the Australian parties are 
not perceived as ideologically distinctive; third, Canadian 
federal parties are somewhat weaker organisationally than
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their Australian counterparts.
The results of the analysis sustain a strategic actor 
model of policy (Model 2) presented in Chapter 1. The 
evidence for the influence of 'administration' and 
'competition' on policy indicates that both factors are 
present in Australia and Canada. Administration and 
competition are not functions of the structure of the party 
system.
Having outlined the broad thrust of the findings of the 
study, it is pertinent to examine a methodological limitation 
of the similar system comparative design (see Chapter 3) 
utilised in the research. As identified previously, a main 
weakness of this type of design is that it controls for all 
factors that are thought not to contribute to a given set of 
outcomes. According to Rodgers (1979) the great advantage of 
comparative research is that propositions may be tested in a 
variety of settings and thereby lead to a gradual refining 
of propositions at specific levels of generality.
There are two different strategies that can be employed 
in examining public policy outputs. In one approach, that 
involving a contextual strategy, attempts would be made to 
examine policy in its historical and particular social 
contexts: see Heidenheimer et al. (1975) as an example of 
such an approach. Alternatively, as the approach used in 
this study exemplifies, we could examine the determinants 
of outputs and expenditure across a range of countries or 
within a time-series framework. Both these variants have 
their strengths and limitations. The main advantage of the
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approach used in this study is the ability to derive a set of 
propositions that can be rigorously tested in a wide variety 
of settings. Admittedly, a consequence of this mode of 
analysis is the neglect of the historical and political 
context in which policies are made. Ideally both kinds of 
approach should be employed to provide a fuller 
understanding of policy-making, but this is realisable only 
with the cumulation of specific types of research as carried 
out in this study.
7.4 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In sum, the findings of this study are potentially 
significant and valuable for developing distinct avenues of 
research, and these when taken jointly may provide a basis 
for charting new research directions for theories of policy: 
first, for the study of Australian and Canadian political 
systems in comparative perspective; and second for research 
on the changing concept of the 'welfare state’.
Before discussing these potential areas of future 
research, it should be noted that, from a conceptual and 
theoretical standpoint, this study has drawn pointed 
attention to the importance of party competition and strategy 
as critical elements in understanding policy, particularly 
policy outcomes. It would appear from what has been reported 
that the dominant influence on party policy is not so much 
the structure of the party system but the nature of 
competition. In other words, the emphasis in future studies
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relating to the role of ’party' in the analysis of policy 
developments must move from one that places causal 
significance on the structural basis of the party system to 
one that focuses on the processes of party competition. This 
perspective has several ramifications for the conception of 
democratic theory, and is consistent with the definition of 
democracy given by Schumpeter nearly 40 years ago, when he 
noted that
the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people's vote 
{1950: 173-174 in Quinton 1967).
Schumpeter’s standpoint is in sharp contrast to the orthodox
viewpoint, which defines democracy as an
institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions which realises the common good by making the 
people itself decide issues through the election of 
individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out 
its will (1950: 153, in Quinton 1967).
Adherence to the less conventional view of democracy, 
according to Schumpeter is expressed in terms of a struggle 
for a people's vote rather than a means of discerning the 
common good. This has two implications for the study of 
democracy and public policy. Firstly, it throws into sharp 
relief the importance of party strategy rather than the 
responsiveness of the party to its electoral base. Therefore 
this ’strategic democratic’ approach places greater emphasis 
on political factors such as competition and leadership 
rather than the sociological bases of parties. Secondly, it 
pays more heed to the manner in which individuals form 
electoral preferences. These conceptual consequences of the
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study must be taken into account in any evaluation of the 
influence of democratic participation and public policy. The 
conventional or structural account of the role of democratic 
politics in policy is underpinned by what Schumpeter (1950) 
calls the 'classical' definition of democracy. The thrust of 
this study has been to argue that the examination of policy 
formulation should be based on what has been described as a 
'strategic' definition of democracy. This perspective goes 
beyond the confines of this study to enrich our understanding 
of the dynamics of comparative public policy.
In the context of these research findings, we can now 
turn briefly to consider future areas of research. The first 
of these relates to the study of the Australian and Canadian 
political systems and the findings of this study may have a 
significant bearing upon, and value for, enhancing our 
understanding of these particular political systems. It will 
be recalled that in embarking on this comparative study, an 
overriding objective was the elucidation of politics of 
public policy in Australia and Canada.
Part of the impetus for this study came from Alford's 
classic (1964) work on class voting in Anglo-American 
democracies, in particular his emphasis on the presence of 
class cleavages in different degrees in Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand, and absence of class cleavages in Canada and 
the U.S.A. Although Alford's empirical analysis is now 
somewhat dated, his conclusions still continue to have 
much significance and force.
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A further set of intriguing contrasts (see Chapter 1) 
was the distinction between North American party systems and 
other party systems. The work of Schlesinger (1965) and 
Epstein (1968) in particular has drawn attention to this 
perceived geographical compartmentalisation of party systems. 
The party systems are said to differ in terms of the mode of 
representation of interests. North American parties are 
viewed as 'brokers' between different interests and the 
political system, rather than representing and aggregating 
social and economic interests. As a consequence, North 
American parties are difficult to distinguish ideologically. 
Additionally, these party organisations are also weaker than 
party organisations in competitive systems elsewhere in the 
world. This geographical compartmentalisation corresponds 
roughly to the analytical distinction between structural and 
strategic actor perspectives utilised in the present 
research.
Apart from this general literature, the Canadian 
political science literature, as stated in Chapter 1, 
perceived parties as brokers and agents of accommodation. 
The sources of weakness of the Canadian model, according to 
some writers are structural (Porter 1965) mainly because of 
the failure to assess the influence of class-based factors. 
Because the Australian parties are in many ways the 
antithesis of their Canadian counterparts, particularly as 
regards representation, ideology and organisation, we are in 
the fortunate position of being able to examine this implicit 
assumption in much of the Canadian political science
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literature.
The stability of the party system also presents 
additional grounds for contrasting Australia and Canada. In 
comparative terms, Australian parties have a high degree of 
stability at both the aggregate and individual level. As 
Aitkin correctly observes:
The party system has taken in its stride the changing 
balance of federal state relations, and the 
dislocations caused by two world wars and major 
economic depression... the images of the parties and 
the rhetoric of party conflict have been very stable 
for more than two generations. Stability is 
characteristic of the whole party system (1977: 3).
As against this the comparable Canadian survey evidence
of Clarke et al. (1980) shows that in relative terms the
Canadian party system does not exhibit a great deal of
stability. Indeed, on a continuum Australia and Canada would
lie on the extremes.
One final element of the Australian and Canadian
dichotomy relates to what can be termed the 'cultural’ 
dimension. The evidence here is rather tenuous, and more 
subjective than the other contrasts mentioned above.
However, the works of Horowitz (1966) and Hancock (1929) 
point to the persistence of different ideological traditions 
of state intervention in the two countries, particularly to 
the dominance in Canada of traditions of liberalism and 
conservatism and in Australia the presence of a utilitarian 
(social liberal) tradition which has underpinned state 
intervention.
These several contrasting features between the two
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countries serve to indicate that the policies produced by the 
party system would be markedly different. Given the range of 
contrasts, one is struck by the extent to which the two 
countries have produced similar sets of results for the 
different political variables examined in this study. There 
are, of course, important differences in the directions of 
the coefficients for expenditure categories, and these have 
been discussed in the individual chapters. But the dominant 
impression gained from this study is of two nations whose 
politics are broadly similar in the determination of policy 
output.
This general impression is certainly contrary to the 
traditional standpoint of Australian and Canadian literature. 
From a comparative perspective it would appear that Canadian 
parties are as influential in the determination of policy 
outcomes as parties that are differently structured. This in 
turn suggests that ideological and cultural factors might 
not be as important in policy formulation as the literature 
suggests.
A point of caution is needed here in the use of terms 
such as 'similar' and 'different' in comparative politics. 
These terms take on meaning only in a given context. The 
rather simple Wittgensteinian proposition is that Australia 
and Canada seem 'similar' in the context of social policy 
outputs. This does not imply that the differences between the 
two are not insignificant. However it does suggest that 
they are worth investigating in order to determine whether 
these differences lead to outcomes which are markedly
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different.
More generally, the overriding conclusion we wish to 
draw is that the two nations are similar in terms of the 
political determinants of expenditure because the political 
parties are governed by a common set of ’strategic’ 
interests. Consequently the study suggests that, apart from 
the analysis of structural differences, emphasis should be 
laid on the manner in which party strategies are formed.
This last observation points to a key systematic 
conclusion that may be drawn from this study, and this 
relates to particular analyses of 'welfare state’ 
development. The political science literature on the welfare 
state (see for example the orientation of Bryden 1974, 
Falcone 1974 and Kornberg et al. 1972 for Canada; and Jones 
1983 and Graycar 1979 for Australia), despite its substantial 
contribution to the study of the welfare state policy 
development, is notably deficient in its analysis of welfare 
politics. In particular, it lacks significant analysis of the 
role of party strategy and competition in welfare state 
policy development.
In this context, one promising line of research lies in 
the examination of how different types of welfare structures 
shape the nature of policy strategies. As an instance of 
this, we may note from the findings of this study that 
Canadian social welfare is insulated from political changes 
largely because of its character and raison d'etre as a 
universal contributory scheme. This in turn has provided
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limited room for ’bidding up' welfare expenditure.
As a final reflection on the limitation of the data used 
in this analysis, it could be argued that the expenditure 
categories utilised are far too broad-ranging and need 
greater disaggregation. This point has also been expressed by 
Rose (1981) and Peters and Heisler (1981). There are two 
lines of defence to this argument. First, much of the policy 
output literature does in fact utilise the range of broad 
aggregative categories. Indeed this study has a greater 
degree of disaggregation than most of the studies in the 
field. Furthermore there is a more practical problem of 
comparability involved in greater aggregation. The second 
point, more in the nature of a methodological argument is 
that the degree of aggregation depends critically on the 
research problem. If one is doing a piece of social policy 
research it is imperative that specific programmes are 
analysed in more piecemeal fashion rather than presented as 
broad categories. On the other hand, if the research is 
focussed more generally on macro issues such as the source 
of welfare expenditure determinants, the level of aggregation 
has to be greater.
More generally, in terms of a theory of policy 
formulation, this study is important and valuable in that it 
highlights two main issues that deserve closer scrutiny in 
theory construction. First is the need to build into policy 
models a conception of bureaucratic behaviour. While this 
study has attempted to do this in a limited way by examining 
the role of ’incrementalism' in policy determination, it is
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also the case that this is perhaps one of the few available 
indicators of the influence of bureaucracy. However, a more 
precise and detailed specification of bureaucratic 
constraints should be considered in future research.
The second issue useful in outlining a new theory of 
policy revolves round the conception of party that underlies 
research of this nature. Sartori (1969) pointed out twenty 
years ago that analysis must move from a sociological 
conception of parties to a model which allows parties a 
greater degree of autonomy. In the case of the analysis of 
social expenditure this would involve placing greater 
emphasis on delineating the 'strategic’ issues that concern 
the electorate. The emphasis then would move from the 
interests that parties serve to a consideration of party 
strategy. A connected issue arising from this is the need in 
aggregate policy output studies to take greater account of 
individual level data.
But these matters, like others addressed in these 
concluding remarks, remain to be explored. This thesis has 
highlighted some of the central issues of a new research 
agenda. It opens a window on a new and promising research 
frontier.
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APPENDIX 1
DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE DATA AND DATA SOURCES
This Appendix sets out the sources of data used in the 
empirical analysis. In the expenditure data, the figures 
relate to broad categories of spending rather than to 
specific programmes. The political data pertains to federal 
rather than the provincial or state arena.
AUSTRALIA
A) Expenditure: Australian Federal Expenditure
W.E. Norton and M.W. Brodie, Australian Economic 
Statistics, 1949-50 tog 1978-79. Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Occasional Papers, No 8a.- 42.
The figures before 1964 have been collated by reference to:
Annual Budget Papers. (various years) A.G.P.S.
Statistical Year Books, (various years) A.G.P.S.
The data after 1978 have been updated by
W.Norton and P. Kennedy, Australian Economic Statistics 
1944-1950 to 1984-1985. Reserve Bank of Australia.
Also consulted
The Annual Reports (various years) of the Departments 
of Social Welfare, Health and Education.
B) Economic and Social Data
W.E. Norton and M. Brodie, Australian Economic 
Statistics (updated for 1979 and 1980, by W.E. Norton 
and Kennedy cited above).
Also consulted for population and demographic data.-
Population of Australia published by ESCAP, United 
Nations. Country Monograph Series, No. 7.
Hugo, G. (1980) Australia’s Changing Population:
Trends and Implications. Oxford University Press.
Statistical Year Books (various years) A.G.P.S.
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C) Politics
C. Hughes and B. Graham A Handbook of Australian 
Politics 1890-1964, and supplements.
CANADA
A) Expenditure: Canadian Federal Expenditure
F.H. Lacey, (1983) (ed.) Historical Statistics of
Canada, (2nd edn). (M.C. Urquhart and K.A. Buckley,
eds, 1st edn), Statistics Canada, Expenditure Series, 
No 19-34.
Also consulted:
R. Bird, (1970) The Growth of Government Spending in 
Canada. Canadian Tax Foundation.
Statistics Canada, Federal Government Finances 
(various years).
OECD (1978), Public Expenditure Trends, Paris.
B) Economic and Social Data
Historical Statistics of Canada. 2nd edn, cited 
above.
Also consulted for population and demographic data:
Population by Age and Sex, 1921-1975 - revised annual 
estimates of population in Canada and the Provinces. 
Statistics, Canada (Statistics Canada, Catalogue 
Numbers, 91-512).
Also consulted:
Statistical Year Books for Canada (various years).
C) Politics
Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd edn (cited above).
Appendix 1 in C. Winn and J. McMenemy (1976) (eds) 
Political Parties in Canada
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Appendix A in I. Smith (1985) "Party Government, 
Representation and National Integration in Canada". 
In P. Aucoin (1985) (ed.) Party Government and
Regional Representation in Canada: 54-57.
FOR BOTH COUNTRIES:
A) Expenditure
OECD (1976a) Public Expenditure on Incomeg Maintenance 
Programmes. Paris
OECD (1976b) Public Expenditure on Education. Paris 
OECD (1977) Public Expenditure on Health. Paris 
OECD (1978) Public Expenditure Trends. Paris.
B) Economic and Social Data
OECD (various years) Economic Surveys. OECD, Paris.
OECD (1979a) National Accounts of OECD Countries 
(96 1977) 2 Vols, OECD, Paris.
OECD (1979b) Measuring Employment and Unemployment. 
OECD, Paris.
Note on the Specification of the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in the analysis of Tables 
4.2, 4.3, 5.4, 5.5, 6.1 and 6.2 has been calculated in the
following manner (where ’x' and *y' are expenditures):-
deflated
Nominal x ------ > to real x^
deflated
Nominal y ------ > to real y
Then the difference between x^- and y forms the basis for 
the creation of the dependent variable1
Note: (i) Nominal expenditure has been deflated by CPI.
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APPENDIX 3
TABLE 3.1
Raw Expenditure Data: Australia
(Nominal Expenditures in millions of $s)
Year
Social
Welfare Education Health
Total
Expenditure
1950 237.876 2.671 28.444 0441
1951 283.317 3.215 44.552 0526
1952 322.652 7.768 57.779 0722
1953 353.100 7.743 66.194 0647
1954 395.198 8.505 76.362 0724
1955 420.887 9.345 88.841 0789
1956 470.013 10.447 99.213 0837
1957 490.829 12.573 105.077 0930
1958 540.105 15.949 98.604 0993
1959 578.149 19.979 141.018 1020
1960 619.250 23.515 164.640 1132
1961 686.216 29.707 184.349 1202
1962 743.618 35.357 206.134 1142
1963 769.509 40.396 224.378 1227
1964 844.404 46.317 244.234 1310
1965 875.634 62.305 265.315 1460
1966 923.554 73.433 297.871 1585
1967 993.961 88.324 322.562 1672
1968 1025.742 102.591 347.780 1817
1969 1118.502 117.961 383.132 2004
1970 1250.294 153.539 446.591 2213
1971 1378.000 298.000 559.000 2470
1972 1597.000 349.000 687.000 2499
1973 2100.000 442.000 783.000 2595
1974 2493.000 852.000 947.000 3184
1975 3749.000 1652.000 1283.000 3792
1976 5077.000 1846.000 2953.000 4877
1977 6431.000 2160.000 2543.000 5523
1978 7490.000 2355.000 2698.000 5874
1979 8144.000 2493.000 2901.000 7172
1980 8748.000 2611.000 3169.000 9300
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TABLE 3.2
Raw Expenditure Data: Canada
(Nominal Expenditures in millions of $s)
Year
Social
Welfare Education Health
Total
Expenditur
1945 0284 016 0002 02316
1946 0333 016 0006 02364
1947 0365 010 0008 02196
1948 0386 005 0019 02175
1949 0445 004 0030 02449
1950 0477 005 0033 02901
1951 0545 012 0041 03759
1952 0747 Oil 0045 04646
1953 0782 010 0050 04722
1954 0817 010 0053 04657
1955 0853 010 0056 04787
1956 0896 021 0062 05218
1957 1047 072 0065 05482
1958 1202 034 0132 05951
1959 1262 034 0227 06278
1960 1328 029 0270 06551
1961 1423 058 0367 07145
1962 1565 246 0393 07305
1963 1666 175 0452 07681
1964 1783 138 0498 08104
1965 1891 029 0373 08662
1966 2222 090 0447 09871
1967 2586 114 0549 11260
1968 2817 287 0674 12309
1969 3121 315 0922 13662
1970 3496 462 1193 15084
1971 3938 561 1476 17046
1972 4218 588 1643 18645
1973 6154 617 1798 22839
1974 7811 641 2121 29245
1975 8902 701 2544 33979
305
APPENDIX 4
MODELS OF POLICY OUTPUT
In terms of Dye’s (1978) framework policy Dye policy 
output models can be thought of as the interaction between 
the environment and the political system in producing a given 
set of outcomes. policy output. In diagrammatic terms the 
model, following Falcone, (1974: 25-27), can be presented 
thus :
DIAGRAM 4.1
General Policy Output Model
Environment Public Policy
The linkages suggest several plausible as well as 
implausible models which have been used in the literature. 
Indeed this reciprocal association remains a fertile subject 
of study for future research.
Three models of the possible linkages between these 
variables can be discerned from the literature. Falcone 
(1974) refers to these as the sequential environmental, the 
environmental and the hybrid environmental models. In the 
diagrammatic representation of each of these models presented 
below, a weak linkage between variables is denoted by a 
broken line (- - - ).
The sequential environmental model takes the following 
form:-
DIAGRAM 4.2
Model 1: Sequential Environmental Model
Politics
/
✓
Environment ^  
Inputs
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In this model, environmental factors are mediated through 
the political system. While there are hardly any studies 
which confirm or are based solely on this model, there are 
many others which have stressed the need for the presence of 
certain socio-economic variables, before aspects of political 
competition critical to the determination of policy output 
can come into play. Wilensky’s (1975) study of welfare is 
one such study: he notes the critical role of economic 
development in fostering welfare state growth. Briefly, the 
thrust of his argument is that after a certain level of 
economic development, political determinants such as the 
degree of centralization become significant in influencing 
the level of welfare expenditure.
Secondly, the environmental model could be diagrammed as 
follows:-
DIAGRAM 4.3
Model 2: Environmental Model
/
/
/
Environmental«^
Inputs
Politics  ^ \
\
\X----------------Policy Output
The principal determinants of welfare expenditure in 
this model are socio-economic forces which may influence 
the nature and structure of political competition. However, 
the significance of politics itself is marginal. The central 
determinants of welfare expenditure are environmental 
variables which include a wide variety of social and economic 
factors. A feature in many of these studies is the 
importance of the level of economic development.
The third model is that of the hybrid environment" which 
may be diagrammed as follows:-
DIAGRAM 4.4
Model 3: Hybrid-Environmental Model
Environment
Inputs
/Politics
/
/
/
/
/_________________ Policy Output
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In these models a key feature is that both political and 
economic factors play an important role in determining policy 
output. While analysts differ on the relative importance of 
environmental and political determinants, few would claim exclusivity for either in determining the scope and level of 
policy output, an exception to this being the early studies 
of state politics of Key (1951) and Lockard (1963) (also see 
Jewell, (1962) who argued that the political arena was vital 
for processing demands.
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